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Abstract 
 
In the UK, accidents associated with maritime, aviation and rail transport are 
conducted by the Inspectors of Accidents at the Marine, Air and Rail Accident 
Investigation Branches.  
 
A review of current academic literature provides little insight into the qualities 
and attributes essential for the role of accident investigator.  A wealth of 
material exists about accidents themselves but as yet, a study into the profile of 
the accident investigator has not been conducted. 
 
This research sought to determine the requisite skills and behaviours of an 
effective accident investigator based upon a three-phased, primarily qualitative, 
methodology.  Content analysis was used to determine task and non-task 
specific themes from semistructured interviews conducted with accident 
investigators from the UK and the US, the findings of which are characterized 
by individualism and variability: the former having implications for effective 
teamwork and the latter indicating the paucity of structured analysis processes 
in use, which would lead to reproducible and transparent results.  
 
Repertory Grid interviews elicited five competency themes and one hundred 
attendant behavioural indicators which were employed during the final phase of 
the research to determine their relative importance in terms of recruitment, 
training and the superior investigator. 
 
The findings showed that it was believed essential to consider interpersonal and 
communication skills, cognitive abilities and personal attributes during 
recruitment and that technical skills were deemed to be most amenable to 
change through training interventions with personal abilities least likely. Further 
thematic analysis of highly rated behavioural indicators showed an emphasis on 
report writing and dealing with people.  These findings have implications for 
recruitment with a need for non-technical competencies such as report writing 
and the ability to deal with people to be more prevalent in selection testing and 
decision-making. 
 
No specific skills or behaviours were found to distinguish superior performance 
in investigation, instead requiring a balance of competencies.  With no defining 
threshold, the researcher proposed that superior performance should be 
measured “relative to mission” and is more usefully thought of an added value 
continuum rather than a set of discrete skills and behaviours.  Evidence was 
provided to demonstrate how the organizational structure and philosophy 
influenced the working styles of the Inspectorate and therefore the expected 
skills and behaviours. 
 
The researcher advocates the combination of the competency framework and 
behavioural indicators derived with an extant Branch competence measure to 
strengthen the tools whilst responding to a call in the literature for a more 
blended approach to determining competences and competencies. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
In the UK, the responsibility for conducting investigations into the causes of 
accidents and serious incidents associated with marine, air and rail transport 
falls to three organizations, under the aegis of the Department for Transport.  
These are the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), the Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch (AAIB) and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), 
respectively. 
 
There has been a long-established relationship spanning three decades 
between Cranfield University, as a training provider, and the Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch.  The University ran its first accident investigation course in 
1977; initially conceived and developed in association with the Chief of Air 
Accidents due to the increasing strain placed upon the Branch by requests for 
assistance for training by foreign agencies (Tench, 1985).  Principally designed 
for civil aircraft accident investigation, its syllabus and scope has widened to 
include military accidents and in recent years has been „enhanced‟ through 
collaboration with the MAIB and RAIB to incorporate the investigation of 
accidents in other modes of transport.  
 
The three Branches provide strategic guidance for the ongoing development of 
the accident investigation training, and the Cranfield Aviation Safety Centre as a 
whole, through close involvement as an industry advisory board. 
 
As part of this relationship, the Branches agreed to support doctoral research 
with a view to better understanding the skills and attributes essential for 
effective performance of the role of accident investigator. Funding was made 
available from each of the Branches as well as from the Department of Air 
Transport at Cranfield University. 
 
Accident investigation is a demanding role drawing upon not only technical 
expertise and experience but as importantly, ability and personal attributes.  
Establishing an appropriate mix of expertise, experience and specific skills 
through the recruitment and training process remains a challenge to the 
Branches.  The recruitment and training costs associated with employing new 
investigators are high so it is imperative for the Branches that those selected at 
interview are appropriate for the role and will be retained.   
 
1.2 Context 
 
Statistically, travel by marine, air and rail transport is relatively safe within the 
UK.  UK transport statistics published in 2008 by the Department for Transport 
show that in terms of number of fatalities, the three transport modes collectively 
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resulted in 48 deaths, in comparison with 2946 fatalities associated with road 
transport.  These figures, however, belie the total number of serious incidents 
and accident reports published. 
 
Each Accident Investigation Branch (AIB) operates as a separate autonomous 
entity reporting through to the Secretary of State for Transport, with varying 
cultures, history and operational procedures but sharing a common remit: the 
independent and impartial determination of the facts surrounding the causes of 
accidents and serious incidents, in order to make safety recommendations 
intended to prevent recurrence and preserve life.  It is not, it is emphasized, to 
apportion blame or liability. 
 
Employing collectively more than 150 people, the AIBs have a reputation for 
integrity, impartiality and credibility, not only in the UK but internationally.  The 
accident investigators, or Inspectors of Accidents as they are called in the UK, 
are drawn from a specialist population.  Such is the desireability of the role that 
it attracts the very best of the industry bringing with them a wealth of knowledge 
and experience. 
 
The accident investigators at the AIBs are known collectively as the 
Inspectorate.  The organizational structure is relatively flat with respect to 
hierarchy, the main grades being:  Inspector/Senior Inspector (seniority title 
appears to be given after period of employment); Principal Inspector 
(responsible for the man-management of the Inspectors and the individual 
investigations); Deputy Chief Inspector and Chief Inspector responsible for day-
to-day running of the Branch and political and strategic overview respectively.   
 
The three Chief Inspectors form a Board of Transport Accident Investigators to 
pursue joint initiatives, identify opportunities to share best practice and the 
efficient use of shared resources. (MAIB, 2008a). 
 
UK Inspectors are typically drawn from a professionally qualified and 
experienced cohort within their particular industry. 
 
Marine Inspectors will be selected from nautical, engineering, naval architecture 
and fishing disciplines. Required qualifications and experience include: Class 1 
Deck Officer Certificate of Competency, a degree or equivalent in a relevant 
subject, and considerable experience at sea including some as Master; Class 1 
Engineer Officer Certificate of Competency, a degree in mechanical or marine 
engineering and experience of merchant vessel operation at a senior level at 
sea or ashore; degree in Naval Architecture, ideally with Chartered Engineer 
status, significant experience in a position of responsibility in an establishment 
involved in shipbuilding and survey, ship operations, ship repair, ship design or 
research (MAIB, 2008b). 
 
Air accident investigators historically fell into one of two camps: flight operations 
or engineering.  With the advent and development of flight data recorders, a 
third category of Inspector has emerged.   
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Operations Inspectors hold a current Airline Transport Pilots‟ Licence with a 
valid Class 1 medical certificate.  They are typically able to offer extensive 
command experience on fixed wing aircraft or helicopters and will maintain 
currency by continuing to fly.  Engineering Inspectors must hold an Engineering 
degree and/or be a Chartered Engineer with a minimum of five years' post 
qualifications experience. They are encouraged and supported to learn to fly. 
 
The third and more recent category, the Flight Data Recorder Inspector will 
have attained first degree level in Electronics or Electrical Engineering or an 
Aeronautical Engineering related subject and/or will be a chartered member of a 
relevant engineering institute with at least eight years' experience since 
qualifying. (AAIB, 2008). 
 
There are no comparable operator‟s qualifications for the newly formed RAIB to 
draw upon.  Their recruitment requirements look for a degree in a relevant 
discipline or equivalent professional experience, with membership of a relevant 
professional institution.  There is an expectation of a minimum of eight years‟ 
experience post qualifying. (RAIB, 2008). 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
 
A wealth of material exists about accidents and accident investigation; the 
majority of texts on the subject include a detailed breakdown and analysis of 
events with varying degrees of conjecture.  These do not, however, cast much 
light on the skills and behaviours of those undertaking the task (Tench, 1985; 
Owen 1998). 
 
Generalizations regarding the significance and complexity of the role are made 
and lists of adjectives provided (Taylor, 1996) but the researcher was unable to 
find previous academic work regarding the qualities and attributes specific to 
the role. 
 
When constructing a model of an occupational role, there are a number of 
perspectives from which to approach the task.  An individual can be described 
by the specific tasks that comprise the role, the behaviour exhibited whilst 
performing the task and the psychological constructs employed.  These three 
differences in approach have formed the basic philosophy behind the numerous 
occupational analysis techniques available for use. 
 
One of the approaches to understanding and measuring desired behaviours in 
the workplace is the use of a competency framework.  Competencies are 
essentially the key characteristics or behavioural capabilities that the most 
successful performers have that make them successful (Kessler, 2006).  At 
least half of the Fortune 500 and other major organizations in the US, Europe 
and internationally are said to be using competency-based systems for 
selection and appraisal (Kessler, 2006), with upward of 95% of the UK Civil 
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Service, to whom the Inspectorate belong, having adopted or in the process of 
adopting competency-based management (Horton, 2000b).  
 
„Competency‟ should not, however, be confused with the term „competence‟ for, 
as shall be discussed in more detail during the course of this thesis, they are in 
fact distinct in terms of their focus, purpose and what they purport to summarize 
(Wood and Payne, 1998).   
 
Rowe (1995) defines it thus: “Competence [is] a skill and the standard of 
performance reached while competency refers to the behaviour by which it is 
achieved.  In other words, one describes what people can do while the other 
focuses on how they do it.”  This is reiterated by Woodruffe (1990) who 
delineates between competence which defines the area of work at which a 
person is competent, and competency as the dimensions of behaviour 
underlying competent performance. 
 
The confusion surrounding terminology in this area stems largely from the 
historical context of two seemingly divergent approaches in the US and UK.  In 
essence, the US „competency‟ model emphasizes the personal characteristics 
of superior performers, typically but not exclusively drawn from the 
management population whereas in contrast, the UK construct of „competence‟ 
is task or output focused: it is the job that is deconstructed to its minima not the 
individual‟s attributes. 
 
There is tendency to conflate the terms by the use of both „competence‟ and 
„competency‟ which, dependent upon the perspective, can either be used 
interchangeably or exist as completely separate entities with entirely different 
precursors and results (Woodruffe, 1990; Rowe, 1995; Rankin, 2001).   
 
The sponsors expressed an interest in undertaking research into Inspectors‟ 
competency but the terms „competence‟ and „competency‟ were used in 
reference to differing activities by the three Branches.  As the requirement to 
articulate the research objectives became more pressing, it became apparent 
that this was not simply a question of semantics; differing perspectives in terms 
of the focus and direction of the research began to be expressed. 
 
Additionally, each of the three UK AIBs was individually involved with projects 
which had implications for the study and a consultancy had been employed to 
develop a competency framework although this was never concluded. 
 
Given the amount of work already being undertaken in the area, there appeared 
to be diminishing room for unassisted innovative research.  In order to produce 
work that was original, the researcher stepped outside of the original „remit‟ of 
developing a competency framework for the Branches and chose to review the 
role of the accident investigator in a broader context.  
 
There were also conflictions with regards to the understanding of what 
constituted doctoral research and how that differed from short term consultancy 
5 
work in terms of timescales and deliverables.  The initial stages of the research 
were, therefore, characterized by a requirement to manage expectations and 
develop a mutually agreeable compromise. 
 
The focus of this study is upon the three UK AIBs, although the researcher was 
keen to look at their work within the context of the global accident investigation 
industry.  The findings of the research are limited to the Branches, but during 
the course of the study the researcher took the opportunity to talk with 
representatives from regulatory authorities, operators, manufacturers and other 
investigation agencies to gain an alternative perspective.  Whilst this material 
does not form part of the research data per se, it provided insight into the 
interfaces between the AIBs and the organizations with whom they work. 
 
The researcher wanted to explore whether the context in which the accident 
investigation took place had any bearing on the effectiveness of the outcome.  
This was sought within the history of the three Branches, legislation governing 
accident investigation and the wider European and international influences. 
 
This research project, therefore, seeks to determine the requisite skills, qualities 
and behaviours in an effective accident investigator where effective is defined 
as producing the result that is intended: that is, a thorough, impartial, 
evidentially-based analysis of events with proportionate recommendations for 
change.  This will be based upon analysis of the role of the investigator in terms 
of competencies required to perform generalized investigation tasks.  The 
research will also look at how superior performance might be distinguished in 
investigation. Psychological constructs will be excluded from the study unless 
they can be directly inferred from behaviour. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
This is not an evaluative study in as much as the organizations and the 
Inspectorate, in particular, involved in this research are not being ranked, rated 
or assessed as to competence. 
 
The research study has been broken down into three individual but 
complementary phases; the results of the former phase informing the next.  
 
The first stage, Phase 1, called for an exploratory study: “… to find out what is 
happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions; to assess phenomena in a 
new light and to generate ideas and hypotheses for future research” (Robson, 
2002). This allowed the researcher to become more familiar with the subject 
and context, enabling a better understanding of the research question through 
the use of semistructured interviews, literature reviews, background research 
and observation. 
 
Phase 2 utilized the findings from Phase 1 to conduct more in-depth interviews 
with Principal Inspectors to determine their perceptions regarding behavioural 
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indicators of effectiveness in accident investigation.  Behavioural indicators are 
a description of either a positive or negative behaviour that illustrates the 
possession or not of a competency (Honey, 1982).  This was achieved by 
employing the Repertory Grid technique to structure interviews and elicit 
responses. 
 
Subsequent to this stage of the research, the RAIB felt unable to continue to 
support the research at a time when resources were more usefully employed in 
shaping the operation.  Their withdrawal from the research was regrettable as 
their inclusion would have offered a valuable additional perspective as well as 
an opportunity to study how the shape and structure of a newly formed 
organization might influence the investigative process. 
 
The final phase of the research, Phase 3, again employed the findings from the 
previous phase and sought to quantify the relative importance of these 
behavioural indicators for the role of accident investigator, in particular in terms 
of recruitment, training and the superior investigator.   
 
The small sample meant that quantitative comparisons could only ever be 
suggestive (Freeman, 2003) and the researcher felt that a methodology that 
was predominantly qualitative in nature was more appropriate.  Such an 
approach focuses upon interpretation rather than quantification, seeking to 
describe and understand as opposed to explain and predict.  A flexible 
methodology was employed as it allowed for “progressive focusing” with 
concepts developing during research (Hall and Hall, 1996). 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, the contents of each is outlined below. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis, setting out the research background, context 
and objectives including an overview of the methodology.  It also informs as to 
the structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
The literature review further establishes the context in which the investigation of 
accidents takes place, both in the UK and internationally.  It discusses the 
history and development of the UK Accident Investigation Branches within their 
industry, outlining the governing legislation that sets their purpose and shapes 
their output.  The accident investigation process and the role of the investigator 
within that process are outlined and the chapter concludes with an overview of 
the terms competence, competency and job analysis as important concepts in 
determining and describing effectiveness in accident investigation. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter sets out the three complementary phases of the research, each 
phase informing the next.  Commencing with a discussion regarding the 
underpinning philosophical considerations and their influence on the 
methodology, the three phases of the research are then explained.  Phase 1 
involves the use of semistructured interviews with UK AIB Inspectors as well as 
US equivalent National Transportation Safety Board investigators to gather 
detailed information regarding the investigation process and the role of the 
accident investigator; Phase 2 uses in-depth Repertory Grid interviews to elicit 
polar constructs and resultant competency themes and behavioural indicators 
from the Principal Inspectors; and Phase 3 utilizes those indicators to determine 
their importance in terms of recruitment, training and the superior investigator 
by way of a questionnaire administered to the MAIB and AAIB Inspectors. 
 
Chapter 4: Phase 1 Analysis 
Each phase of the research is analysed and the results discussed in context.  
Phase 1 utilizes content analysis and coding to determine task and non-task 
specific themes which are illustrated by verbatim exemplars.   
 
Chapter 5:   Phase 2 Analysis 
Phase 2 content analysis reveals constructs and behavioural indicators which 
are categorized by competency theme: interpersonal and communication skills; 
work activity management; personal attributes; cognitive abilities; and technical 
abilities.   
 
Chapter 6:  Phase 3 Analysis 
The analysis of the Phase 3 questionnaire reveals further background 
information regarding the Inspectors as well as their ratings of the individual 
behavioural indicators in terms of recruitment, training and the superior 
investigator. 
 
Chapter 7: Discussion 
This chapter of the thesis seeks to synthesize the various elements of the 
research; to further consolidate the knowledge acquired during the course of the 
study and to determine what the implications are for this knowledge.  
 
The chapter discusses how well the research design performed and 
summarizes the salient findings within the context of the AIBs.  It concludes with 
consideration of the overall limitations of the present study as well as 
opportunities for further research. 
 
Chapter 8:  Conclusions 
The final chapter provides a summation of the research, highlighting the most 
significant findings.   
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2.0 Literature Review 
 
2.1  Why investigate accidents? 
 
Accident investigation serves to satisfy one of the most fundamental 
perturbations of mankind: the fear of the unknown.  Nietzsche (1908) described 
the “cause–creating drive” as the feeling of fear but “… to trace something 
unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives 
moreover a feeling of power”.  Society‟s need to find a „cause‟ stems from an 
overwhelming desire to control and show certainty: to regain the security and 
confidence of feeling derived from an advance in our body of knowledge. “First 
principle: any explanation is better than none.” (Nietzsche, 1908).   
 
The public‟s response to accidents “… often seems to require a stimulus that is 
immediate, close at hand and dramatic.” (Haddon et al, 1964).  Haddon et al 
continue that accidents remained the only source of morbidity viewed “… in 
essentially extra rational terms.  „Luck‟, „chance‟ and „acts of God‟ are all 
culturally acceptable explanations of accidents.” 
 
Less philanthropically, we are living in what has become known as an 
increasingly litigious society.  Whether this litigious society is a reflection of a 
reluctance to admit fault coupled with an inability to accept that accidents may 
not be as a result of the actions or inactions of others is unclear.  “Everywhere 
accountability is sought, it is usually the instinct for punishing and judging that 
seeks it.” (Nietzsche, 1908).  
 
There has, however, been a shift towards a compensation-oriented society, 
driving the desire “… to treat every death as chargeable to someone‟s account, 
every accident as caused by someone‟s criminal negligence” (Douglas, 1992).  
Douglas asserts that this is indicative of a “pervasive individualist culture” and 
that we are living through “adversarial times”.  This is supported by an ever-
decreasing political and public tolerance for accidents (Kirchsteiger, 2004). 
 
Approaching the question from a less philosophical stance, Kletz (1993) 
provides four reasons for investigating accidents: moral; pragmatic; economic; 
and image.  Perhaps most importantly we have a moral duty to prevent future 
accidents and to preserve life.  It is, also, practically effective to share data and 
information that can erode our „infinite ignorance‟ (Popper, 1963).  Accidents 
are expensive both financially and as a result of loss of image – the whole 
industry suffers when one company has a serious accident. Stoop (2003b), on 
the other hand, states that accident investigations serve generally as 
performance indicators for policy making and supply data for scientific research. 
 
Harvey (1985) outlines five purposes of investigating accidents.  Firstly, there 
are legal requirements which dictate which accidents must be investigated, 
particularly subsequent to the violation of prescribed codes.  Secondly, it 
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enables the description of the events – the identification of a “… complete set of 
facts.”  The efficacy of this identification and the construction of an accident 
narrative is predicated upon an inference of objectivity by the accident 
investigator, with the knowledge and experience to recognize which „facts‟ are 
relevant and pertinent, and which are not. 
 
Prevention is perhaps the most often stated motivator behind accident 
investigation (ICAO, 2001; van Vollenhoven, 2002) where changes to a 
condition are proposed based on findings, satisfying the moral aspect proffered 
by Kletz (1993). 
 
Harvey continues with research as a purpose for investigation but stresses the 
need for a complete and reliable data set for like-for-like comparison across 
different data sets – a task not without its difficulties. 
 
Harvey finally alludes to the identification of cause but suggests that this is often 
subject to bias, conjecture and inference, serving little purpose other than to 
determine culpability - a view often cited (Johnson, 2003; Rimson, 2004).   
 
The drivers for the investigation will impact the shape of the process and 
therefore the saliency of specific information and ultimately the outcome.  The 
accident model adopted is thought to influence the data collected, acting as a 
filter or bias (Leveson, 2004).  
 
In the UK, the three Accident Investigation Branches cite their fundamental 
purpose to be to determine or identify circumstances and causes. It is not their 
remit to determine criminal or civil culpability nor do they become involved with 
organizational disciplinary procedures. Their focus is singularly upon 
establishing what has occurred.   
 
There are however, dissenting voices with regards to the pursuit of cause; the 
concept representing a fundamental difference in approach between 
international investigative agencies.  
 
The National Transportation Safety Board in the US, for example, propose the 
establishment of “probable cause” as a deliverable from their accident 
investigations but, by contrast, as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
contest, the term “cause” – whether probable or not – can be confused with 
legal causality.  They prefer to present their results in terms of findings and 
significant factors to avoid any inference of blame or liability.  The recent ICAO 
Accident Investigation and Prevention Divisional Meeting in 2008 emphasized 
the polarity of opinion with regards to the definition of „cause‟: a suggested 
compromise was to include the addition of contributory factors, but even that did 
not satisfy all parties. (ICAO, 2008). 
 
“The idea of a single cause is the fixation of the media”. (Miller quoted in Faith, 
2001).  Cause suggests the existence of an absolute truth which is impossible 
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to demonstrate for as Kletz (2006) states, “Accident reports are rather like 
Rorschach inkblots.  Different people see different underlying causes.” 
 
“Only litigants argue the merit of probable cause” (Benner, 2008).  The 
establishment of cause with regards to accident investigations has unwittingly 
led to the inference of culpability and blame; there is an “… implicit normative 
notion of blame or liability” in the term (Stoop, 2003a).   Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the aviation industry.  RAND (Sarsfield et al, 2000) in their 
lengthy study of how the NTSB operates concluded that “… the investigation 
process, as important as it is to the safety of the flying public, has 
unintentionally also become important to the establishment of legal fault and 
blame.”  Indeed, NTSB accident reports were referred to as “… roadmaps to 
liability”. 
 
Safety and human factors studies have shown that approaching an accident 
investigation with the objective of finding „culprits‟ or those responsible in order 
to exact punishment is counterproductive to determining the facts surrounding 
an accident event. 
 
Blame is described as “an aspect of everyday conduct evaluation that identifies 
behavior as morally wrong or socially opprobrious.” (Alicke, 2000).  As a society 
we are quick to apportion blame, as it is emotionally satisfying particularly with 
outcome knowledge rather than a focus upon the actions and omissions that 
preceded the accident.  Calming public outrage, blame and punishment have 
often been used to assuage corporate guilt, ensuring the problem goes away 
quickly. 
 
It has been argued, however, that given that the majority of accidents are found 
to be attributable to human error where foresight and an intent to do harm are 
not present, that blame and punishment serve little purpose in accident 
prevention and move only to demoralize individuals involved, discouraging 
people from sharing information which could possibly prevent future accidents. 
 
“Blaming those responsible for a crash is not really important to the cause of 
safety.  Nor even, necessarily, is finding the definitive, or probable, cause of a 
crash.  Much more important is to find out how the crash can be prevented in 
the future.” (Weir, 1999). 
 
Rimson (1998) argues that attempting to balance the objectives of the pursuit of 
cause and the prevention of recurrence is “countervalent” or in opposition.  
“They are so fundamentally inconsistent that increasing concentration on one 
diminishes the worth of the other.” 
 
RAND noted that the complexity of aviation accident litigation had evolved in 
synchrony with the evolution of the industry.  Early aircraft were less complex 
and built to carry fewer passengers and the activity of flight was ascribed a 
certain degree of risk.  Today‟s modern jets can carry 400 or more passengers 
and what was once seen as an adventurous occupation has now become 
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commonplace; “… an everyday event, integral to commerce and leisure, that 
involves minimal risk.” (Sarsfield et al, 2000).  As a consequence, any accidents 
are more likely to be thought of as caused by negligence with its accompanying 
inference of blame, as opposed to technical aberrations (Kreindler, 1998). 
 
Whether or not the outcry is justified (practically or philosophically), “… public 
concern is a strong weapon against those considered at fault in mishaps” 
(Ferry, 1988) and the power of public opinion should not be underestimated in 
its ability to shape the industry.   As an example, the UK charter airline, 
Excalibur Airways, went into liquidation in 1996 due to a loss of consumer 
confidence caused by safety concerns about its aircraft. 
 
What there does appear to be agreement upon is the need for accident 
investigation that is both independent and transparent. As Chairman of the 
International Transport Safety Agency, Pieter van Vollenhoven claimed that 
independent accident investigation is every citizen‟s right and society‟s duty 
(van Vollenhoven, 2002).  Assuaging public concern and enabling victims and 
their families to come to terms with events is as important, he asserted, as 
ensuring lessons are learnt and future recurrences prevented. 
 
This is echoed by former Chief Inspector of the AAIB, Ken Smart, “Perhaps the 
most important prerequisite for public and industry trust is independence.” He 
continues, “ An independent accident investigation body ensures that there can 
be no perception of conflict of interest which reduces the scope for „cover-up‟ or 
conspiracy theories.” (Smart, 2004) 
 
Independent accident investigation, van Vollenhoven asserts, can only be 
guaranteed through law thereby making actions transparent.  The difficulty 
arises with smaller countries experiencing few, if any, serious accidents or 
incidents where the justification for funding an independent body might not be 
acceptable.  Where this is the case, there is often a requirement to fall back on 
existing government inspectors to perform the role, which can lead to questions 
regarding the impartiality and independence of the investigation. 
 
Elliman et al (2007) state that independence in an investigative organization can 
be measured in terms of its structure, finances and functioning.  Structural 
independence is gained through separation from “regulatory bodies, including 
the judiciary, and when the body and its investigators are granted a legal 
status.”  Investigative agencies should not be financially dependent upon 
commercial organizations and should have autonomy over its own finances.  
Functional independence occurs when “legislation governs the categories of 
accidents to be investigated but the body has the autonomy over the decision to 
investigate and the focus and scope of the investigation.” 
 
Transparency of practice, on the other hand, gains public trust.  It enables the 
public to assess the quality of the investigations and the resulting data and is 
defined as “the full, accurate, and timely disclosure of information.”  (Elliman et 
al, 2007) 
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It is a question of debate as to whether a government investigation organization, 
however ostensibly independent it purports to be, can ever be truly transparent.  
The MAIB‟s first investigation report into the Marchioness accident in 1989 
attracted criticism for conducting the investigation in „private‟ (as opposed to 
through public inquiry).  It was argued that this resulted in a lack of public 
scrutiny of evidence and an inability for the public to be able to challenge what 
evidence was considered and what was omitted.  
 
As has been illustrated, the primary reasons for the establishment and 
continued operation of the UK Accident Investigation Branches is to determine 
the causes of accidents with the intention of preventing recurrence.  The AIBs 
are precluded from implying blame or culpability although their reports will 
always have the potential for inference from its findings.  As such, it mitigates 
the public desire for accountability by offering a detached interpretation of 
events that will, it is ventured, also offer advances in knowledge to the industry. 
 
2.2  Development of the UK Accident Investigation Branches  
 
“Each transport mode has its unique culture.  The aviation, maritime and rail 
industries carry with them elements of their history and development that can be 
found in these industries today” (Smart, 2004). 
 
The following section outlines the historical context in which each of the three 
UK Accident Investigation Branches developed as well as the international and 
European framework within which each operates.  
2.2.1  Air 
 
Of the three, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch has the longest history as a 
permanent independent organization.  Despite its relatively recent history, 
aviation has been a tremendously dynamic and fast paced industry and yet, 
even though it has only been a century since the first powered flight, the desire 
to understand why accidents occur and to introduce ameliorating measures has 
driven the institution of accident investigation bodies across the globe.  It is this 
international perspective, and not the reliance upon individual States or 
companies, which has been most influential in ensuring that accident 
investigation has such a high profile and exemplary reputation. 
 
The first recorded aviation accident report was written as a result of the 
uncontrolled descent and crash landing of the aircraft Flyer 3 piloted by Orville 
Wright in 1908.  US Army Cavalry Officer Lt. Thomas E Selfridge was on board 
the demonstration flight and whilst Wright survived, Selfridge did not. 
 
In the UK, concern about significant numbers of early aircraft being lost led to 
Captain CB Cockburn, a leading aviation expert and the holder of pilot 
certificate number 5, being appointed to the independent post of Inspector of 
13 
Accidents in 1915 as part of the Accidents Investigation Unit of the Royal Flying 
Corps.  As such, Cockburn was directly responsible to the Director General of 
Military Aeronautics at the War Office. 
 
In the years immediately subsequent to the end of the First World War, the 
impetus for civil public transport increased and a Department of Civil Aviation of 
the Air Ministry was established.  The Accidents Investigation Unit became part 
of this Department, changing its title to the Accidents Investigation Branch, and 
its function became substantiated in law through the Air Navigation Act of 1920 
giving the Secretary of State for Air the power to make separate provision for 
the investigation of civil air accidents through the Air Navigation Order of 1922 
and the Air Navigation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1922.  
 
Smart (2004) refers to three post-war UK government reviews of aircraft 
accident investigation which have “shaped” investigative practice, both 
nationally and internationally.   
 
The Shelmerdine Committee was tasked with “considering whether the pre-war 
accident investigation arrangements were likely to be adequate for the post-war 
global expansion of the industry.” (Smart, 2004).  Never published, the 
Shelmerdine Report (1945) called for all accidents to culminate in a published 
report and that the UK should “take the lead in devising international 
arrangements for aircraft accident investigation.” 
 
Three years later, the Newton Committee sought to „embed‟ the principles of 
accident investigation being espoused by the newly formed Provisional 
International Civil Aviation Organization, an interim precursor to the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  The independent status of the 
accident investigation body was reinforced by the work of this committee. 
 
Seen as “probably the most comprehensive” of the post-war inquiries into 
accident investigation (Smart, 2004), the Cairns Report, published in 1961 
under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Mr Justice Cairns, widened the 
scope by examining accident procedures in the United States of America, 
Australia, France and Germany as well as across the transport modes: railway 
and maritime.  Once again, the Cairns Report reiterated the requirement that 
accident investigation should remain independent and be seen as such by 
government, industry and society and that there should be more public 
accountability.  The Report also called for the removal of the question that “is 
always put to the commissioner of a public inquiry”, “Was the accident due to or 
contributed to by the wrongful act or default of any party?” (Flight International, 
1962), thus strengthening the philosophy of non-judgement. 
 
The Accidents Investigation Branch has remained resident within the 
Department of Transport in its various nomenclatures and in 1987 changed its 
name to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch as it remains known today. 
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From its early days as part of the Royal Flying Corps, the AAIB has maintained 
a close alliance with the UK military (in particular the RAF and MoD) and is still 
on hand to provide assistance to the military as requested. 
 
Despite its colocation with the UK civil aviation regulatory body (the Civil 
Aviation Authority) in terms of government departmental oversight, the AAIB 
has assiduously maintained its function independent from that of the regulator.  
Within the UK aviation community, it would now be inapprehensible to combine 
accident investigation with regulatory oversight as the much lauded 
independence of the first would be seen to be compromised by the second. 
 
Other industries, however, have not necessarily developed along similar tenets.  
For many years both the rail and the marine industries in the UK have had such 
functions inextricably linked and it is only in the last couple of decades that the 
benefits of separating the functions have been fully acknowledged. 
  
2.2.2  Marine 
 
Historically accident investigations were first found in the maritime industry in 
the second half of the 19th century in many of the seagoing trade nations 
(Stoop, 2003a).  At this time investigations formed part of the judicial system, 
enabling disciplinary action for erring captains and officers in order to protect 
crew, passengers and cargo.  Despite its long and illustrious history, objective 
and independent marine accident investigation was only recently established.  
Not unlike the rail industry, the driver was not international foresight but a 
reactive response to a high profile accident, at a time of decreased public 
forbearance. 
 
Thus the judicial system prevailed until in his report on the Inquiry into the 
capsizing of the M/S Herald of Free Enterprise roll-on roll-off passenger car 
ferry in 1987, Lord Justice Sheen commented that “The responsibilities of the 
Department [of Transport] for matters of safety of life at sea are very wide.  After 
a casualty has occurred there is natural instinct on the part of ship-owners to 
adopt the attitude that they had not taken certain precautions because the 
Department had not made Rules which required those precautions.  From that 
defensive position there can easily develop what appears to the public, probably 
erroneously, to be a cover-up.  In every Formal Investigation it is of great 
importance that members of the public should feel confident that a searching 
investigation has been held, that nothing has been swept under the carpet and 
that no punches have been pulled.”  (Sheen, 1987) 
 
The formation of a separate independent accident investigation branch was 
thought to go some way to assuaging the public‟s fear and in July 1989, the UK 
marine industry saw the establishment of an independent Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch established under Section 33 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1988 and operated under The Merchant Shipping (Accident Investigation) 
Regulations 1989. 
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Prior to that the function of accident investigation formed part of the remit of the 
Marine Office Surveyors who came under the Surveyor General‟s Organisation, 
reporting through to the Secretary of State for Transport via the Marine 
Directorate. The Marine Directorate had previously moved under the Marine 
and Shipping section from the Department of Trade and Industry to the 
Department of Transport in 1983.  The Surveyor General‟s Organisation went 
on to become the Marine Safety Agency and most recently, in 1998, joined with 
the Coastguard Agency to form the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 
remaining responsible for the regulatory aspects of the marine industry and 
implementing the UK government‟s maritime safety policy. 
 
The casualty investigation section of the Surveyor General‟s Organisation  
appears not to have had a direct remit to conduct investigations itself, but to 
ensure that casualties to UK registered ships anywhere in the world and 
casualties to any ship within UK territorial waters were properly investigated.  
The principal purpose of the section was to gather information pertaining to the 
accident, analyse the reports with respect to previous events and pass on 
suitable recommendations to another part of the Organisation. 
 
Surveyors could undertake desk audits or would be appointed as an Inspector 
under the Merchant Shipping Act to conduct a preliminary investigation if the 
situation was felt to warrant it.  Suitably qualified people, usually from the 
Marine Office, would be sought to carry out investigation.  The primary purpose 
of the casualty investigation was “to learn lessons for the future and not to 
apportion blame.  If, however, breaches of regulations or unacceptable conduct 
were uncovered then a parallel investigation would ensue with a view to court 
proceedings.” (Scully, 2000) 
 
Within weeks of establishment, the MAIB found their complement of five 
Inspectors fully occupied with the investigation into the collision of the 
Marchioness and the Bowbelle on the River Thames which claimed 51 lives.  
Their first investigation and report proved to be contentious: a public grown 
accustomed to formal inquiries were incensed to find that a „private‟ 
investigation was being conducted with no opportunity to test the evidence by 
„adversarial‟ means before the writing of the report.  The MAIB were accused of 
being “an anomalous body” (Hughes, 1993) and “not awfully well regarded” 
(Spearing, 1993) and the report was criticized as being “shot through with 
opinions” (Christian, cited in Hartley, 2001). 
 
There had been resistance to holding a public inquiry into the Marchioness 
accident as it was felt that it would undermine the credibility of the MAIB‟s 
investigation: after all, the MAIB had in part been set up to avoid the need for 
expensive and time consuming public inquiries.  But such was the strength of 
public opinion, however, the government were obliged to reconsider their 
position and subsequently instigated a formal investigation under Lord Justice 
Clarke.   
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In the intervening years, a number of private inquiries had been held including 
the report into the Enquiry into River Safety, conducted by John Hayes in July 
1992 and the Thames Safety Inquiry, a precursor to the Formal Investigation, 
under the guidance of Lord Justice Clarke.  
 
During the first two years of operation, the MAIB relied quite heavily upon the 
expertise and experience of the Marine Office Surveyors.  The Surveyors were 
used as Inspectors when necessary and Inspectors were encouraged to spend 
time on secondment with the Surveyor General‟s Organisation. The transition 
from oversight to independent investigation was, therefore, not immediate: the 
formal inquiry into the Marchioness and the Bowbelle in 2001 noted that, in its 
recommendations, the MAIB had advised against the prosecution of one of the 
individuals involved in the collision, indicating that it had considered disciplinary 
action to be part of its remit. 
 
Eventually it was, however, acknowledged that the dual function of regulator 
and investigator was untenable.  The Hayes Report recommended that care 
should be exercised with the use of members of the Surveyor General‟s 
Organisation to “… maintain public confidence and avoid any possible 
criticisms” (MAIB, 1992).  This was reiterated by Lord Justice Clarke who was 
critical of the perceived “close relationship” between the Department of 
Transport and the MAIB.  His report called for clear lines of demarcation to 
promote public confidence in the independence of the MAIB as an investigative 
body. 
 
Since its formation, the MAIB has grown in reputation, budget and numbers.  
Recently there have been changes to the grading structure of MAIB Inspectors 
to give them parity with their counterparts in the Air and Rail Branches.  It is 
now seen as being a highly regarded independent organization, with a rightful 
place on the international stage. 
 
2.2.3  Rail 
 
At the start of this research study, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch was at 
its inception.  A Chief Inspector had been appointed and an interim project team 
was brought together to design and set up a new independent accident 
investigation unit.  Whereas the other two Branches had evolved over time with 
industry changes and technological advances, the RAIB were establishing 
themselves in full view of not only industry but also politicians and the travelling 
public. 
 
Prior to October 2005, the investigation of railway accidents was undertaken by 
Her Majesty‟s Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) which in 1990 had transferred from 
the Department of Transport to the Health and Safety Executive to become the 
operational division with responsibility for health and safety on the railways.  At 
this time, HMRI‟s responsibilities were threefold: technical; legal (prosecutory) 
and advisory.  In addition to the investigation of accidents, HMRI was also 
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responsible for safety regulation of the rail industry – approving railway safety 
cases, allowing train companies to operate as well as providing technical 
expertise to the industry.  Not unlike the marine industry, the HMRI had a 
combined function of investigation and regulation within one corporate body and 
latterly, there was “… an increasing tendency of the railway inspectorate to seek 
prosecution following accidents” (Watson, 2004).   
 
Two major accidents at Southall in 1997 and Ladbroke Grove two years later, 
highlighted the inadequacies of the system post privatization and combined with 
an overwhelming support from industry for separated investigation from 
regulation (Hall, 2001), proved a catalyst for the initiation of the RAIB. 
 
At 13:15 on 19th September 1997, nine miles west of Paddington, a side-on 
collision occurred involving Great Western Trains 10:32 Swansea to Paddington 
High Speed Train and a freight train operated by English Welsh and Scottish 
Railways (EWS).  Seven people died as a result of the collision and a further 
139 were injured.  It was the first major rail accident to occur in Britain since the 
start of privatization of the railways in 1994. 
 
Professor John Uff QC was asked to Chair an enquiry into the accident.  As a 
result of the lengthy study, prosecutions were brought against the Great 
Western Trains driver and also against the train operating company, Great 
Western Trains for corporate manslaughter.  The driver was found to have 
passed signal SN254 at danger: an action known colloquially as a SPAD. 
 
Uff‟s report pointed to a number of areas for improvement, one aspect of which, 
included in recommendation number 81, was consideration be given to whether 
an additional independent accident investigation body should be created, to 
take over the accident investigation functions of HMRI.  The increasing 
tendency of the regulator to seek prosecutions was felt to have a negative effect 
on the industry‟s motivation for self reporting of issues and would more likely 
drive a blame culture, where each part of the fragmented structure denied 
culpability.  This was exemplified by “… a general recourse to lawyers” (Uff, 
2000). 
 
Uff also commented upon the perceived “… duplication and protraction of the 
technical investigation”: where multiple enquiries were found to be wasteful in 
terms of time and money; where important information may have been 
overlooked. 
 
In his opinion, the instigation of a new accident body would ensure that “… a 
single, thorough and definitive technical investigation is carried out.” (Uff, 2000). 
 
Whereas the Uff report only intimated that an additional investigative body 
would be beneficial, Lord Cullen‟s report into the subsequent accident at 
Ladbroke Grove two years later made the point more vociferously.  In total, 9 of 
his 74 recommendations made direct reference to an independent rail accident 
investigation organization. 
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At 08:09 on 5th October 1999, a head-on collision occurred between the 08:06 
Paddington to Bedwyn Thames Train Turbo and the 06:03 Cheltenham to 
Paddington First Great Western High Speed Train at Ladbroke Grove junction.  
Thirty one people died as a result of the crash with a further 227 admitted to 
hospital as a result of sustained injuries. 
 
A subsequent enquiry by Cullen highlighted several anomalies with regards to 
organizational and regulatory issues.  His report was divided into two parts: the 
first concerning itself with the description of events at Ladbroke Grove; and the 
second, which took “… a much wider look at the industry post-privatization” 
(Watson, 2004). 
 
Independent investigating of rail accidents formed the “… centerpiece of Lord 
Cullen‟s reforms of railway safety” (Haigh, 2001).  The two objectives of 
independence and control were considered to be incompatible.  Criticisms were 
raised regarding the arrangements with regards to the responsibility for accident 
investigation being discharged by the regulator.  “It is inappropriate for the 
safety regulator to carry out the function of investigation since it might be 
necessary for the investigator to examine the decisions and activities of the 
safety regulator itself.” (Cullen, 2001). 
 
After a period of consultation with industry, the Rail Accident Investigation 
Branch was established by the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 which 
in turn empowered the Secretary of State for Transport to make detailed 
provisions in the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 
2005.  The RAIB became operational under these regulations and are now 
responsible for the investigation of accidents and incidents on the UK‟s national 
mainline railway networks, the Channel Tunnel (in cooperation with the Bureau 
d‟Enquêtes et d‟Analyses in France) and the London and Glasgow underground 
systems, Midland Metro and other metro systems as well as tramways, heritage 
railways and cable hauled systems of 1km or longer. 
 
Formation of the RAIB “… strips from Her Majesty‟s Railway Inspectorate its 
161 year tradition of accident investigation which, although not one of the roles 
for which it was created, was one it took on from the beginning” (Haigh, 2001). 
 
Not everyone was as convinced of its benefits outweighing its costs.  With major 
accidents being rare, Haigh (2001) expressed concern that the RAIB would not 
be able to maintain the skills required for the role and indeed Hall (2001) went 
further: “Noone who proposes a separate Accident Investigation Unit has yet 
suggested how it will fill its time between accidents sufficiently severe to warrant 
its attention.  Even when there were plenty of accidents and a dozen public 
inquiries a year, a couple of Inspecting Officers and couple of clerks sufficed.  
The danger then is that they will dabble in minor accidents which ought properly 
to be left to the industry.”  He saw the remit of the RAIB focused solely upon the 
more serious accidents and proposed that there might not be a great deal for 
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them to do, with an allusion to the devil finding work for idle hands.  This has 
proven to be far from reality. 
 
2.3  Multimodal or Unimodal? – the variation in structure of  
  accident investigation organizations 
 
The three UK Accident Investigation Branches operate as separate entities, 
each responsible for the investigation of accidents within their distinct mode: air, 
marine and rail.  Other nations have adopted a multimodal approach including 
the US National Transportation Safety Board, the Transport Safety Board of 
Canada, the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau, the Transport Accident 
Investigation Commission of New Zealand and the Statens Haverikommission 
of Sweden.  These organizations cover a multiplicity of modes although 
typically, investigators will remain mode specific in their investigations – for 
example, those with aviation experience will find themselves investigating 
aviation accidents and so forth. 
 
The exceptions to this are to be found at organizations such as the Dutch 
Safety Board (DSB).  In 2005, the Dutch Transport Safety Board transformed 
itself from an organization responsible for five sectors or modes “… each 
working with their own investigators, with respective domain expertise” (Koning 
and Peters, 2006) to the Dutch Safety Board complete with expanded remit.  
The DSB now found itself responsible for the investigation of ten sectors (rail, 
shipping, aviation, road transport, industry, pipelines and energy net, 
construction and services, defence, healthcare, water (environment) and crisis 
control) and, constrained by funding and resource, utilized the skills of the 
existing investigators in unfamiliar domains supported by newly hired 
generalists (Koning and Peters, 2006).  The Netherlands, along with Sweden 
and Finland, are the only independent accident investigation bodies to have 
legal authority outside the transportation sector (Stoop, 2004). 
 
The main advantage cited for the multimodal approach is that the basic 
methodology used in an investigation can be the same across all modes.  The 
European Transport Safety Council (2001) also posit that “… certain 
investigative tools can best be utilized across all modes”, including data 
recording facilities, forensic studies and human factors specialization.  They 
also cite practical advantages in “… sharing the administrative load, investigator 
training, public relations and legal issues.”  Stoop (2004) refers to this as 
“synergistic cooperation” which leads to “… harmonization of investigative 
methodologies” and it is his view that there will be a trend towards multimodal 
boards in the future. 
 
Koning and Peters (2006) commend the use of a common methodology, 
strategy and goals as well as shared uses but advise that multimodal boards 
need clearly defined tasks and accountabilities, taking into account multiple EC 
directives and “supra-national established resolutions”, for example those of the 
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International Civil Aviation Organization and International Maritime 
Organization.  Stoop (2004) also warns against the potential loss of in-depth 
modal expertise and credibility. 
 
In the UK, there have been appeals for the Government to give thought to 
establishing a multimodal board.  In 1999, the Parliamentary Advisory Council 
on Transport Safety (PACTS) called for a new national safety body, responsible 
for all modes of public transport which would bring the existing accident 
investigation branches together along with commercial road operations.  It was 
felt that the new organization would “… encourage the sharing of experience 
and best practice across the modes”.  It recognized, however, that “each of the 
modes is likely to argue that, while change might be beneficial, that that specific 
mode should be left alone.” (PACTS, 1999). 
 
2.4  The international perspective 
  
The transport industry, by its very nature, is a global enterprise.  And yet, it is 
only in the last two decades that independent accident investigation has begun 
to be considered on more than a national basis.  The one exception has been 
aviation. 
 
In 1944, 54 States accepted an invitation by the United States government to 
attend an International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago.  Research in the 
US and abroad had shown that the economic advantages offered by aviation 
could only be realized with the establishment of standards and regulations 
worldwide (Smart, 2004).  It was no longer a national concern. 
 
The conference in Chicago culminated in the signing of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (most often referred to as The Chicago Convention) 
and the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
with the aim of achieving the desired harmony of services and standards 
throughout the industry and across the world.  Article 26 of the Convention spelt 
out the responsibilities of States in the event of an accident to an aircraft.  The 
State of occurrence is required to “… institute an inquiry into the circumstances 
of the accident, in accordance, so far as its laws permit, with the procedure 
which may be recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization”  
(ICAO, 1944).  As annexes to the Convention, 18 Standards and 
Recommended Practices were laid down, of which Annex 13 set out the 
guidelines and responsibilities for aircraft accident and incident investigation.  
Subsequent iterations have refined the document but its original intent, to 
provide structure, standardization and international cooperation in air accident 
investigation remains.  It was here that the Member States were required to 
investigate accidents with the “sole objective” being “the prevention of accidents 
and incidents”, and not “to apportion blame or liability” (ICAO, 2001).  These 
phrases have found their way into common usage and are contained in many of 
the regulations.   
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On the marine side, the International Maritime Organization was established by 
Convention in Geneva in 1948 to develop and maintain a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for shipping.  The first maritime treaties date back to the 
19th Century with the first international convention (SOLAS – safety of life at 
sea) being initiated by the Titanic disaster in 1912. A United Nations specialized 
agency, the IMO is responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing 
pollution from ships.  Its objectives are summarized thus: “… safe, secure and 
efficient shipping on clean oceans” and its remit today includes safety, 
environmental concerns, legal matters, technical cooperation, maritime security 
and the efficiency of shipping (IMO, 2007). 
 
As yet, no agency exists to overarch the railways on an international basis.   
This is most likely due to the historical development of the railways on a 
national basis, contained within boundaries.  With greater cross-boundary 
function comes the need for greater international cooperation so it is not unlikely 
that the railway industry will eventually follow suit. 
  
International legislation within each mode provides a framework to promote 
assurances of standardization in independent accident investigation at the 
highest level but given the rapidly changing transport environment (ETSC, 
2001) global intermodal cooperation is required to build on the successes 
gained at a national or European level. Organizations such as the International 
Transportation Safety Agency (ITSA) have been founded to strengthen this 
resolve. 
 
ITSA was created by the investigation boards of the United States, Canada, 
Sweden and the Netherlands in 1993 with the mission to “… improve transport 
safety in each member country by learning from the experiences of others“.  Its 
aim was to bring together independent investigations in all modes of transport 
from around the world.  The organization has a multimodal focus but 
membership is not denied single modality agencies, with caveats.  The UK‟s 
membership is based on the Board of Chief Inspectors which overarches the 
individual Accident Investigation Branches.  Whilst the organization has no legal 
power, it is nonetheless a powerful association for mutual learning, suasion and 
support. (ITSA, 2007). 
 
2.5  Europe 
 
Within Europe there has been an increasing desire to unify and strengthen 
accident investigations across the modes, supported by the international 
framework as described above. 
 
In 2001, the European Transport Safety Council, an international non-
government organization which advises on transport safety matters to the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, published a document 
outlining the situation in Europe with regards to independent accident 
investigation in the transport industry. 
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The report highlighted that “… a key issue in any accident investigation is the 
status and impartiality of the body carrying out the inquiry.  Any organization 
with an actual, or perceived, vested interest in the result is rarely able to act with 
total impartiality.”   
 
It spelled out the need for the European Union to mandate that organizations 
undertaking transport accident investigations are totally independent of the 
regulator.  Such a situation had already been achieved in aviation under Council 
Directive (94/56/EC) which mainly reflected the rules set out in the international 
regulations of Annex 13 of ICAO‟s Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation. 
 
Using the progress made within the aviation industry as a yardstick, the ETSC 
document called for similar measures to be put in place of the rail and marine 
industries in order that there might be comparable standards of accident 
investigation across the modes.  The argument was taken up in the subsequent 
White Paper published in 2001 by the Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities which set out intentions for a European transport policy 
for the next decade. 
  
The paper highlighted once again the need for separation between investigation 
body and regulator.  “The chief concern in investigations conducted by the 
authorities or by insurance companies is to compensate for any damage caused 
by the accident and to determine liability under the codes established by the 
legislator.  However, such investigations are geared towards revealing the 
causes of accidents and ways of improving the law.”  Prior to the paper‟s 
publication, the case for independent investigations had been moved forward 
with the introduction of Council Directive (2004/49/EC) which requires Member 
States to establish independent rail accident investigation bodies.  Similar 
obligations were in preparation for the marine industry under a proposal for a 
directive establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of 
accidents in the maritime transport sector and amending Directives 1999/35/EC 
and 2002/59/EC COM/2005/0590 final of 23/11/2005. 
 
As a consequence of the Commission‟s White Paper, it was decided in June 
2003 to create a “… group of Experts to advise the Commission on dealing with 
accidents in the transport sector” (Commission Decision EC/425/2003).  In their 
final report (European Communities, 2006), the Group of Experts make specific 
recommendations for each mode (including road and pipeline) regarding 
continued and increased coordination within and between the modes on a 
European basis.  Of great import for successful investigation of transport 
accidents and incidents, they propose, is a common European methodology for 
investigation, designed “… to produce a harmonized and consistent approach to 
safety investigation of transport accidents and incidents within the European 
Union” (European Communities, 2006). 
 
Given “… increased concerns about transport safety”, the EU has “… stepped 
up its determination to improve mobility safety” by the creation of a number of 
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independent EU agencies, set up under European law (European Communities, 
2007). 
 
The European Maritime Safety Agency was created in the aftermath of the Erika 
oil pollution disaster in 1999.  It became operational in 2002 and aims to “… 
contribute to the enhancement of the overall maritime safety system in the 
European Community”; to reduce the risk of maritime accidents, marine 
pollution from ships and the loss of human lives at sea.  A specialized expert 
body, EMSA is able to provide technical and scientific support to the Community 
and the Commission as well as working to improve cooperation within and 
between the Member States. 
 
The aviation equivalent, the European Aviation Safety Agency, is “… the 
centerpiece of the European Union‟s strategy for aviation safety”, aimed at 
promoting the “… highest common standards of safety”.  Working closely with 
ICAO and other aviation organizations across the world, EASA has developed 
common safety and environmental standards at the European level which it 
monitors through inspection.  Its remit is growing as it draws back to a 
centralized function many of the activities that would have been carried out at a 
national regulatory level. (EASA, 2007). 
 
The aviation industry in Europe is also working towards a European standard 
for accident reporting through the European Coordination Centre for Accident 
and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS), part of the European Commission 
Joint Research Centre.  Their aim is for safety information from investigations to 
be collected, analysed and ultimately shared, in order to improved public 
transport safety.  This work presupposes a common understanding of the 
underlying taxonomy, strongly reinforcing the need for standardized 
methodologies and investigation techniques. 
 
2004 marked the inception of a new EU body responsible for improving the 
safety and interoperability of Europe‟s railway networks – the European Railway 
Agency.  The ERA seeks to bring „synergy‟ to the 25 Member States with what it 
perceives as disparate regulations and policies, contributing to “… creating an 
integrated railway that is competitive and guarantees a high level of safety.” 
(ERA, 2007). 
 
Whilst the ERA does not have regulatory powers, it submits opinions and 
recommendations to the European Commission which, in accordance with the 
Safety and Interoperability Directives, transforms them into decisions applicable 
to the Member States of the European Union. 
 
There have been calls for European cooperation to be extended further with the 
establishment of a multinational single mode board, initially within the aviation 
community along the lines of the Air Transport Accident Investigation 
Committee which is a sub-committee of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States: comprising twelve member states of the former Soviet Union.  Whilst the 
24 
intention is far sighted, it is thought unlikely that the individual states in Europe 
would accede autonomy. 
 
2.6  Intramodal community 
 
In addition to the agencies set up by statute on a national, European and 
international level, two further organizations exist to further support global 
accident investigation.  
 
The International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI) was established in 
1964 to promote air safety by the exchange of ideas, experiences and 
information regarding aircraft accident investigations.  Its objectives include: 
promoting technical advancement through professional education; the 
exchange of information for mutual development of improved investigations; to 
broaden professional relationships among members; and to maintain and 
increase the prestige, standing and influence of Air Safety Investigators in 
matters of air safety. (ISASI, 2007)   
 
Similarly, within the marine industry, the Marine Accident Investigators 
International Forum (MAIIF) was established in 1992 and exists to foster, 
develop and sustain a cooperative relationship among national marine 
investigators for the purpose of improving and sharing the knowledge in an 
international forum; to improve maritime safety and the prevention of pollution 
through the dissemination of information gained in the investigative process; 
and to encourage through cooperation the development, recognition, 
implementation and improvement of related international instruments, where 
appropriate (MAIIF, 2007a). 
 
An alternative association, the newly launched Maritime Casualty Investigation 
Association (MCIA), aims to “maintain, enhance and promote professionalism in 
maritime and offshore casualty investigation in the public and private sectors” 
as a means of enhancing safety and risk reduction. 
 
Of particular interest to the researcher are the objectives of encouraging “the 
study of theoretical and practical aspects of investigation methodologies and 
practices” to develop “code-compliant templates and ontologies” referring to the 
IMO Casualty Code and the development and acceptance of  “a unified matrix 
of desired competencies for maritime casualty investigation.” 
 
As yet, there appears to be no unifying international professional group for the 
railway industry although conferences such as the International Rail Accident 
Investigation Conference hosted by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in 
2007 would suggest that collaboration is welcomed. 
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2.7  The accident investigation process 
 
Within the UK, notification of an accident to one of the three Branches will result 
in a decision as to whether an investigation will ensue.  This decision ultimately 
resides with the Chief Investigator although under the definition of what 
constitutes an accident, there will be an understanding of what is an 
investigatable occurrence.   
 
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 
1996 define an accident in terms of fatalities and serious injuries, where the 
aircraft sustains significant damage or structural failure or where the aircraft is 
missing or completely inaccessible. 
 
The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 
2005 similarly use the term accident to mean any occurrence on board a ship or 
involving a ship where there is loss of life or major injury, or significant damage 
to the ship, its equipment or the environment. 
 
Lastly, The Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005 
define a serious accident as one that involves a derailment or collision of rolling 
stock which has an obvious impact on railway safety regulation or management 
of safety and results in the death of at least one person, serious injuries to five 
or more persons or extensive damage to rolling stock, the infrastructure or the 
environment. 
 
The accident investigation process is essentially “the examination, study, 
searching, tracking, and gathering of factual information that answers questions 
or solves problems.  It is more of an art than a science.  Although the person 
engaged in investigation is a gatherer of facts, he or she must develop 
hypotheses and draw conclusions based on available information.  The 
investigative process, that is to say, is a comprehensive activity involving 
information collection, the application of logic and the exercise of sound 
reasoning.”  (Sennewald and Tsukayama, 2006). 
 
It is a logical means of answering Stoop‟s (2003b) five questions: 
 What happened? 
 How did it happen? 
 Why did the accident occur? 
 What can be done to prevent a recurrence? 
 What can be done to minimize accident consequences? 
 
To provide answers to the questions above, Stoop outlined five distinct phases 
to accident investigation: 
1. Initiation phase – a decision is made as to whether action is warranted. 
2. Fact finding phase – can be a reactive event investigation, a retrospective 
safety study or a proactive safety study. 
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3. Safety deficiency identification phase – determining systematic threats to 
transport safety through modelling or using operational experience or a 
combination of both. 
4. Recommendation phase – recommendations should be economically and 
politically acceptable. 
5. Feedback phase - systematic monitoring of recommendations. 
 
Henderson et al (2001) expanded upon this by stating that a successful 
investigation process should contain the following basic requirements: 
 A causal model that represents a system-based approach to accident 
and incident investigation 
 The involvement of relevant individuals within the investigation 
 Procedures or protocols to structure and support the investigation 
 The identification of both immediate and underlying causes 
 The development of recommendations that address both immediate and 
underlying causes 
 The implementation of these recommendations and the updating of 
relevant risk assessments 
 Follow-up to ensure that actions taken are successful in reducing the risk 
of further incidents 
 Feedback to relevant parties to share immediate learning 
 
Summarizing the accident investigators‟ tasks, Zotov (2002) suggests “… we 
first seek to describe the accident, and then answer the questions how and why 
it happened.  Finally, we try to persuade others to take action to avert future 
accidents”.   
 
There appears to be little agreement in the literature as to what constitutes the 
“best” accident investigation methodology (Benner, 2000).  Reinach and Viale 
(2006) comment that: “Accident/incident investigations must be consistent and 
thorough to be most effective.  Yet they are, by most accounts, part science and 
part art.  Thus, inevitably, some degree of variability exists across investigative 
methods and results.  Variability depends on a number of factors, including the 
data collection methods and tools that are used (eg Woodcock et al, 2005), the 
knowledge and experience of the investigators, and the particular 
accident/incident causation philosophy of the investigator or company.”   
 
In his study of seventeen US Federal organizations, Benner (1985) determined 
14 different models (the perceived nature of the accident phenomenon) and 17 
different methodologies (the system of concepts, principles, and procedures for 
investigation accidents). Given the diversity of the models and the fact that, in 
some cases, intermodel conflict was observed, Benner concluded that not all 
models were valid.  What became clear from Benner‟s study was that there was 
extensive variability in approach and little consistency in terms of quality of 
output: the accident report. 
 
Literature regarding accident investigation techniques points to a wide variation 
of available overarching methodologies, in contrast to specific accident analysis 
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tools. McCormick and Papadakis (1998) outline seven techniques to aid in “… 
sorting out the clues”. 
 
The Integrated Method simultaneously gathers facts and sorts them both to 
exclude areas of nonconcern and to note areas of high probability. 
 
The Differential Method is “… used almost exclusively in air crash disasters”. 
The event is dissected into logical and definable segments, which are assigned 
to committees whose job it is to gather and document all pertinent facts 
pertaining to the assigned segment.  The findings of each subgroup will be 
integrated later.  This methodology very much allies with the “party process” 
adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board in the United States.  One 
potential shortfall of this method is that some meaningful material may be 
discarded or overlooked and lost.  This echoes Uff‟s comments (2000) post the 
Southall rail accident in 1997 when he alluded to multiple enquiries being 
duplication and wasteful in terms of time and money, calling instead for a “… 
single, thorough and definitive technical investigation.” 
 
The Hypothetical Exclusion Method lists all possible scenarios and these 
hypotheticals are created and limited by logic, experience and facts.  The 
investigator then tries to exclude scenarios by looking at facts that reduce its 
likelihood.  This method is described as being potentially flawed if assumptions 
are incorrect or incomplete.   
 
In the Time Line Method, all factual data is documented and given a time 
stamp.  The accident is then plotted and reconstructed.  Whilst it can be 
cumbersome, by adding causation chains and discarding meaningless facts, the 
investigator is left with “… a very straightforward and complete picture of the 
timely structuring of facts and events that caused or contributed to the 
accident.”   It provides an “… emerging line of causation”. 
 
With the Factual Exclusion Method, McCormick and Papdakis explain that facts 
are collected sufficient to exclude a system or scenario from being a factor.  
When such a conclusion can be drawn, effort is then curtailed within that area.  
A forced version of this method involves a protocol or checklist to ensure no 
facts are left ungathered.  It does not attempt to evaluate the facts gathered, 
merely to act as an aide memoire in data collection. 
 
But for the existence of a certain event or fact, would the accident have 
happened anyway?  If an affirmative answer is given, the But For Test Method 
suggests that the event or fact may not be a factor in the chain of causation.  
This method centres firmly on cause as opposed to looking at extraneous 
contributory factors. 
 
The last method suggested by McCormick and Papdakis is perhaps, in the case 
of independent non-attributory accident investigation, complete anathema.  The 
Legal Causation Method only gives validity to facts with probative value.  There 
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is no room for speculation or opinion with this method – only what can be 
proven. 
 
Standards such as ICAO‟s Annex 13 prescribe matter to be reported but not a 
criteria for measuring the adequacy of data or material.  There is little 
disagreement regarding the need for integrity in the investigation which should 
be “independent, credible and influential” and “of an indisputable quality” 
(Stoop, 2003b; Marinho de Bastos, 2004) and not an attempt to squeeze “… 
known events into the most plausible or convenient deterministic scheme” 
(Dekker, 2005). There can, however, with the best of intentions be substantive 
variability in the quality of the output.  One explanation is that “… the output is 
not a given with measurable and immutable characteristics, it is an organic 
entity: a bundle of more or less reliable facts and propositions which will be 
changed radically as it moves through the system.” (Irving and McKenzie, 
1993). 
 
The three UK AIBs follows a similar process: data collection; data analysis and 
conclusion; report writing; and recommendations.  Whilst the step-by-step detail 
can be seen to differ between the Branches, the journey from accident to report 
is largely the same; the success of each phase very much dependent upon the 
comprehensiveness of the preceding one.   
 
Data collection:  Investigators will attend the site of the accident and according 
to their remit will preserve and recover evidence.  This can be physical, 
documentary and electronic and include witness statements. 
 
Data analysis:  A plethora of analysis tools are available for use, for example: 
Why-Because Analysis (Ladkin, 2001); the Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada‟s Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology; Blackett‟s (2005) 
Combined Accident Analysis Method; and more recently, the Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau‟s analysis framework (ATSB, 2008).  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests, however, that formal methods such as those above are 
used infrequently and inconsistently within accident investigation agencies.  It 
would speculative to suggest that these models do not provide the breadth and 
flexibility that is required but investigators have a preference for relying on 
intuition and experience. 
 
Report writing:  The report is the key deliverable from an investigation as it 
represents the quality of the investigation as a whole.  It should provide a clear 
explanation as to what happened and why.  Some reports are prescribed in 
terms of structure (eg ICAO‟s Annex 13) and offer guidelines as to writing 
conventions (impartiality, objectivity, clarity, conciseness, consistency, 
phraseology – ICAO, 2003a) but the quality remains largely dependent upon the 
skill of the investigator. 
 
Not only does a report have to be well written, to be of benefit to the industry it 
also needs to be produced in a timely manner.  The legislation governing the 
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investigation of accidents by the UK AIBs states the required timescales for 
report production subsequent to an accident investigation: 
 
The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 
2005 calls for the report to be “… made publicly available in the shortest time 
possible”. 
 
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 
1996 requires copies of the reports “… in a form appropriate to the type and 
seriousness of the accident or incident” to be submitted “… without delay” and 
to be made public “… in the shortest time possible (and if possible, within 12 
months of the date of the accident or serious incident)”.   
 
The Railways (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 reiterate 
the twelve month timescale requiring a report “… in the shortest time possible 
and normally not later than twelve months after the date of the occurrence.”  
 
Self-imposed targets seek to reduce the time available further.  The MAIB 
Annual Report (2006a) stated that reports of investigations that do not involve 
other administrations are to be completed and made publicly available within an 
average of 8 months from the date of accident (reducing to 7 months by 2008-
2009).  Where the investigation involves another administration of either the flag 
or coastal state, however, another 2 months is allowed. 
 
Reviewing the time taken to publish accident reports by the UK AIBs, the 
researcher found wide variations in the mean time and range between the 
Branches.  There appears to be variation in the type of reports produced by 
each Branch but the researcher has concentrated on reports resulting from an 
accident investigation as opposed to additional special bulletins.   
 
In 2007, the MAIB produced 25 investigation reports which took between 3 
months and 14 months to be published, with an average time of 8.5 months.   
 
The AAIB produced 7 formal reports which ranged between 17 and 33 months 
to produce with an average of 26.7 months.  They also produced 209 bulletins 
from desk-based investigations and 66 bulletins from field investigations.  
Timescales for production of these ranged from 2 months to 15 months and 2 
months to 23 months respectively.  Mean times were 5.2 months and 10.9 
months. 
 
Finally, the RAIB produced 47 reports in the same year with a range between 3 
months and 16 months and an average of 10.7 months.  The reason for 
including this data was to give an illustration of the variation in time taken to 
publish accident reports in the UK, raising the question of the value of a report 
produced in some cases more than two years post-event.   
 
Recommendations: All recommendations are written with a view to future 
accident prevention or in order to mitigate consequences.  They are, however, 
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written in a political and economic environment and there is no obligation to 
implement them. 
 
The accident investigation process can be thought of in similar terms to that of 
„research‟.  Initially there is a problem to be resolved: why did the accident occur 
and what can be done to reduce the likelihood of recurrence?  There is then a 
data collection phase followed by the formulation of a hypothesis.  That, of 
course, presupposes an inductive process.  The converse, the hypothetico-
deductive approach, would structure the data collection from the basis of a 
hypothesis.  There are obviously strengths and weaknesses with both 
approaches.  Induction does not start with a preconception and is therefore 
heavily reliant on the quality of data to form an accurate picture of events. There 
are, however, no limits set on the breadth or depth of data to analyse and 
collate save by legal framework and resource. How much of that data will be 
extraneous?  Will the valuable facts be lost in the superfluity? Hypothetico-
deduction, on the other hand, provides a more logical and structured approach 
to data analysis.  The hypothesis will dictate the data collected which will serve 
to either support or refute the argument.  There is a danger, however, that over 
zealous attachment to the hypothesis may lead to a manipulation of the data to 
fit or the exclusion of additional information that may or may not lend weight to 
the argument or provide an interesting corollary. 
 
Either way, the process should follow a logical structure so that its validity can 
be assessed.  To be of value in either the scientific or applied arena, the 
process should comply with the following tenets which Sekaran (2003) refers to 
as the Eight Hallmarks of Science: purposiveness; rigour; testability; 
replicability; precision and confidence; objectivity; generalizability and 
parsimony.  
 
To demonstrate purposiveness, research is required to have an aim, generally 
one where a problem is solved.  Rigour refers to having a sound, logical 
methodological design.  The project aim must be able to be tested and in 
principle, the research should be able to be repeated by others.  Precision and 
confidence are shown through the results closely resembling that which is being 
studied with objective conclusions being based upon facts “stripped of personal 
values and biases” (Sekaran, 2003).  A „regulative ideal‟, the more a piece of 
research can be generalized to other situations, the better and finally, 
parsimony refers to an „economy of explanation‟ where something small but 
meaningful is described as opposed to something vast and complex (and often 
shallow). 
 
Accident investigation is not thought of as an exact science.  Its measure of 
success derives not from some “generally accepted decision rules” leading to 
“reproducible outputs” (Benner, 1980) but is largely dependent upon the 
philosophy, model and methodology adopted by those undertaking the 
investigation.   As such, it falls short of many of the tenets of scientific rigour or 
Hallmarks of Science.    
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There is no agreement as to which methodology is „best‟ where best alludes to 
the most robust, effective manner for pursuit of the absolute (or not so absolute) 
truth.  What can be asserted is that the validity of the process and subsequent 
conclusions could be strengthened considerably by the adoption of a quality 
control mechanism which will be discussed further in subsequent chapters of 
the thesis.  
 
2.8 The role of the accident investigator 
 
At the heart of the global legal framework upon which transportation accident 
investigation is built, lies the accident investigator.  It is axiomatic to state that 
the success of the overall investigation is very much dependent upon the skills 
and abilities of the investigator (Marriott, 1996); each phase of the investigation 
requiring a wide array of skills and knowledge. 
 
“When they reach an accident scene, which can be in just about any type of 
environment, they may be faced with dead or dying people, pathogens, toxic 
materials, and other physical hazards.  They may also have to deal with 
jurisdictional disputes, intense media scrutiny, and concerned family members.  
In the midst of all this, they must act as managers, technologists and 
investigators in order to collect and assess evidence to support subsequent 
efforts to identify the cause of the accident.” (Sarsfield et al, 2002). 
 
“What is a typical air crash investigator like?  There is, of course, no such bird.  
But they share numerous attitudes and characteristics” (Barlay, 1969).  “What is 
clear is that good investigators do not come about by chance or simply the 
ownership of a fluorescent jacket.” (Braithwaite, 2002). 
 
Just as no two accidents are ever truly the same, so it is with investigators.  
Differing backgrounds, experience, skills, interests and personalities are 
brought to bear and yet, as with accidents, scratch below the surface and there 
are similarities to be found. 
 
As identified in the Introduction to this thesis, a review of current academic 
literature regarding accident investigators provides little insight into the qualities 
and attributes specific to the role. A wealth of material exists about accidents 
and accident investigation; the majority of texts on the subject include a detailed 
breakdown and analysis of events with varying degrees of conjecture.  These 
do not, however, cast much light on the skills and behaviours of those 
undertaking the task (Tench, 1985; Owen 1998). 
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization‟s Training Guidelines for Aircraft 
Accident Investigators (2003b) states that: “Aircraft accident investigation is a 
specialized task which should only be undertaken by qualified investigators”.  
Mode not withstanding, ICAO‟s Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation: Part 1 Organization and Planning (2000) elaborates further: “In 
addition to technical skills, an accident investigator requires certain personal 
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attributes. These include integrity and impartiality in the recording of facts, logic 
and perseverance in pursuing inquiries, often under difficult or trying conditions 
and tact in dealing with a wide range of people who have been involved in the 
traumatic experience of an aircraft accident” (ICAO, 2000).  What the guidelines 
stop short of specifying is what qualifications an investigator should possess. 
   
This was echoed in a paper published by Taylor (1996) in Forum, the Journal of 
International Society of Air Safety Investigators, where he comprehensively 
described the ideal air accident investigator as being “… qualified, trained, 
experienced, knowledgeable, observant, inquisitive, dedicated, diligent, open 
minded, independent, impartial, objective, persistent, patient, logical yet capable 
of lateral thinking, literate, diplomatic, fit, tireless, stable, level headed and much 
more.  He or she should have humility, integrity, a good and ready sense of 
humour and be able to maintain good working relationships with all other parties 
involved”  (Taylor, 1996).   
 
Wood and Sweginnis (1995) were more concise in their summation: “All good 
investigators share at least three attributes: They are not afraid to be wrong.  
They will accept facts that are contrary to their present theory. They readily 
admit that they don‟t know everything.  When they need help, they seek help. 
They listen to the other investigators.  They don‟t necessarily believe them, but 
they listen to them.  Those are pretty good traits to acquire.”  
 
The International Society of Air Safety Investigators states in its adopted 
positions on air safety investigation issues (ISASI, 2003) that “… it is desirable 
that investigators possess the following qualities: an inquisitive nature, 
dedication, diligence, patience and objectivity, technical skill, perseverance, 
logic, tact and understanding”.  It continues that they should have as a 
foundation upon which to develop their skills, “… flight crew, cabin crew or 
aeronautical engineering qualifications”.   
 
The Marine Accident Investigators International Forum (MAIIF) points to 
accident investigation being a highly specialized task which should ideally 
(emphasis in original) only be undertaken by highly trained personnel 
possessing many qualities, following very closely those ascribed by ISASI, “… 
not the least important of which are an inquisitive nature, dedication to this kind 
of work, diligence and patience.  Technical skill, perseverance and logic are the 
tools of the profession; humility, integrity, and respect for human dignity his 
guiding rules.” (MAIIF, 2007b). 
 
“One of the most important factors in establishing trust in the investigation 
process is that of the professional qualities of the individual inspectors” (Smart, 
2004).  He continues “ … it is a relatively straightforward process to establish a 
candidate‟s professional qualifications and experience.  Far more difficult is to 
get an assessment of a candidate‟s personal qualities.” 
 
Extending the literature search still further, the role of investigator can be found 
in other fields within the UK, such as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or 
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as road traffic accident investigators - both independent and police.  The 
fundamental difference between these investigators and the AIB Inspectors is 
their independent remit. The HSE have a regulatory, inspection and 
enforcement mandate; police road traffic accident investigators will be working 
towards building a case for prosecution; and „independent‟ investigators are 
usually working on behalf of an individual or organization which might influence 
or bias the findings.  As well as this level independence, there are often 
differences in terms of level of education, training and technical expertise, with 
AIB Inspectors having an increased amount of each.  The skills for collecting 
and analyzing evidence and formulating hypotheses based on findings are not, 
however, dissimilar. 
 
In the UK police force. Smith and Flanagan (2000) identified 22 core skills in 
their study of Senior Investigating Officers, which they organized in three 
clusters: investigative ability; knowledge levels; and management skills.   
 
Smith and Flanagan (2000) quoted a detective sergeant involved in the study, 
“Some of the „skills‟ of the best investigators are inherent in the individual”.  
Interviewees used terms like passion, commitment, dedication, charisma.  Also 
tenacity, attention to detail, patience, enthusiasm, being a „people‟ person, 
sympathy, honesty and an appropriate sense of humour. The more „effective‟ 
Senior Investigating Officers were identified as those that were naturally gifted 
with many of these personal characteristics. 
 
Similarities to the role of accident investigator can also be found in those of  a 
scientist or researcher which require data gathering and analysis skills, 
communication skills (written, oral and interpersonal) as well as management 
skills (leadership and project management skills) (FHCRC, 2009).  
 
The three clusters identified in the Smith and Flanagan study (2000) are 
comparable to the delineation made in the RAND study at the National 
Transportation Safety Board in the United States (Sarsfield et al, 2000). 
 
Sarsfield et al (2000) determined three skill sets required by accident 
investigators:  
 basic investigation skills – to understand the application of the 
appropriate methodology and the requisite steps to successful 
investigation output; 
 management skills – both in the coordination of an investigation team or 
process and the day-to-day administrative tasks; 
 technical skills – domain and industry expertise and experience. 
 
Of these three, the last skill – technical – is seen as the least static.  Indeed, 
Sarsfield et al (2000) described it as “perishable”, by which they suggested that 
with the advances in technology and the changes to system designs, 
knowledge may have a „shelf life‟ and require continual updating to ensure 
relevance and maintain currency.  
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They also concluded that the skill set required for investigations would vary 
unpredictably from accident to accident and often demand reactive self 
education, particularly when the aircraft type was unknown or unfamiliar.  Given 
the relative stability of the investigation and management skill sets, it is 
postulated that these will provide a firm grounding upon which the less irregular 
technical skills could be based. 
 
Robinson et al (2005) conducted a study to determine requisite skills and 
abilities in  aerospace design engineers, both for the current role and for the 
future.  Their findings illustrated the organization‟s need to balance cognitive 
and personal attributes with technical expertise in their engineers but that it was 
anticipated that non-technical skills would become increasingly important to the 
success of the organization.  Aptitude for learning and intellectual capacity were 
found to be more relevant than crystallized intelligence or technical knowledge. 
 
In his description of the responsibilities of expert witnesses (a duty which many 
accident investigators are called on to perform), Pamplin (2000) might have 
been describing accident investigators in general when he stated that their 
responsibilities or duties are “… to be truthful as to fact, thorough in technical 
reasoning, honest as to opinion and complete in coverage of relevant matters”. 
 
Pamplin went on to state that the desired qualities are: 
 A sound knowledge of the subject matter 
 The powers of analytical reasoning 
 The ability to communicate findings and opinions clearly and concisely 
 The flexibility of mind to modify opinions in the light of fresh evidence or 
counter-arguments 
 The ability to „think on one‟s feet‟ 
 A demeanour that is likely to inspire confidence. 
 
“There are few roles as specialised or as skilled as accident investigation that 
do not carry a specific professional qualification or accreditation.” (Braithwaite, 
2002).  Within the aviation industry the AAIB Inspectors are held in high esteem, 
and doubtless the same could be said for the MAIB Inspectors.  This is due to a 
long history where credibility grows out of a combination of thorough 
investigations, impartiality and integrity.  The RAIB faced an immediate 
challenge when it formed in that it did not have the same longevity and 
credibility to bolster its reputation and as such, does not assume such 
„unassailability‟, particularly when facing a legal assault.   
 
AIB Inspectors appear in court as expert witnesses – or at the very least, in the 
case of the RAIB, as witnesses of fact.  Whilst they may have qualifications or 
licences as pilots, masters or engineers, there has been no specific recognized 
qualification for the position of accident investigator nor system of accreditation 
until recently. 
 
Membership of a professional organization such as the International Society of 
Air Safety Investigators (ISASI) or the Marine Accident Investigators‟ 
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International Forum (MAIIF) is not a sufficient indicator of expertise.  To become 
a Member of ISASI requires an individual to be “An Air Safety Investigator who 
is, or has been actively engaged in the investigation of aircraft accidents or 
incidents or conducted accident prevention activities designed to identify, 
eliminate or control aviation hazards before they result in accidents or incidents, 
including representatives from aircraft manufacturers, air carriers, the military, 
other government agencies, and members of aviation professional groups.”  
(ISASI, 2007).  This position should have been held for not less than five years 
and any applicant must have participated in at least ten aircraft accident 
investigations.  It does not specify what types of accident investigations qualify 
(large scale, minor, desk based) nor does it define what an individual‟s role or 
responsibility should have been within that accident investigation.  Braithwaite 
(2004) questions whether this defines a level of competence or simply suggests 
a level of commensurate experience.  
 
MAIIF membership is not as prescriptive and is offered to any individual 
appointed as a marine accident investigator or any person employed in the 
process of marine accident investigation. 
 
The question remains as to what part, if any, professional bodies such as ISASI 
or MAIIF should play in ensuring the competence of its membership.  Should 
inclusion within such a group ascribe inferred capabilities and if so, how can 
these be measured?  Could the experience requirement be better supported 
with levels of continuing professional development as a means of endorsing the 
„expertise‟ of the investigators? 
 
The newly launched MCIA state one of their objectives to be “to develop and 
encourage the acceptance of a unified matrix of desired competencies for 
maritime casualty investigation.”  Links to an external maritime training provider 
indicate that these competencies can be measured and appraised through the 
use of a competency assurance system (IDESS, 2009).  Further evaluation of 
their literature suggests, however, that the terms competence and competency 
have been conflated as the fundamental units of measurement are competence 
– the ability to perform specific tasks to a specific standard. 
 
Acknowledging the lack of recognized qualifications available in accident 
investigation, a number of organizations have sought to provide a solution.  In 
2002, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau became nationally accredited as 
a Registered Training Organisation enabling them to formalize their “… 
minimum operational training requirement‟ for investigators in a Diploma of 
Transport Safety Investigation, based upon a vocational training model.  There 
is an expectation that trainees will dedicate approximately 700 hours to the 
qualification which includes core based training to complement and supplement 
any shortfalls in prior knowledge or competences, as well as on-the-job training 
and experience. The Diploma has been successfully implemented and has 
received international approval. (ATSB, 2002). 
 
36 
Continuing Education Units or equivalents can be earned by individuals who 
participate in approved training activities, research and development or 
approved programmes such as the accident investigation courses offered by, 
amongst others, the National Transportation Safety Board or the Southern 
California Safety Institute.  Such credits contribute to continuing professional 
development. 
 
In the UK, Cranfield University now offers a part-time MSc in Safety and 
Accident Investigation (Air Transport) for which credits can be accrued by 
attendance on their six week Aircraft Accident Investigation course.  In addition, 
there are shorter Postgraduate Certificates and Postgraduate Diplomas offered 
for those seeking a formal postgraduate qualification in the field. 
 
Two of the AIBs have actively pursued accreditation as a means whereby 
certification of “… competency, authority or credibility” is presented.  This 
accreditation, however, is approached from differing perspectives based upon 
the requirements of the Branches. 
 
The MAIB have focused on demonstrating competence through internal 
accreditation.  Their accident investigation accreditation scheme (Professional 
Standards of Competence in Accident Investigation), implemented in January 
2007 (MAIB, 2007b), measures competence of its Inspectors against a 
framework associated with the major activities in which they are involved.  The 
researcher assisted with the development of the framework that was loosely 
based upon the National Occupational Standards for Forensic Science (Skills 
for Justice, 2006).  The investigation process was broken down into meaningful 
units (for example, evidence collection, evidence analysis) and then further 
subdivided into discrete tasks.  For each set of tasks or elements specific 
performance criteria were established along with knowledge and understanding 
requirements.  These are absolute measures of competence and Inspectors are 
expected to demonstrate the skill or articulate the required level of knowledge in 
order to attain the „tick in the box‟.  These competences are linked to a “… 
specialised learning system of theoretical and practical modules” (MAIB, 2008). 
 
The researcher felt that such a competence framework complements rather 
than conflicts with the current research study and its synergies will be discussed 
in more detail during the Discussion chapter of this thesis. 
 
The RAIB, it is surmised, are looking to increase their professional standing 
within the industry by pursuing external accreditation with an accredited 
certification body.   The process of evaluation should be similar in practice:  
Inspectors‟ knowledge and skills will be measured against the required standard 
to determine competence.  Once established, accreditation will ensue.  What is 
not clear is whether this accreditation is given to the RAIB as a whole or to 
individual Inspectors as with the MAIB‟s scheme. 
 
Accreditation is widely accepted as bringing an element of trust and verification 
into courts where one is purporting to represent expertise.  As George (2003) 
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commented, “ … the primary purpose of the accreditation debate was to 
produce a system that would endorse an individual‟s professional competencies 
and standing in the eyes of the legal community, and ultimately support the 
acceptance of the accredited person as an expert witness.” 
 
That said, accreditation does not necessarily find complete favour with the 
judicial system.  Lord Woolf‟s “Access to Justice Report” states that an 
exclusive reliance upon accredited expert witnesses would narrow the pool of 
available experts creating an uncompetitive monopoly on “professional experts‟” 
out of touch with current practice in their fields.  What was wanted in an expert 
witness was “… a specialist who is up to speed in current practice and who 
attests to a professional set of standards.” (Woolf, 1996). 
 
The skills and experience required can be dependent upon the philosophy and 
structure of the organization.  As explained earlier, national independent 
accident investigation agencies can be described as multimodal or unimodal – 
the organization‟s remit may cover many modes or just the one.  And further 
variation exists within what constitutes multimodal. The National Transportation 
Safety Board headquarters in the US houses domain specific investigators.  
Within each transportation function, for example, air, there are specialists 
whose frame of reference within an investigation is limited and constrained by 
that specialism.  The UK accident investigators, by contrast, are treated more 
as “specialist generalists” in that they are expected to step outside their specific 
areas of previous expertise and tackle an infinite assortment of accidents.  
Countries such as the Netherlands and Finland have taken the principle of 
generalism one stage further by encouraging cross modal experience. 
 
This standpoint assumes that an investigator can be trained in accident 
investigation techniques and mode not withstanding, will be able to produce as 
detailed and accurate a report as an investigator with years of experience and 
pursuant acquired knowledge in that industry. 
 
2.9 Defining the role 
 
When constructing a model of an occupational role, there are a number of 
perspectives from which to approach the task.  An individual can be described 
by the specific tasks that comprise the role, the behaviour exhibited whilst 
performing the task and the psychological constructs employed.  These three 
differences in approach have formed the basic philosophy behind the numerous 
occupational analysis techniques available for use. 
 
Leaving psychological constructs aside, there are, however, currently two 
approaches which purport to underpin all aspects of the human resources 
structure - from recruitment and selection, through training, appraisal and 
compensation: job analysis and competency modelling.  Both claim to be able 
to offer efficiency savings and enhanced performance; both have been the 
focus of extensive research and literature and yet, they appear, at face value to 
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approach the question from diametrically opposing directions.  Both have been 
subject to the vagaries of fashion and semantic confusion, to the point that their 
epistemological perspectives have blurred.  
 
Job analysis has historically been viewed as a predominantly work oriented 
approach and competency modelling, worker oriented but proposing such a 
clear cut distinction would be a fallacy.  As will be shown in subsequent 
discussion the similarities and crossover between the two serve more to 
perpetuate the “… morass of semantic confusion” (Kershner, 1955) rather than 
to clarify. 
 
Until now the work versus worker oriented approaches have largely remained 
separate or where combined through ignorance rather than design have 
produced skewed and meaningless data (Woodruffe, 1990).  There is, however, 
an increasing call in the literature for a „blended‟ approach (Schippmann et al, 
2000; Brannick and Levine, 2002).   
 
The present study suggests that it is more beneficial to see the two approaches 
not as completely distinctive constructs but as points along a continuum with the 
evaluation and measurement of individual task steps (time and motion studies) 
at one extreme and the concept of organizational competencies at the other 
(from micro to macro) and the majority of the research amassed medially.  
Specifying the requirement of the information sought (for example, for 
recruitment or job evaluation) will thus determine the most applicable 
methodology for eliciting and representing the data – that is, how far along the 
continuum you should be.  
 
Subsequent sections will outline the definitions, applications and historical 
contexts of job analysis and competency modelling as distinctive constructs as 
well as looking at crossovers in theory and overarching methodologies. 
 
2.9.1  Job analysis 
 
Job analysis is essentially concerned with the collection and analysis of any 
type of job-related information (Tiffin and McCormick, 1965; Ash, 1988).  It is an 
umbrella term, including a multitude of data collection techniques, the suitability 
of each being determined by its fit to the research objective.  Definitions in the 
literature consistently use the terms „systematic‟, „analytical‟, „reliable‟ and 
„accurate‟ (Pearn and Kandola, 1988; Primoff and Fine, 1988) to denote its 
scientific derivation.  Importantly, it should be based upon units of observable 
behaviour to reduce the need for drawing inferences. 
 
It can be seen in a purely mechanistic way as a process whereby “… a job is 
dissected into its component parts and those parts are studied to decipher the 
nature of the work” (Gael, 1983) or more broadly as a multivarious “… host of 
activities, all of which are directed toward discovering, understanding, and 
describing what people do at work” (Brannick and Levine, 2002).   
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Depending upon the requirements of the exercise, job analysis can be used to 
determine information regarding the work itself (specific tasks) or information 
associated, but not directly involved, with the work (skills and abilities, 
characteristics of the work environment) (Gael, 1983).  It is, above all, designed 
to meet a particular purpose and satisfy a particular need (Primoff and Fine, 
1988); the importance of purpose being manifest in the definition.  Ash (1988) 
describes job analysis as a way of “analyzing reality”.  
 
In the early 20th century the focus of study was upon the potential savings 
available through efficiency initiatives at work such as time and motion studies 
(Taylor, 1911). Further inclusion of worker variables into the analysis of jobs 
was effected by the Gilbreths who were particularly influential in the redesign of 
tasks to meet the needs of workers with “varying potentialities” (Gilbreth and 
Gilbreth, 1919). 
 
The two World Wars provided an enormous impetus to the scientific study of job 
analysis particularly with its applications to military personnel classification and 
placement. Implications for civilian posts were soon recognized and particularly 
in the US, job analysis increased in popularity.   
 
Whilst research into new techniques continued in the post War years (Primoff, 
1953; Flanagan, 1954; McCormick et al, 1972), the popularity enjoyed by job 
analysis in the earlier part of the century waned over time.  It was seen as a dull 
and uninteresting subject matter; an image that it was felt to have self 
perpetuated through lack of development (Pearn and Kandola, 1988).  It was 
“… characterized by neither heated controversy nor prominent visibility in the 
research literature” (Harvey, 1991). 
 
Legislation in the US regarding Equal Opportunities led to a resurgence in 
research in the 1970s, in particular the publishing of the „Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures‟ (1978).  The Guidelines state that the choice 
of a selection procedure should be based on an understanding of the job and 
that to gain an understanding, some method of job analysis should be used.  
Whilst there is no legal requirement to do this, the Guidelines are still in effect 
and used by the courts in the US to determine unlawful discrimination (Brannick 
and Levine, 2002). 
 
The use of job analysis data covers the entire human resources spectrum.  Ash 
(1988) proposed twelve areas where he felt job analysis data could make a 
valuable contribution: job descriptions; job classifications; job evaluation; job 
design and redesign; human resource requirements and specifications; 
performance appraisal; training; worker mobility; workforce planning; efficiency; 
safety; and legal requirements.  His list sought brevity from previous groupings 
such as Zerga (1943), Gagne (1963), Prien and Ronan (1971), Wilson (1974), 
McCormick (1976) and Dunnette and Borman (1979) although interestingly 
Zerga (1943) included investigating accidents in his summary.  Absent but 
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perhaps implicit in Ash‟s list is the area of academic research within industry 
and organizations.    
 
2.9.2  Competency modelling 
 
Schippmann et al (2000) surveyed 37 subject matter experts from a variety of 
different backgrounds in the development and application of competency 
models and when asked to define a competency, recorded the following: 
“Observable, behavioural capabilities that are important for performing key 
responsibilities of a role or job”. 
“Mishmash of knowledge, skills and abilities, and job performance 
requirements”. 
 
A review of the literature also offers the following frequently cited definitions: 
“An underlying characteristic of a person.  … a motive, trait, skill, aspect of 
one‟s self image or social role, or a body of knowledge which he or she uses” 
(Boyatzis, 1982). 
“A knowledge, skill, ability or characteristic associated with high performance on 
a job” (Mirabile, 1997). 
“Underlying characteristics of people” (Spencer and Spencer, 1993) indicating 
“… ways of behaving or thinking” (Guion, 1991). 
 
One prevailing concern that emerges from the literature is the lack of a precise 
or commonly held definition of „competency‟ (Schippmann et al, 2000; Garavan 
and McGuire, 2001).  The indiscriminateness is further compounded by the 
tendency to conflate the terms by the use of both „competence‟ and 
„competency‟ which, dependent upon the perspective, are either used 
interchangeably or exist as completely separate entities with entirely different 
precursors and results (Woodruffe, 1990; Rowe, 1995; Rankin, 2001).   
 
Dictionary definitions use the word „competence‟ and „competency‟ as 
synonymous nouns.  The Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 2002) alludes to “… 
a competent capacity”; Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary (CALD, 2003) 
and Longman (2005) defines competency as “… the ability to do something 
well”.  Implicit in this is ability or potential. 
 
The adjective „competent‟ however is less uniformly defined as “… having 
adequate ability, knowledge, power, qualifications; sufficient” (OED, 2002); “… 
able to do something well” (CALD, 2003) and “… having enough skill or 
knowledge to do something to a satisfactory standard” (Longman, 2005).  If a 
clear definition cannot be found amongst the learned lexicographers, then it is 
little wonder that disparities and confusion exist within the social science and 
management literature. 
 
The essential differences between the two terms are their focus, purpose and 
what they purport to summarize (Wood and Payne, 1998).  Rowe (1995) 
defines it thus: “Competence [is] a skill and the standard of performance 
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reached while competency refers to the behaviour by which it is achieved.  In 
other words, one describes what people can do while the other focuses on how 
they do it.”  This is reiterated by Woodruffe (1990) who delineates between 
„competence‟ which defines the area of work at which a person is competent, 
and „competency‟ as the dimensions of behaviour underlying competent 
performance. 
 
The confusion surrounding terminology in this area stems largely from the 
historical context of two seemingly divergent approaches in the US and UK.  In 
essence, the US „competency‟ model emphasizes the personal characteristics 
of superior performers, typically but not exclusively drawn from the 
management population whereas in contrast, the UK construct of „competence‟ 
is task or output focused: it is the job that is deconstructed to its minima not the 
individual‟s attributes.  The standards of competence are more often applied to 
the general workforce as opposed to the management collective.   
 
McClelland (1973) proposed a number of principles that one would use to “test 
for competence … [using] … that word as a symbol for an alternative approach 
to traditional intelligence testing.”  Intelligence tests, he concluded, were not 
reliable or valid predictors of future “life outcomes” and were biased against 
those with lower socioeconomic status and minority groups.   
 
McClelland‟s principles were a marked departure from the methodologies and 
tenets of the time. He proposed relabelling what were traditionally called 
personality variables such as communication skills or patience as 
„competencies‟ (McClelland, 1973).   
 
Spencer and Spencer (1993) proposed five types of competency 
characteristics: 
1. Motives – things that drive or direct behaviour 
2. Traits – physical characteristics and consistent responses to situations 
3. Self concept – attitudes, values or self image 
4. Knowledge – specific content area information 
5. Skill – ability to perform a task 
 
They introduced an iceberg model to show the relative depths of these 
characteristics.  Surface skill and knowledge are relatively easy to identify and 
develop through training.  The deeper, core personality characteristics, 
however, are less easily assessed and less amenable to training interventions.  
Spencer and Spencer suggest that it is therefore more cost effective to select or 
recruit for them. 
 
Competencies and competency modelling have been embraced by a US 
business community who had largely turned away from job analysis towards a 
technique which offered them a business advantage in an increasingly 
competitive marketplace (Horton, 2000a).  Surveys at the end of the 1990s of 
competency-based practice showed that between 75-80% of companies 
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surveyed in the US were using such a competency model (Cook and Bernthal, 
1998). This figure will have undoubtedly increased in recent years. 
 
In the UK, competency models have been widely applied in both the private and 
public sectors (Horton, 2000a; Rankin, 2004) and whether or not it is merely an 
en vogue human resources construct, it nevertheless purports to provide a 
common language, readily understood by all facets of industry. 
 
The UK has also been a major proponent of the „competence‟ movement, 
emerging as a result of changing technology and improved performance 
(Horton, 2000a).  The UK had been criticized for a focus upon levels of 
knowledge in industry and not its application.  This had led to a growing skills 
gap and the call for a more vocational approach to training and education.   
 
The Management Charter Initiative (MCI), created in 1988 as an employer-led 
organization, supported by Government and the British Institute of 
Management, was part the UK‟s response to this increasing gap.  Its aim was to 
“… improve the performance of UK organizations by improving the quality of UK 
managers” (Cheng et al, 2003).  By establishing standards of appropriate 
performance, the MCI intended to bring all managers up to a requisite level in 
terms of skill and behaviour.   
 
A comparable programme was initiated for the general workforce and in the 
same year the National Council for Vocational Qualifications, as it was called at 
the time, was established to “… secure standards for occupational competence” 
(Jessup, 1991 cited in Cheng et al, 2003).  Although there have been differing 
oversight bodies and nomenclature in recent years, the desire to reduce the 
skills gap and improve productivity in the UK has remained.  Strategic partners 
now contribute to the development of National Occupational Standards (NOS).  
NOS set out measurable performance outcomes to which an individual is 
expected to work in a given occupation with the skills, knowledge and 
understanding required to perform competently in the workplace, and have 
formed the basis of the MAIB‟s Professional Standards of Competence in 
Accident Investigation framework. This allows, in a similar way to the American 
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) database, a common understanding 
and definition of job roles and standards of performance expected. 
 
A major criticism, particularly of the MCI standards, was that it was focusing on 
establishing „adequate‟ performance where adequate equates to basic.  In the 
meritocratic US, the focus was clearly on superior performance - a reflection, 
perhaps, of differing business cultures. 
 
There is, however, an indication that the US search for excellence and the UK 
systematic description of skills for a role are beginning to converge.  In 1994, a 
National Skills Standards Board (NSSB) was established in the US to 
encourage the development of a voluntary set of occupational standards which 
were assessable (Horton, 2000a).   
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Conversely, there has been a burgeoning of competency modelling within the 
UK (Pickett, 1998; Horton, 2000a) with upward of 95% of the UK Civil Service, 
to whom the AIBs belong, having adopted or in the process of adopting 
competency-based management (Horton, 2000b).  
 
Encouraged by the success of US models, many British companies have 
identified the use of competencies as a means of establishing and maintaining 
competitive advantage over rivals although as indicated by Smith (2005), how 
can discrimination between competitors be validly based upon a competency 
model when ten of the most cited competencies are to be found within two 
thirds of competency models? 
 
Competency models, not unlike job analysis data, can be used to underpin the 
entire human resources strategy, providing a common language for an 
organization and a means of fair and consistent assessment. 
 
Models vary enormously between organizations; each adapting the framework 
to suit their business requirements and maturity.  There are clear warnings 
against overcomplicating the process by creating an unworkable number of 
competencies.  Surveys have shown that between 8 and 12 competencies is 
common and more practical although some companies have identified over one 
hundred. 
 
By way of an example, Rankin‟s 2004 survey into 49 employers‟ core 
frameworks found the top twelve competencies (in order of prevalence) to be: 
team orientation; communication; people management; customer focus; results 
orientation; problem solving; planning and organizing; technical skills; 
leadership; business awareness; decision making; and change orientation. 
 
Competency headings on their own are not sufficient to assess capabilities: 
they are often too ambiguous to be used consistently.  It is usual to develop 
further layers beneath including definitions, behavioural indicators and in some 
cases performance levels with behavioural examples. Some organizations 
include negative behavioural descriptors as an acknowledgement of workplace 
reality.  The most important consideration when constructing the framework is to 
determine how the model will be most effectively used in the long term. 
 
The Inspectors, as employees of the Department for Transport, are Civil 
Servants: members of the permanent bureaucracy of Crown employees that 
supports UK Government Ministers.  As with many large organizations within 
the UK, the Civil Service implements a competency framework: in fact, there 
appear to be a number in use dependent upon the level of seniority and which 
department or agency one is associated with.  
 
Given that competencies were originally conceived as “… identifiers of what 
separates the best from the rest” (Kanaga, 2007), the researcher was interested 
to discover their use with respect to the accident investigators.  One such 
model, the Professional Skills for Government framework, was designed to 
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ensure that staff within the Civil Service, regardless of department or agency, 
have the “… right mix of skills and expertise” to deliver effective services. 
 
Designed for senior grades (which would include the grades for AIB Inspectors), 
the Professional Skills for Government framework has at its heart the concept of 
leadership: providing direction; delivering results; building capability and acting 
with integrity. 
 
This leadership is then complemented with the four core skills of people 
management; financial management; programme and project management; and 
analysis and use of evidence.   
 
The AIBs are measured at both an individual and a Branch level.  In a written 
response to a question posed by Greg Knight MP regarding performance 
assessment of the RAIB, Derek Twigg, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary at 
the Department for Transport, responded that the Secretary of State assesses 
the work of the RAIB (and from that one might infer the same would happen for 
the AAIB and MAIB) on an on-going basis by looking at the quality of the 
investigation reports issued.  This was in addition to one-to-one meetings with 
the Chief Inspector. 
 
At an individual level, the researcher was shown the DfT Inspector‟s 
Performance Report; an annual appraisal covering all three AIBs.  Assessed as 
„not achieved‟, „achieved‟ or „exceeded‟, Inspectors were rated in terms of the 
following three areas: level of professional knowledge/skills; application of 
professional skills to accident investigations; and writing and follow-up of reports 
and recommendations.  Each area was further broken down into assessable 
competences, as shown below.  Inspectors could be said to either have 
demonstrated that competence or not.  The level of detail provided is limited 
which may have implications for completely objective assessment.  Note should 
be taken that the level of measurement is now competence and not 
competency.  It is presumed that this assessment complements the 
Professional Standards of Competence in Accident Investigation and does not  
seek to replace it.  
 
Level of professional knowledge/skills: The objective is to develop professional 
skills to investigate and report on accidents to meet the level of expertise 
required by the Branch.  Inspectors are required to demonstrate current 
knowledge and expertise in the areas of trends in accidents and accident 
investigation, industry developments, specialism developments, investigative 
interviewing and processes, evidence identification, collection and preservation, 
and developments in operational technology and IT. 
 
Application of professional skills to accident investigations:  The objective is to 
work within agreed time-scales, conduct investigations thoroughly, involving 
external stakeholders as necessary, obtaining and preserving all human and 
physical evidence, and analysing it accurately to provide a true picture of the 
causes of an accident.  This is demonstrated by responding to an accident 
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within agreed times and procedures, effectively project managing contribution to 
every investigation, identifying and managing risks, dealing sensitively and 
appropriately with all stakeholders, the media and the bereaved, properly 
managing physical evidence, effectively gathering human evidence and using a 
range of appropriate investigative techniques. 
 
Writing and follow-up of reports and recommendations:  The objective is to 
produce timely written reports that explain accurately the causes of an accident 
and offer sound, well considered recommendations to prevent similar events 
occurring in the future.  This is to be demonstrated by producing reports and 
coroner‟s statements within deadlines; constructing reports to Branch 
procedures; writing in clear, plain English, taking audience need into account; 
ensuring reports are accurate, thorough, balanced and objective with 
conclusions and recommendations based on clear logical analysis; and 
effectively managing post-publication actions. 
 
In 2000, the Job Analysis and Competency Modeling Task Force (JACMTF) 
published a report on the “Practice of Competency Modeling” (Schippman et al, 
2000).  The Task Force, sponsored by the Professional Practice Committee and 
the Scientific Affairs Committee of the Society for Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology in the US, conducted a two year investigation into the increasing 
use of competency modelling by human resources professionals and its 
correlation with the more established job analysis techniques.   
 
One aspect that they considered during their investigation was the perceived 
differences between the two constructs; some subject matter experts 
questioned believed that they were one and the same but the vast majority cited 
the work (job analysis) versus worker (competency modelling) focus as the 
main differentiator.  Given that under the umbrella of job analysis techniques 
such a split already exists, this was a convenient but not altogether satisfying 
conclusion.  
 
The JACMTF concluded that one of the weaknesses of both approaches was 
the need for making inferential leaps from the product of the research.  Utilizing 
either the job analysis or competency modelling data to inform a human 
resources decision or application and feeling satisfied with its validity could be 
eased by the presence of ten variables which they believed would “… 
essentially serve as evaluative criteria” and enhance the “… rigor of the 
research methodology” (Schippmann et al, 2000).   
 
The variables against which they measured both approaches were: method of 
investigation; type of descriptor content collected; procedures for developing 
descriptor content; detail of descriptor content; link to business goals and 
strategies; content review; ranking descriptor content; assessment of reliability; 
item/category retention criteria; and documentation.   
 
When evaluated against this model, job analysis was seen to be „superior‟ in all 
categories with one exception: link to business goals and strategies.  Brannick 
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and Levine (2002) determined that job analysis was better at obtaining the 
necessary information but failed to effectively communicate its value to its 
users.  The value of competency modelling therefore is not in its scientific rigour 
and validity but how it imbues functions with the focus and direction of the 
business.  Its attraction to the business community, if not the scientific 
community, is clear – “… it links explicitly the results of the modeling effort with 
the organization‟s outcomes of interest” (Brannick and Levine, 2002). 
 
Job analysis and competency modelling include an array of data elicitation and 
collection techniques (Gael, 1988). They vary significantly in their 
methodologies and use, and there is an overlap of application.   
 
Within the job analysis literature there is a convenient if sometimes fuzzy 
delineation between those analysis techniques which focus upon what the 
worker does in terms of function, tasks, context, tools etc. and how the worker 
performs the task: which attributes are requisite.  The work versus worker 
approaches.  In many respects this mirrors the distinction between job analysis 
and competency modelling as a whole and serves to confuse rather than clarify.  
To compound this confusion further, job analysis also proposes hybrid 
methodologies, combining both work and worker orientations (Brannick and 
Levine, 2002). 
 
The underlying principles of one method, the Combination Job Analysis Method 
(C-JAM) were of particular interest to the researcher and as such, an overview 
is now provided. 
 
C-JAM (Levine, 1983) borrows from both job analysis and competency 
modelling to provide information about what tasks are performed and the 
requisite skills and attributes for the role.  Essentially, task statements are 
developed and the importance of the tasks rated.  The knowledge, skills, 
abilities and other personal characteristics (KSAOs) needed to perform the task 
are described and rated, again in terms of their importance.   
 
The process appears to be quite labour intensive, initially requiring a group of 
job experts to individually generate a list of approximately fifty task statements 
for the job under analysis.  Tasks are defined as involving the “change, or an 
attempt at changing some material, person, product, subject matter, or set of 
data from one form to another form.  The change is attempted by means of a 
worker‟s efforts either applied directly or exerted through the use of particular 
tools, machinery, equipment or work aids.” (Levine, 1983).  Task statements are 
written with an implied subject, verb, object and end with a purpose for the 
action. 
 
A list of between 30-100 task statements will be compiled by the researcher for 
rating by the job experts with regards to the relative time spent, the relative task 
difficulty and the criticality of the task (the degree to which incorrect 
performance would result in negative consequences).  Ratings are made on a 7 
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point Likert-type scale.  From these results the task importance value is 
calculated where task importance is equal to difficulty x criticality + time spent. 
 
Subsequently, the list of task statements are used by the job experts to 
generate examples of knowledge, skills, abilities and other personal 
characteristics (KSAOs) required to perform the tasks with an objective of 
creating 100 KSAOs.  The same group of job experts are then tasked with 
rating these KSAOs in terms of whether they are necessary for newly hired 
employees, whether they are practical to expect in the labour market, to what 
extent trouble is likely if the KSAO is ignored during selection and lastly, to what 
extent the different levels of the KSAO distinguished the superior from the 
average worker. 
 
Levine (1983) and later, Brannick and Levine (2002) propose that the results 
can be used to inform job design and evaluation as well as selection and 
training and as such, the researcher felt that the technique was worthy of 
consideration for use in the study.  The researcher was particularly interested in 
the scales used to rate the KSAOs and these have been utilized, albeit in a 
modified manner, during the course of the research (see Chapter 3 for 
elaboration).  
 
This research has sought to employ a broad definition of a competency to 
include knowledge, skills, attitude and behaviours, thus largely removing the 
„conceptual ambiguity‟ of the term (Robinson et al, 2005).  It will enable both 
work and worker oriented competencies to be considered simultaneously. 
 
Robinson et al (2005) suggest two main approaches to competency modelling 
which have implications for this present study.  Based upon Boam and Sparrow 
(1992), they differentiate between a top-down approach utilizing existing 
predetermined competency labels, determining which ones are relevant or 
appropriate to the job being analysed and a more labour-intensive bottom-up 
approach where labels are emergent from interview data.  The latter method 
has greater affinity with the methodological philosophy adopted in this research 
and will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
 
The literature review for this research study has been relatively broad.  Given 
the minimal academic literature pertaining to the requisite qualities of an 
accident investigator, the researcher chose to widen the review to illustrate the 
psychological, moral and economic drivers for accident investigation within the 
transport industry.  Despite differing cultures and histories, there is commonality 
in the intent of the three UK Accident Investigation Branches, supported by the 
national, international and legal context in which they operate.  And yet, despite 
the overarching rules and guidance, the process for investigating accident is 
sufficiently varied so as to produce disquiet about its claims to be transparent 
and trustworthy.  Conflictions in underlying philosophies can lead to 
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contradictory perspectives, compounded by a myriad of available but 
inconsistently applied analysis techniques.   
 
At the heart of the process is the accident investigator.  The romantic image of 
the inscrutable detective is supported by the popular literature but little 
academic work appears to have been undertaken regarding the assessment of 
skills and behaviours required for effective accident investigation. 
 
The literature has shown that there are a number of techniques available for 
defining occupational roles and concludes that the most appropriate one for the 
purposes of this research is competency modelling.  The terms „competency‟ 
and „competence‟ are often (erroneously) conflated but this chapter has defined 
what they purport to represent and measure. 
 
Based upon this review, the research seeks to utilize the construct of 
competency modelling to determine the requisite skills qualities and behaviours 
in an effective accident investigator, developing a framework which can be 
blended with extant competence standards to strengthen and complement 
whilst answering a call in the literature for the combined use of both measures 
of performance. 
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3.0 Methodology 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter is written in two parts: methodology and method.  It summarizes 
the philosophical perspective underpinning this research, accounts for the 
methodology adopted and describes the methods and analytical techniques 
employed.  
 
3.2  Methodology and philosophical considerations 
 
Within the discussion of the philosophy of social research there remain many 
unresolved arguments (Toft and Reynolds, 1994).  The diverse nomenclature 
serves to confuse particularly when competing terms appear to be describing a 
similar perspective.  Chia (2002) notes the “… seemingly wide panoply of 
theoretical perspectives … proffered in recent times in the social sciences”.  
Perhaps they are more usefully considered as a valuable means of situating 
one‟s research along a philosophical continuum.  At either pole sit the extremist 
views: positivist, objective „scientific‟ method vs constructionist, subjective 
relativism, representing “… various amalgams of two opposing epistemological 
impulses” (Chia, 2002).  Determining where along that continuum the research 
sits enables us to better understand and articulate the research objectives and 
assumptions (Williams and May, 1996). 
 
A positivist epistemology would posit that reality is something that is real and 
apprehensible; an objective data set exists to describe and explain the subject 
matter.  Through explaining comes the ability to predict (Perry et al, 1999).  “An 
objective truth exists in the world which can be revealed by the scientific 
method” (Cassell and Symon, 1994). But is this notion of absolute truth illusory?  
Particularly when the object of research is in part a socially constructed 
phenomenon. 
 
The researcher in the positivist tradition remains an objective outsider – an 
impartial observer of fact.  This, along with a drive for numerical analysis and 
quantification and a highly structured methodology which lends itself to 
replication, makes the scientific method intuitively appealing (Cassell and 
Symon, 2004) but with little of the flexibility required by this research study.   
 
The opposing view to positivism is constructionism where a purely subjective 
perspective is adopted.  Realities are constructed based upon experience and 
as such are multiple and interpretivist.  This increasingly influential approach “… 
draws attention to the fact that human experience, including perception, is 
mediated historically, culturally and linguistically.  That is, what we perceive and 
experience is never a direct reflection of environmental conditions but must be 
understood as a specific reading of these conditions.” (Willig, 2001).   
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However, as Bryman (1996) points out “ … polarization of interests … prevents 
fruitful discussions.” 
 
Borch and Arthur (1995; cited in Perry et al, 1999) argue for a blended 
approach combining the strengths of both extremes aiming to “… blend the 
rigour of the „scientific validity‟ of objectivist research with the contextual 
elements and insights of subjectivist research” (Perry et al, 1999).  A mix of both 
objective and subjective perspectives can help to mitigate the criticism that 
research is not capturing “… real world complexity.”  Perry et al (1999) suggest 
taking this blend one stage further by replacing it with a third approach – 
realism. 
 
This doctoral research has been influenced by what might be thought of as the 
„middle ground‟ – the realism paradigm.  This conceptual framework argues that 
reality exists outside of the subjects but that people‟s experiences will shape 
their interpretation of it.  Reality is „real‟ but unlike positivism, this reality is not 
perfectly apprehensible.  Understanding such a reality requires „triangulation‟ 
from many sources.  Perception in itself is not reality but “… a window onto 
reality through which a picture of reality can be triangulated with other 
perceptions.” (Perry et al, 1999).  In essence, to understand how someone sees 
the world requires looking at their „reality‟ from a number of different viewpoints. 
 
“Reality, for the realists, comprises things, structures, events and underlying 
„generative mechanisms‟ which, regardless of whether they are observable, are 
none the less „real‟” (Chia, 2002).  It exists and acts independently of our 
observations, of our thoughts and beliefs, indicating that “… there are large-
scale forces and processes that affect people without their necessarily being 
aware of the existence of such influences on their interpretations and 
behaviours.” (Saunders et al, 2003). 
 
Perry (2002) inserts a caveat: given the complexity of the social science study, 
all knowledge gained is real but must be considered fallible. 
 
What kind of knowledge a methodology aims to produce is dependent upon its 
epistemological position (Willig, 2001).  Epistemology addresses questions 
regarding knowledge: What is knowledge? How is knowledge acquired and 
what do people know?  Is knowledge hard and tangible or soft and subjective?  
What does or does not constitute warranted or valid knowledge? (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002).  Epistemology is driven by the relationship between the 
research and „reality‟.  How this reality is defined is a question of ontology.  Is 
the reality external or internal to the subjects under study?  Is it something that 
exists objectively outside of the individual or something that the individual 
subjectively generates? (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  It is the “… essence of 
phenomena” and the nature of their existence (Gill and Johnson, 2002).  
Realism, not unlike positivism, stems from an ontology of „being‟ – reality is 
assumed to be relatively stable and discrete (Chia, 2002).  This is in contrast to 
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a „becoming‟ ontology as would be seen with more interpretivist or 
constructionist viewpoints. 
 
Aligning research with an approach, therefore, has important implications for 
methodology and research design (Freeman, 2003).  Blaikie (1993) comments 
that “In adopting an approach to social enquiry, the researcher is buying into a 
set of choices with far reaching implications.”  
 
One of the downsides to affiliation with a particular philosophy is that the 
paradigm can dictate which types of research questions are „legitimate‟.  The 
researcher was concerned that this should not negate the validity of data 
gleaned from the research if it was seen as being based upon ideologically 
„incompatible‟ methodologies. 
 
Research has been described as a “… journey of adventure” (Miller and 
Crabtree, 1992): the inference being that one embarks on the voyage without 
knowing quite what to expect and this is particularly most pertinent to research 
which follows qualitative form. Whilst the freedom to pursue whatever lines of 
social inquiry appear most interesting is ultimately gratifying, the non-
prescriptive format can often be quite daunting.  Clearly defined boundaries or 
variables are expected in many forms of research and yet, the social scientist 
often rails against such conformity. 
 
With small samples, quantitative comparisons can only be suggestive 
(Freeman, 2003).  It was therefore determined that the most appropriate form 
for the research to take would be qualitative.  This aligned with the researcher‟s 
philosophical perspective that the accident investigator is not a „nomothetically 
described phenomenon‟; that is, what is learned about accident investigators 
through this research is not necessarily generalizable to other non-related 
groups and would, therefore, be better suited to an ideographic approach where 
their „uniqueness‟ could be studied in context. 
 
The researcher also felt that a prescriptive fixed methodology would provide 
less useful or meaningful information and that the requirements should be 
emergent from the research process and not shape it.  Research plans are 
revised in respect to things planned but not accomplished or unforeseen 
changes which had to be made as the opportunity arose.  “The tidiness and 
orderliness of design are usually replaced by the fuzziness and compromise of 
practice.” (Hall and Hall, 1996).  A flexible qualitative approach was therefore 
more fitting with “progressive focusing” as the concepts developed and 
narrowed during the course of the research (Hall and Hall, 1996). 
 
Qualitative research is interested in how people make sense of the world.  “The 
quality and texture of experience rather than with the identification of cause-
effect relationships.”(Willig, 2001).  It focuses upon interpretation as opposed to 
quantification and seeks to describe and understand as opposed to explain and 
predict. 
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Tracing its history back to the beginning of the 20th century, anthropologists 
such as Boas, Mead et al, developed a fieldwork method whereby observers 
immersed themselves within another culture to study the customs, habits, 
beliefs and behaviours of that society.  These approaches enabled researchers 
to develop understanding from the perspective of the „researched‟.   
 
Qualitative research is characterized by being largely exploratory in focus.  
Whereas quantitative research aims to test hypotheses, a qualitative study will 
facilitate a direct experience of the research object.  But, as Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005) concede, “… qualitative research is difficult to define clearly.  It has no 
theory or paradigm that is distinctly its own”. 
 
This type of research, as a set of interpretive activities, “… privileges no single 
methodological practice over another.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) and is 
inherently multimethod in focus (Flick, 2002).  This “reflects an attempt to 
secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question”.  Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005) posit that objective reality can never be captured.  
 
Dawson et al (2006) assert that “Researchers should adopt a problem-focused 
methodological pluralism in which divisive theoretical alliances are overcome in 
the quest for useable knowledge.”  This reiterates a call for methodological 
pluralism, where the phenomenon observed requires multiple methods to 
account for its nature, and complementarity: “Different kinds of information 
about man and society are gathered most fully and economically in different 
ways, and the problem under investigation properly dictates the methods of 
investigation …” (Trow, 1957 cited in Gill and Johnson, 2002). 
 
“Unlike quantitative methods where technical sophistication of method and 
statistics are the hallmark of good research, qualitative researchers need 
reflective skills, and flexibility of method and theorising.” (Bishop, 2007).   
 
Research rigour is often seen as being dependent upon the adoption of the 
concepts and terminology of positivist research, with particular reference to 
validity and reliability (Morse et al, 2002). Sandelowski (1993) argues that if 
reality is assumed to be „multiple and constructed‟, then “repeatability is not an 
essential (or necessary or sufficient) property of the things themselves”; 
“…issues of validity in qualitative studies should be linked not to „truth‟ or „value‟ 
as they are for the positivists, but rather to „trustworthiness‟”.  (Rolfe, 2006). 
 
Paralleling the conventional criteria of internal and external validity, reliability 
and objectivity, Lincoln and Guba (1985) posit that „trustworthiness‟ in research 
is an important means of evaluating its worth.  Trustworthiness involves 
establishing credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.  
Credibility is built upon the degree of confidence in the „truth‟ of the findings.  Do 
the findings represent a credible conceptual interpretation of the data?  
Demonstration of transferability shows that the findings can apply outside of the 
research context.  Dependability measures the consistency and replicability of 
the findings requiring the appropriate and consistent application of process.  
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Lastly, research is deemed to have confirmability when researcher neutrality 
can be established.  The findings of the research are therefore shaped by the 
respondents and not researcher motivation. 
 
The researcher intends to use a qualitative procedure to determine the 
perceptions of accident investigators regarding performance in the role.  In line 
with Hayes (2000), “The idea is that the end process will result in a theoretical 
overview which is a reasonably thorough reflection of the data which have been 
collected, and which can serve as the basis for future research into the area”.     
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe techniques that can be used in qualitative 
research by which each of the four components of trustworthiness may be 
established.  It is the intention of the researcher to use these techniques during 
subsequent chapters of this thesis to demonstrate trustworthiness in the 
research findings. 
 
3.3  Method 
 
The research study has been broken down into three individual but 
complementary phases; the results of the former phase informing the next. 
 
The first stage called for an exploratory study: “… to find out what is happening; 
to seek new insights; to ask questions; to assess phenomena in a new light and 
to generate ideas and hypotheses for future research” (Robson, 2002). This 
allowed the researcher to become more familiar with the subject, the context 
and enabled a better understanding of the research question, utilizing 
semistructured interviews, literature reviews, background research and 
observation. 
 
Phase 2 involved conducting more in-depth and focused Repertory Grid 
interviews with Principal Inspectors to determine their perspectives of 
behavioural indicators of effectiveness in accident investigation. 
 
The final phase of the research utilized the findings from the previous phase 
and sought to quantify the relative importance of these behavioural indicators 
for the role of accident investigator, in particular in terms of recruitment and 
training.  Each phase will now be described in turn. 
 
3.4  Phase 1 study 
 
Although the researcher had a working knowledge of the policies and 
procedures of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch from previous experience 
in the aviation industry, the finer details of the day-to-day workings of the 
Branch were unknown.  Little was known, too, of the MAIB and at the 
commencement of the research, the RAIB was still in its design stage. 
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A desk top review of Branch and departmental policies and procedures, 
overarching industry and statutory regulations was conducted, but of much 
greater interest was determining whether these written documents reflected 
what actually happened in practice and where deviations, if any, occurred and 
why. 
 
The researcher attended meetings and debriefs in-house in order to gain a 
better understanding of the terminology and language used and also to 
understand more with regards to the day-to-day running of the operation: the 
constraints; the challenges; the opportunities; and the grievances.  It was a 
valuable opportunity to also watch the social interactions of the groups from a 
non-participatory stance. 
 
3.4.1  Interviews with the UK Accident Investigation Branch  
  Inspectors 
 
Semistructured interviews were conducted with Inspectors and Senior 
Inspectors, initially at the AAIB and subsequently with the other two Branches in 
order to gather background information regarding the role of the accident 
investigator.  Combined with desk top reviews and observation of the 
Inspectors, it was proposed that this would give the researcher a better 
understanding of the Branches and the research question.   The sampling was 
purposive rather than random or probabilistic, as is normal for a qualitative 
approach.  There was a limited pool from which to select given the size of the 
organizations involved but the researcher tried to ensure that there was 
representation from the differing specialisms within the modes (eg flight 
operations and engineering at the AAIB; signal engineers and permanent way 
subject experts at RAIB; nautical and engineering at the MAIB) as well as in 
terms of age and length of service.  Flexibility was essential as the stochastic 
nature of their industry sometimes meant that predetermined interviews needed 
to be moved or cancelled.  Many Inspectors found themselves out in the field, 
both home and abroad, for extended periods of time in which case a more 
opportunistic sampling was engaged and alternative interviewees were sought. 
 
The use of semistructured interviews was considered to be an efficient and 
practical way of eliciting data that cannot be readily observed such as 
perceptions or emotions.  It has been described as a technique with high validity 
as it allows a degree of freedom to the respondents to express and explain 
thoughts in depth as well as providing an opportunity for the researcher to 
resolve any apparent contradictions. 
 
It remained incumbent upon the researcher to maintain focus during the 
interviews to counter the tendency for interview „drift‟ but the semistructured 
interview allowed for a “… pause for reflection” (Freeman, 2003) – questions 
could be changed during the course of the interview according to the responses 
from the interviewees; emergent themes could be probed and explored further.  
Freeman (2003) also advocates that researchers make use of this technique 
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particularly where they are less familiar with the field as it permits “… proximity 
to the data” which was particularly relevant to the researcher in this study. 
 
It was important to the researcher that the Inspectors felt themselves to be 
participants in the research as opposed to subjects.  By involving them in the 
design of the questioning it was hoped that they would feel the research to 
ultimately be of more value and not something that was merely being „done‟ to 
them (Cassell and Symon, 2004).  The researcher therefore used the first two 
interviews with experienced and well respected Senior Inspectors at the AAIB 
as a pilot study in which potential questions were trialled and either included in 
further interviews or discarded as unproductive. 
 
Interviews were arranged at the convenience of Inspectors and were conducted 
in the Inspectors‟ individual offices or in a quiet private area where the 
Inspectors felt able to speak freely.   
 
The researcher remained mindful of ethical considerations regarding research 
and in line with recommendations from the British Psychological Society 
advised the Inspectors of the research objectives and obtained their informed 
consent for continued involvement.  They maintained the right to withdraw from 
participation at any time and to decline to answer questions.  Inspectors were 
assured of the confidential nature of the interviews and that comments made or 
information gathered would only be used to inform the body of knowledge as a 
whole. No comments would be attributable to an individual (BPS, 1990 and 
2006).   
 
The interview commenced with an overview of the research aims and history 
and the purpose of the specific interview as a means of learning about what 
Inspectors did on a day-to-day basis.  Classification or demographic data was 
sought, for the most part to encourage the interviewee to start conversing in a 
more relaxed and open manner and to establish rapport (Sekaran, 2003).   
 
The Inspectors were asked to explain the investigation process and provide a 
description of their routine activities.  Life at the Branch and the role of the 
accident investigator in society were explored as well as discussion regarding 
effectiveness in investigation.  An interview protocol is included in Appendix A. It 
should be noted that not all topics were discussed by every respondent.  Given 
the flexibility of the semistructured interview, respondents were afforded the 
opportunity to discuss preferred topics in more depth.  The researcher ensured, 
however, that the breadth of topics was covered by the body of respondents as 
a whole. 
 
The consequent interviews were recorded on a digital recorder to facilitate the 
interview and to provide a complete and accurate record of proceedings.  
Recordings were, however, hampered at the AAIB by noise from on-going 
building work at the premises.  Permission was always sought and given before 
recording commenced. The individual interviews were analysed at length to 
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determine emergent themes and salient comments made around these themes 
were extracted and transcribed verbatim. 
 
The interviews were conducted over the course of the first two years of 
research.  In total, 23 Inspectors of varying disciplines, grades and experience 
were interviewed at the three UK Accident Investigation Branches.  Interviews 
varied in length dependent upon the time constraints of the individual Inspectors 
but ran from between 50 minutes to 2 hours and 10 minutes. After these 
interviews, the researcher felt that a sufficient breadth and depth of information 
had been uncovered and any subsequent interviews would have simply proven 
repetitious and so this phase of the study was drawn to a conclusion. 
 
The researcher was fortunate enough to have continued access to subjects 
allowing for changes to be made to the method based upon experience.  The 
researcher was, however, mindful of not occupying too much of any one 
individual‟s time and so with only a few exceptions, they were interviewed once, 
and once only.  Inspectors were, however, happy to provide subsequent 
clarification as required by email or through ad hoc chance meetings. 
 
3.4.2  Interviews with the US National Transportation Safety Board 
  investigators  
 
In addition to conducting interviews with the three UK Branches, the researcher 
also sought to gain awareness of the functioning of comparable organizations 
internationally.  The researcher was fortunate enough to be able to spend time 
at the National Transportation Safety Board headquarters in Washington, DC, 
with investigators in aviation, rail and pipeline, and marine.  Interviews were 
conducted with investigators in these modes as well as with human 
performance specialists and professional writers.  Ten interviews were 
conducted in total.  These were transcribed where pertinent, for salient 
comments. 
 
A thorough desktop review of available material was conducted, in particular 
policies and procedures, prior to the visit to gain an understanding of the 
similarities and differences between the philosophies and operation of these 
organizations. 
 
3.5  Phase 2 study 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify and discuss those aspects of an 
Inspector‟s behaviour deemed to be “effective” with regards to the accident 
investigation process.  This, as previously discussed, is essentially a subjective 
evaluation; one that reflects how the individual Inspectors have assigned 
internal weightings to those aspects of behaviour that are important to them. 
Job incumbents are thought to be able to infer the knowledge, skills, abilities 
and other characteristics required for the role with some degree of accuracy 
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(Brannick and Levine, 2002) and the researcher therefore felt it was appropriate 
to model effective behaviours using the Principal Inspectors.  These perceptions 
were to be contrasted with other studies and civil service competency 
frameworks at a latter part of the study and found to be credible. 
 
The research called for a technique that was relatively intuitive and easy to 
administer, that did not require significant investment with regards to material, 
analysis software or training and that could be used on a relatively small 
sample, focusing therefore on breadth of representation and depth of analysis.  
A multitude of techniques for job analysis and competency modelling have been 
developed, as discussed in the previous chapter. The researcher considered 
Critical Incident Technique (Flanagan, 1954), Combination Job Analysis Method 
(Brannick and Levine, 2002) and Repertory Grid (Kelly, 1955) in more detail.  
No one method fulfilled all the requirements of the researcher and it was 
therefore decided that the most relevant elements of Repertory Grid and 
Combination Job Analysis Method should be adopted in Phases 2 and 3 of the 
study respectively.   These are, therefore, explored in more detail below. 
 
Despite being in common use and the technique of choice for Robinson et al 
(2005), the researcher did not consider Critical Incident Technique (CIT) to be 
appropriate for this research.  Flanagan‟s (1954) CIT asks job incumbents to 
describe an incident which did or did not meet a particular job objective.  The 
lead up to the incident is described as well as the behaviour displayed (what the 
person actually did).  Flanagan suggests that for jobs of a supervisory nature, 
2000 to 4000 critical incidents are required to cover the critical behaviours for a 
job role.  The researcher considered that it was not feasible to generate such 
large numbers of incidents from such a small sample size.   In addition, the 
technique does not readily identify the underlying behaviours and skills, 
requiring an “extrapolitive leap” (Boam and Sparrow, 1992) to bridge the gap 
between “long lists of discrete behaviours and the identification of the core 
behaviours and competencies underlying job effectiveness.” (Boam and 
Sparrow, 1992). 
 
3.5.1  Repertory Grid 
 
Repertory Grid technique has become the most widely used aspect of Kelly‟s 
(1955) Personal Construct Theory (PCT).  George Kelly‟s work came about as a 
reaction to and against the prevailing dominance of positivism.  He proposed a 
move away from statistically generated „laws‟ of human behaviour to form 
predictions based on smaller groups and individuals.  He based PCT on two 
notions: “… (1) that, viewed in the perspective of the centuries, man might be 
seen as an incipient scientist, and (2) that each individual man formulates in his 
own way constructs through which he views the world of events.  As a scientist, 
man seeks to predict, and thus control, the course of events.  It follows, then 
that the constructs which he formulates are intended to aid him in his predictive 
efforts.” (Kelly, 1955). 
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PCT suggests that reality is not a fixed entity but that individuals form their own 
perspective of that reality based upon their life experiences.  By understanding 
someone‟s „construct‟ or life perspectives, it follows that you can understand 
their history and actions in context, but also go some way to predict their future 
actions in given situations.  This reality is built up of contrasts rather than 
absolutes (Jankowicz, 2004). Although PCT could be viewed as an essentially 
constructivist philosophy where individuals construe and reconstrue meaning, 
Kelly was at pains to emphasize that the “… universe is real; it is happening all 
the time; it is integral” (Kelly, 1955); a perspective which aligns quite well with 
the researcher‟s espoused „realistic‟ viewpoint. The methodology for eliciting 
these constructs is Repertory Grid.   
 
Developed primarily for a clinical setting, Repertory Grid has become a well 
used technique often employed in therapeutic interventions (Fransella and 
Bannister, 1977) as well as in business settings: the design of training (Hare, 
2004); in market research (Stewart, 1981); and in measuring team performance 
(Senior and Swailes, 2004).  It has been described as “… a measurement 
device that has a solid conceptual basis for its structure; it provides a succinct 
representation of the way a person construes his world or some aspect of it; it is 
flexible in allowing for both individualized and normative kinds of assessment; it 
can be applied to an almost limitless range of contexts, and it can be used to 
provide many different kinds of information.” (Bell, 1990).   
 
“Rep Grid … enables one to interview someone in detail extracting a good deal 
of detail about him … in such a way that the input from the observer is reduced 
to zero” (Stewart, 1981).  It also avoids the over reliance on „expert‟ opinion to 
interpret the thoughts and opinions of the subject. 
 
Generalizability is, however, always limited.  Comparing or contrasting subjects 
is a departure away from Kelly‟s original theory that constructs were ideographic 
in nature and therefore did not lend themselves to comparison. 
 
Repertory Grid combines elements of work and worker oriented techniques 
producing an all-encompassing approach that satisfies both job analysis and 
competency modelling demands.  It “attempts to go straight to the underlying 
behaviours and skills which distinguish between effective and less effective job 
performers.” (Boam and Sparrow, 1992).  Described as flexible and relatively 
easy to use, Repertory Grid appeared to fit the researcher‟s criteria most 
comprehensively. 
 
3.5.2  Interview design 
 
Repertory Grid comprises two main parts: constructs and elements.  Constructs 
are, in Kelly‟s view, a “… reference axis, a basic dimension of appraisal.”  
Bipolar in nature, constructs are the personal perspectives that the interview 
seeks to uncover.  Elements, on the other hand, are chosen “… to represent the 
area in which construing is to be investigated.” (Fransella and Bannister, 1977) 
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– the „objects‟ of what is being explored (Freeman, 2003).  In this research 
study the set of elements were effective and ineffective investigators. 
 
Constructs can either be supplied by the researcher or elicited through interview 
from the interviewee although the latter is more common (Freeman, 2003).  
Findings generally support the idea that elicited constructs are more 
„meaningful‟ (Fransella and Bannister, 1977) although they concede that not all 
studies have substantiated this claim (Warr and Coffman, 1970), and that there 
is no definitive evidence that you should not supply them.  Fransella and 
Bannister (1977) provide examples of situations where the supply of constructs 
are by contrast „vital‟, in particular with clinical or educational settings. 
 
As this research is in part interested in the subjective views and opinions of the 
participants, it was decided that neither constructs nor elements would be 
supplied during the Repertory Grid interviews. 
 
Repertory Grid interviews typically take three elements or people and ask the 
interviewee to compare and contrast them, looking for how two of them differ 
from the third.   Where elements are supplied, names are written on individual 
cards and separated into two piles – those who are good at their job and those 
that are less so.  The interviewee is asked to take two cards from one pile and  
one from the other and then to articulate the ways in which the two are similar to 
each other and different from the third. The way that the similarities and 
converse differences manifest themselves are defined as constructs and are 
recorded as a bipolar statement. This difference is focused by the use of a 
qualifier expressed „in terms of‟. The cards are replaced and the process 
repeated until no new constructs emerge. 
 
Kelly (1955) described constructs as “dichotomous”: for every basic unit of 
description and analysis there is a contrast.  Only by understanding the contrast 
can the specific context of the statement be understood.  Jankowicz (2004) 
uses the example „pleasant‟; its precise meaning can only be understood when 
the particular contrast which is being implicitly conveyed is identified.  „Not 
pleasant‟ is merely a negative; it lends little to comprehension.  Using „pleasant‟ 
as opposed to „rude‟ carries a different meaning than „pleasant‟ as opposed to 
„exciting‟, it is suggested.  Implicit in the first is politeness and in the second 
placidity.  A successfully implemented Repertory Grid ensures that elicited 
constructs have a clear contrast between the poles with an appropriate level of 
detail and that they are clearly related to the subject under discussion 
(Jankowicz, 2004). 
 
Feedback gained during the preliminary interviews with Inspectors pointed to a 
reluctance to discuss or rate individuals within the group.  Whilst shortcomings 
and strengths were freely talked about within the context of a confidential 
interview, they did not feel it to be appropriate to identify individual Inspectors as 
elements.  As such, the interview protocol asked the Inspectors to “bring to 
mind” individuals as opposed to determining and categorizing their 
effectiveness prior to comparing the elements.  This was considered to be a 
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much more useful means of eliciting constructs as it was considered that 
individual Inspectors had both strengths and weaknesses in differing aspects of 
their role and given the matrix management structure of the AAIB, Principal 
Inspectors worked with different groups of Inspectors on an ad hoc investigation 
by investigation basis. 
 
Data elicited by Repertory Grids can be analysed by content analysis or 
quantitatively as a grid where each element is then assessed against a 
construct.  As individual people were not identified during the course of the 
Repertory Grids, and specific comparisons were not felt to be appropriate in this 
study, it was determined that more value would be gained by rating or ranking 
the accumulated constructs and this forms the basis of Phase 3 of the study. 
 
3.5.3  Pilot interviews 
 
“Much of the responsibility for the richness of the data that are produced for a 
Rep Grid falls to the quality of the initial design.” (Freeman, 2003).  Given the 
limited sample available and the desire to balance the requirements of the 
research with the workload and time constraints of the participants, it was felt 
prudent to test the interview protocol. 
 
Two pilot interviews were conducted with Principal Inspectors to ascertain that 
the interviewees understood how the Repertory Grid interview worked, that the 
language and instructions used were appropriate and that the constructs 
emerging were commensurate with expectations that is that they referred to 
behaviours, that the poles were captured and discussed and that the constructs 
were considered in respect of the predetermined qualifiers.  The instructions, 
categorization of elements and qualifiers all performed well.  What became 
clear was that the overall length of interview was longer than anticipated.  Both 
interviews overran the scheduled 60 minutes and were closer to 95.  Whilst this 
did not appear to unduly concern the participants, it was felt that by keeping to 
the interview script and not indulging in too many anecdotal examples, the 
length of interview could be constrained without compromising either the depth 
or breadth of constructs being elicited.  It also gave the researcher an 
opportunity to experiment with a previously unfamiliar technique and to feel 
comfortable with the language and process. 
 
As the interviews went well and the constructs data was considered meaningful, 
it was decided to include the pilot interview data with the final data set. 
 
3.5.4  Interview protocol 
 
Individual interviews were arranged at the convenience of the Principal 
Inspectors from the AAIB and MAIB at their place of work and were conducted 
in the Principal Inspectors‟ individual offices or in a quiet private area where 
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they felt able to speak freely.  At this stage of the research the RAIB were no 
longer involved with the study. 
 
Again, the researcher remained mindful of ethical considerations regarding 
research and in line with recommendations from the British Psychological 
Society advised the Principal Inspectors of the research objectives and obtained 
their informed consent for continued involvement.  They maintained the right to 
withdraw from participation at any time and to decline to answer questions.  
Inspectors were assured of the confidential nature of the interviews and that 
comments made or information gathered would only be used to inform the body 
of knowledge as a whole. No comments would be attributable to an individual 
(BPS, 1990 and 2006).   
 
The interview therefore commenced with an overview of the research aims and 
history and the purpose of the specific interview. Interviews were recorded on a 
digital recorder to facilitate the interview and to provide a complete and accurate 
record of proceedings.  The purpose of the interview was described as a means 
of determining what the interviewees considered to be an effective investigator.  
They were not required to talk about specific individuals but to look at 
generalized behaviours that demonstrated effectiveness. Personality 
judgements were also not required unless they had a direct impact on the 
quality of the work. 
 
The Principal Inspectors were asked to think of three people within the Branch 
whom they considered to be very good at their job and then three people whom 
they considered to be less effective. 
 
Bringing to mind the three effective investigators, the interviewees were asked 
to tell the researcher something that made two of the people more effective than 
the third in terms of the following task-oriented qualifiers: 
 
i.  how they collected evidence 
ii.  how they analysed evidence 
iii.  how they liaised with families 
iv. how they wrote reports 
v. how they made recommendations. 
 
The qualifiers were based upon the task related categories emergent from the 
interviews in Phase 1. 
 
Again, they were asked to think about the three less effective investigators and 
to report to the researcher something that made two of these people less 
effective than the third in terms of the same criteria described above. 
 
Permeable or propositional constructs regarding universally observable 
characteristics (gender, age) were discouraged as too were constructs that 
were vague or superficial. Where ambiguity was felt in the construct, 
clarification was sought using the technique known as „laddering‟. Laddering 
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repeatedly asks the questions “why?”, “how do you mean?” or “in what way?” in 
order to “probe the thinking behind the constructs” (Adams, 2001), focus the 
construct, remove cliché and prompt the interviewee to question their own 
statements. The interviewees were required to concentrate on the identification 
of observable and measurable behaviours and the objective questions of how 
and why facilitated the process for „uncovering‟ their language for the 
description of effective or ineffective behaviour. 
 
Interview recordings were reviewed and each bipolar construct transcribed 
verbatim. 
 
3.6  Phase 3 study 
 
Phase 3 utilized a questionnaire for the purpose of rating the behavioural 
indicators collected in Phase 2 in terms of their necessity for selection, the 
likelihood of acquisition or reduction through training and the amount that they 
distinguished a superior investigator from an average one.   
 
3.6.1  Questionnaire structure 
 
The questionnaire comprised five parts.  Part 1 collected general information 
regarding position within the organization, experience in industry, age and 
length of service.  Professional development was considered in the subsequent 
section: the time and resource spent to maintain or improve both investigative 
and technical skills and the types of training/learning interventions participated 
in.   
 
Part 3 concerned itself with expertise: in both investigation and industry 
specialisms.  The Inspectors were asked to rate their current expertise on a 
scale of 1 to 5 where 1 equalled little or no knowledge and 5 denoted expert 
status.   
 
The fourth part of the questionnaire used statements generated through the 
Repertory Grid interviews. 75 statements with both positive and negative poles 
were rated against a five-point scale in terms of the following questions. 
 
For positive statements: 
a)  how necessary the behaviour was in terms of new recruits 
b) how likely it was that the behaviour could be acquired or improved through 
training 
c) how much demonstration of the behaviour distinguished a superior 
investigator from an average one. 
 
For negative statements: 
a) how necessary it was to screen out this behaviour at interview 
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b) how likely it was that the behaviour could be removed or reduced through 
training 
c) how much demonstration of the behaviour distinguished an ineffective 
investigator from an average one. 
 
The questionnaire concluded with two general free text questions asking 
respondents to list five skills or behaviours that distinguish colleagues who they 
most and least admired in their organization.  Inspectors were also invited to 
leave comment about specific skills not included in the questionnaire or with 
regards to the construct statements.   
 
3.6.2  Questionnaire development 
 
The questionnaire was developed in consultation with the AIB Inspectors: in 
particular, Inspectors and Principal Inspectors provided assistance with section 
3 regarding the individual investigation and technical skills.  These statements 
were discussed at some length to ensure that they reflected their fields in terms 
of comprehensiveness, language and content.  
 
The fourth part of the questionnaire utilized the constructs gathered through 
analysis of the Repertory Grid interviews.  The original 114 constructs were first 
rationalized to remove exact repetitions.  Where statements offered a variation 
of perspective on the same construct, however, they remained.  
 
The revised data set of 100 cognitive and behavioural indicators were grouped 
together in clusters of similarity and then further separated into the following five 
competency themes: interpersonal and communication skills; work activity 
management; personal attributes; cognitive abilities; and technical abilities. 
There was no desire to force fit the statements using a top-down approach.  
The five competency categories were emergent from the data and not 
predetermined. 
 
It was decided that the data set should be further reduced to 75 in order to 
assist with completion of the questionnaire and thus 25% of the 100 were 
removed.  The rationale behind removal was firstly, ambiguity and secondly, 
duplication.  Very often statements did not stand on their own – they were 
contextual and could only be properly understood in relation to their polar 
contrast.  As the questionnaire called for these to be rated alone, the researcher 
felt that they were sufficiently ambiguous as to cause confusion. 
 
The questions against which the bipolar constructs were rated lent heavily upon 
Brannick and Levine‟s (2002) Combination Job Analysis Method (see chapter 2 
for a full explanation of the technique).  Knowledge, skills, abilities and other 
characteristics (KSAOs) derived during the process are rated against specific 
scales in terms of: being necessary for newly hired employees; being practical 
to expect in the „labor‟ market; the likelihood of „trouble‟ if ignored in selection; 
and the extent to which different levels of the KSAO distinguish the superior 
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from the average worker.  The researcher believed that the questions regarding 
new hires and selection could be amalgamated and used to measure both ends 
of the indicator continuum and therefore rephrased them to ascertain necessary 
behaviour in new recruits and behaviours necessary to screen out at interview.   
 
The researcher was particularly interested in the effects of training on the 
behavioural indicator and so chose to replace „practical to expect in the labor 
market‟ with the likelihood that the behaviour could be acquired or improved, or 
conversely reduced and removed through training. 
 
A five-point rating was used for the questionnaire as it was felt to generate 
sufficient variance for analysis and “less interviewee fatigue” (Varga, 2007). 
 
Finally, the researcher performed a „sense check‟ on each remaining statement.  
The researcher was keen not to alter the sentiment or language of the 
statements but it was important that they were expressed in terms of observable 
behaviours and not abstruse generics.  
 
The questionnaires were checked and approved by the Deputy Chief Inspector 
of each participating Branch prior to administration. 
  
3.6.3  Questionnaire administration 
 
Paper questionnaires were administered to each Inspector and Principal 
Inspector at both the AAIB and MAIB.  At this stage of the research study it was 
no longer possible to have access to the Inspectorate at the RAIB. 
Administration assistance for dissemination and collection of the questionnaires 
was provided by the Branches.  Individual emails were sent to each Inspector 
prior to receipt of the questionnaire, reiterating the objectives of the research 
and encouraging completion and return within 3 weeks.   
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4.0 Phase 1 Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The first phase of the study used semistructured interviews to allow the 
researcher to become more familiar with the subject and the context, enabling a 
better understanding of the research question. 
 
Phase 1 data was also used to inform the qualifiers used in the Repertory Grid 
interviews in Phase 2 of the research. 
 
Over the course of the first two years of research, 23 Inspectors of varying 
disciplines, grades and experience were interviewed at the three UK Accident 
Investigation Branches.  Interviews varied in length dependent upon the time 
constraints of the individual Inspectors but ran from between 50 minutes to 2 
hours and 10 minutes.   As previously stated, the purpose of these interviews 
was to enable the researcher to familiarize herself with the working practices, 
ethos and culture of the Branches.  It was also a valuable opportunity to get to 
know the Inspectors on a more personal level which facilitated future phases of 
the research. 
 
Utilizing semistructured interviews in this phase of the research was an 
appropriate choice of technique for data elicitation.  It allowed the researcher to 
explore new topics of discussion, clarify understanding and challenge 
viewpoints without compromising the overall intent of the interview protocol.  For 
an inexperienced researcher it also provided the perfect opportunity to improve 
questioning techniques. 
 
Whilst semistructured interviews inevitably make direct comparison of 
responses more difficult, the intent was to gather a range of perceptions and 
perspectives from the Inspectors and, as such, formally structured interviews 
would not have been as suitable. 
 
The individual interviews were analysed at length to determine emergent 
themes.  Salient comments made around these themes were extracted and 
transcribed verbatim. Where used within this thesis, they remain unattributable 
in line with the agreement of confidentiality made with the Inspectors. 
 
The Inspectors were self-selected to some degree by their agreement to 
participate in the research.  Not all Inspectors who were approached were 
willing to be interviewed.  For some, this may have been a saliency issue where 
they felt the research was not pertinent to them.  Others excused themselves 
with workload.   
 
The remaining Inspectors interviewed were keen to share their experiences and 
to educate, providing articulate unsolicited insights and personal observations.  
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They were forthcoming on all subjects raised and were confident in their 
opinions and in the confidentiality of the interview material.  The researcher had 
no concerns regarding probity but was mindful that comment was subjective 
and based on experience and should be treated as such. 
 
The interview protocol added much needed structure to what had the potential 
to decline into nothing more constructive than an informal chat.  It allowed the 
researcher to make good use of limited time, made the interviewing of multiple 
subjects “more systematic and comprehensive” (Hoepfl, 1997) and kept the 
interactions focused.  The researcher was conscious of the danger of collecting 
a lot of interesting information but very little „evidence‟. 
 
After these interviews, the researcher felt that a sufficient breadth and depth of 
information had been uncovered and any subsequent interviews would have 
simply proven repetitious and so this phase of the study was drawn to a 
conclusion. 
 
Similarly, ten people were formally interviewed in person at the National 
Transportation Safety Board in the US including subject matter experts from 
aviation, marine, rail and pipeline modes as well as human performance 
specialists and technical writers.  These interviews were also analysed and 
provided insightful comments regarding the differences and similarities of the 
work of accident investigators in the two countries.  Where appropriate, these 
have been subsumed within the quotations.  Only where there are marked 
differences of opinion or process are they context-identified. 
 
4.2  Content analysis and coding 
 
“There is no single way to analyse qualitative data” but in essence it is the 
process of “… resolving data into its constituent components to reveal their 
characteristic themes and patterns.” (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).  Miles (1979) 
describes qualitative data as “an attractive nuisance”.  Attractive because of its 
richness but difficult to find analytic paths through the richness.  Dey (1993) 
purports that analysis is a threefold activity involving describing, classifying and 
connecting. 
 
Whilst semistructured interviews can be time consuming to undertake and then 
to analyse, due to their lack of strict adherence to a predetermined protocol, 
they are much „richer‟ in terms of the quality of information elicited (Hayes, 
2000). 
 
Content analysis was thought to be the most appropriate technique for 
analyzing and coding the semistructured interview data in this phase of the 
research.  It was found to be a straightforward means of structuring and linking 
the responses into logical emergent categories. Whilst it has been described as 
“codified common sense” (Robson, 2002), content analysis is the “… simplest, 
most robust, obvious, transparent and defendable way of analysing the data” 
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(Stewart, 1997).  Its emphasis lies upon allowing categories to be emergent 
from the data in the spirit of ethnographic content analysis as opposed to 
systematically quantifying data in terms of “predetermined categories” (Bryman, 
2004). 
 
The primary task was the reduction of data into “analyzable units” (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996) by creating categories. This was done by coding and linking 
associated data to create categories, having some common property, thereby 
reducing the data into manageable chunks. 
 
This required using codes as a set of organizing principles.  Coffey and 
Atkinson (1996) state that such principles can be existing theoretical concepts 
or “… key variables derived from the research literature”. 
 
Codes were applied to the transcriptions using random descriptors at first, but 
given the “continuous, iterative” nature of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994), 
successive refinement ensured these descriptors were soon rationalized and 
consistent. 
 
The coding in this phase of the study involved mapping incidence and 
measuring the relative incidence of different codes. By assigning codes, the 
researcher looked to identify and interpret the data, enabling the classification 
and connection as alluded to by Dey (1993).   
 
The researcher used QSR International‟s CAQDAS (computer assisted 
qualitative data analysis software) to facilitate this process; in particular NVivo7.   
NVivo7 provides a range of tools for data handling and theory building based 
upon texts derived from interviews, observations, document analysis and 
literature reviews.  In addition, it supports coding and the retrieval of coded 
material. The researcher found that whilst CAQDAS can be a useful tool for 
ordering and structuring the analysis of qualitative data, its obvious drawback 
was that it was not an automatic process; manual coding of the data was still 
required by the researcher, thus the potential bias of subjective assignment of 
groupings remained. 
 
It was important that the researcher was not adding layers of interpretation onto 
the responses given but that any accounts reflected what the Inspectors 
interviewed actually said and not what the researcher thought was meant 
(Bartunek and Seo, 2002).   Content analysis allows for greater flexibility but 
with it comes the possibility of increased researcher bias (Speakman, 2007). 
 
The interest for this research was in transcribing the content of the interviews 
and not pauses, intonations or other non-linguistic features of speech and as 
such these were omitted from the transcripts. 
 
Given the use of a protocol to guide the semistructured interviews, it was not 
surprising that the interviewees for the large part, focused upon similar topics 
and areas for discussion. The individual differences in response were, however, 
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interesting; exceptions and „misfits‟ being seen as equally important as 
concordant data (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).   
 
Yet despite differences in opinion and approach between individuals, groups 
and Branches, the content of the interviews was sufficiently consistent so as to 
allay fears that use of a relatively small sample might evoke. 
 
Analysis of the transcripts provided the following themes: evidence collection; 
interviewing; liaison with families; analysis; report writing; recommendations; 
and inquests. These categories follow the discrete phases of the investigative 
process or are individual tasks associated with the successful conduct of an 
accident investigation.  In addition, the non-task themes of being an Inspector, 
the role of the Principal Inspector and comparisons between the UK and US 
accident investigation agencies were determined.  In the subsequent section, 
exemplars derived from the transcripts have been used to illustrate the 
perceptions of Inspectors with regards to these categories and particularly 
where there is an allusion or reference to „effective behaviour‟. 
 
The use of quotes provides “… a detailed account of how those being studied 
feel about and understand events” (Neuman, 2006); a quote being seen as a 
legitimate way of ascertaining a person‟s perspective without the need for a 
total transcript. 
 
It should be reiterated that it was not the intention of this phase of the research 
to provide a detailed account of each task within the investigative process but to 
focus on those aspects deemed appropriate to effective behaviour research by 
the interviewees.  
 
4.3  Task specific themes 
4.3.1  Evidence collection 
 
Given the perception by the lay-person of accident investigation being a quasi 
scientific activity, the researcher was surprised to find that there were significant 
differences in the approach that individual Inspectors took when visiting an 
accident site.  In place of a prescriptive methodology, each investigator had a 
slightly different way of collecting data, all working within the bounds of 
governing legislation. 
 
“We came up with rather nice aide memoires (sic) to use at the site 
but to be honest, I‟ve never had the time to look at it when I‟ve been 
on site.  I‟ve used it back in the hotel just to make sure I haven‟t 
forgotten anything but on site, it‟s much more difficult to use.” 
 
Many of the comments supported this view and whilst time pressure was cited 
once or twice, the overriding reason was because every accident is different. 
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“I asked when I arrived, did people have checklists and things and 
nobody does, and I can understand now why they don‟t.  Every one is 
so different.  You‟ve just got to go and make your mind up at the time.  
But there are general broad principles.  Go to the accident site, see 
what‟s there.”   
 
“I don‟t think it‟s too structured as every accident site is different.” 
 
“There are different ways of doing things but the end result is fairly 
similar but there is an amount of individuality.”  
 
“There is a common thread running through every investigation, but 
that‟s just the skeleton if you like.  The flesh you put on it comes in 
different shapes and sizes.” 
 
Individuality as a theme ran throughout the researcher‟s interactions with the 
Inspectorate. Within each of the Branches, the degree of accepted individuality 
varied.  The Rail Accident Investigation Branch with its incipient problems of 
trying to gain acceptance from the rail industry as a professional competent 
organization had employed a more rigid structure to establish standards and 
consistency across its staff.  The Air Accidents Investigation Branch, by 
contrast, had a long history of individual experts working in isolation and 
appeared less prescriptive in methods employed. 
 
“I don‟t have a game plan or book to look at.  I just trust my instincts.” 
 
Not knowing what would be found at the accident site was the most frequently 
cited reason for maintaining a flexible approach to data collection.  It was felt to 
be important to be able to prioritize and exercise judgement and not to be 
constrained by a rigid process. 
 
“When you first get to an investigation you have so much information 
coming up that you can‟t physically cover all of it so you have to be a 
little bit selective so you select things that you think are most time 
critical and leave the other things to collect at a later date.” 
 
“There is such a lot to organize when you first get on site.  Asserting 
yourself and ensuring that your needs are met – without being too 
officious of course – is really important.  You need to work out very 
quickly who‟s going to be important to the successful outcome of the 
investigation.” 
 
Very often, time is of the essence.  The accident scene cannot always be 
preserved and decisions need to be made as to what is vital.  This is particularly 
important in rail accidents where there is a business imperative to get the 
railway reopened as soon as possible after an accident. 
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4.3.2  Interviewing 
 
Part of the data collection process, interviewing witnesses and family members 
is an important but time consuming activity.  Eyewitness testimony, essentially 
reconstructive in nature, can however be highly unreliable (Loftus, 1984).  The 
Inspectors interviewed were acutely aware of the variable reports that they 
could gather from witnesses. 
 
“You sometimes have to take things with a pinch of salt and if it 
doesn‟t fit then you have to park it elsewhere.” 
 
“They [witnesses] can be a bit of a headache.  They can be very 
unreliable, they can be very good.  You do get a feeling as to who is 
likely to be better than others.  People are very bad for filling in gaps.  
You get all sorts of things described to you that you know couldn‟t 
have been.” 
 
The discerning Inspector had the ability, it was reported, to extract salient data 
from extraneous information – during the interview process as well as 
technically.  Nothing was taken at face value and everything required evidential 
corroboration. 
 
Whilst not required to take official signed statements from witnesses, many 
Inspectors felt more comfortable having them in order to protect themselves 
should witnesses move to retract statements at a later date.  Other Inspectors, 
however, felt that their notes and observations taken during interviews were 
better removed from a potential litigious process and as such refused to have 
gathered statements signed. 
 
“We‟re empowered to take statements but we‟re not required.  As 
we‟re not required, I just take notes.  Ours is an investigative process 
not a legal one.”  
 
4.3.3  Liaison with families 
 
Historically, the accident investigation process proceeded in isolation from both 
the legal system and interaction with the families and friends of those involved 
in the accident, particularly where fatalities had occurred. This situation has now 
changed. 
 
“In the past it was like a necessary evil having to speak to people; not 
very much you could do for them. Now we practically bend over 
backwards for them. Told it enhances our professional reputation.” 
 
There has been a shift in attitude since the late 1980s, not just within the 
Branches but across the emergency services, as appreciation grows of the 
need to not only look after the dead but also to respond effectively with the 
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living and Inspectors now find that an increasing amount of their time is spent 
describing their findings to relatives. 
 
In the UK, charities such as Disaster Action (founded in 1991 by survivors and 
the bereaved from disasters such as the Herald of Free Enterprise at 
Zeebrugge, the Marchioness and Lockerbie) have done much to provide an 
advisory and advocacy service for people affected by disasters.  In the United 
States, a dedicated service is provided by the National Transportation Safety 
Board through the Office of Transportation Disaster Assistance.  They are self-
described as “… a lighthouse in a storm” (NTSB, 2006).  Whilst not an 
integrated function within the UK Accident Investigation Branches, more 
emphasis and awareness is now placed on family liaison. 
 
There was little variation in response to a question of how much value liaising 
closely with families added to the process.  Most Inspectors fully appreciated 
the benefit that families derived from having the facts explained to them by 
those undertaking the investigation.   
 
“We are public servants after all, providing a public service.  The least 
we can do is to explain to people why their loved ones died.” 
 
“You lead them gently through it and it helps if you can dejargonize 
it.” 
 
“My strategy [with families] is to be helpful, answer any questions as 
opposed to being there for emotional support.” 
 
Far from being an onerous task, liaising with family members was considered to 
be a tremendously important aspect of the role:  
 
“I felt like I‟d done something worthwhile.” 
 
“We get an amount of job satisfaction from it that we perhaps didn‟t 
think was in it for us.” 
 
“It‟s a bit tricky but I‟ve not found it too bad.  I think it‟s down to 
people‟s approaches to be honest.  I find it quite rewarding because I 
never consider myself to be a people person.” 
 
But not one without its difficulties: 
 
“You can help a family by doing a thorough investigation even if the 
result might not have been what they wanted.  Every family wants it 
to be that the pilot struggled heroically with the aircraft to avoid a 
school, to land it in a field at great cost to himself and that it was 
unavoidable.  But most of them aren‟t like that.  Getting that across is 
not an easy job.” 
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“It‟s one of the hardest things because you never know how 
someone‟s going to react.  However they react, you have to keep it 
professional and on the level and it‟s hard not to react to their 
reaction.  You can get called all sorts of names under the sun.” 
 
“A widow became irrational and accused me of doing a cover up.  
Whatever else I get accused of here, I always give my best when I‟m 
doing an investigation.” 
 
“Try not to make any crass remarks: it‟s not difficult; it‟s not rocket 
science.” 
 
Inspectors felt that a balance of empathy and detachment, professionalism and 
humility when dealing with families was admirable. 
 
4.3.4  Analysis 
 
There are a plethora of data analysis tools available to accident investigators, 
including Why-Because Analysis (Ladkin, 2001), the Transportation Safety 
Board of Canada‟s Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology, Blackett‟s 
(2005) Combined Accident Analysis Method and most recently, the Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau‟s analysis framework (ATSB, 2008).  Whilst these 
tools and many others are familiar to the Inspectors, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that they are neither widely nor consistently used.  The AIBs, similarly, 
vary in their levels of prescription in terms of methodologies used, which was 
unexpected to the researcher. It would be speculative to suggest that these 
models do not provide the breadth and flexibility that is required, but there was 
no evidence from the interviews to indicate that it was felt that employment of 
any one specific methodology would greatly benefit the overall outcome of the 
investigation.  Inspectors have, it would appear, a preference for relying on 
intuition and experience.  One Inspector commented: 
 
“If it‟s not an engineering problem then you are down to 
speculation.” 
 
Another compared the process to that of constructing a jigsaw puzzle (hence 
the term „jigsaw men‟). 
 
“You‟ve got to find all the bits of the puzzle and see what pieces 
you have in order to make up the overall picture.  If it‟s a violent 
impact there will be huge bits of the picture missing.  But we‟ve got 
a few of the corners and a few straight edges.  There may be a few 
blanks but you can roughly get the picture.” 
 
“Most of them [accidents] you get a comfortable feeling about what 
happened, you can‟t show evidence but you‟ve got an idea.  
Sometimes you just can‟t find a solution.” 
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The lack of a concrete solution, whilst unsatisfactory, does not appear to cause 
too much consternation with the Inspectors interviewed.  It is not thought to be a 
reflection on the abilities of those involved or the methodology used but as a 
result of insufficient available evidence and system complexity. 
 
 “It doesn‟t hang over me, I don‟t feel guilty that I couldn‟t find the 
answer. There were quite a lot of possibilities and some of them do 
remain open.  One of the first things I say to families is that there 
might not be a cast iron answer.” 
 
“As aircraft get more complex there are going to be one or two 
where we just don‟t know 100% what happened.  But people do 
adapt with new technologies.  We will keep abreast of it.” 
 
4.3.5  Report writing 
 
As previously discussed, the accident report is the culmination of the 
investigative process – the quality of the latter being measured entirely by the 
quality of the former.  Of all the aspects of the investigation, this is the part that 
many Inspectors claim to find most difficult.   
 
One aspect of report writing that was alluded to frequently was the length of 
time it took to produce reports.  Inspectors were mindful of the constant need to 
balance the creation of a comprehensive and evidentially based report with the 
need for industry and families to get timely information.  Some felt that the time 
taken for a report to be published often detracted from its impact.  As was noted 
in the literature review, this can take anywhere up to three years, although 
many reports are published in much less time. 
 
“I‟d rather have a report come out within six months and be useful 
as opposed to waiting three years for the polished article.  
Everything moves on.” 
 
“Although accident information is confidential there is great benefit 
in giving that information back out to industry as soon as possible.  
I‟d rather get a report out in six months with some useful information 
than have a fault free report come out in three and a half years.” 
 
“No point in producing a report that‟s too old.” 
 
The „need to know‟, however, is always weighed up against the veracity and 
resilience of the evidence within the report and as such, appropriate levels of 
scrutiny are required to maintain the expected standards. 
 
“Good quality takes time.  And sometimes it‟s like every paragraph‟s 
hewn from granite.” 
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“We‟ve become a lot more professional.  Our reports are a lot more 
professional but it takes us longer to do them.” 
 
“The writing is the most important skill.  This job is essentially a 
writer‟s job and once in a while they let us go out and play in the 
dirt.” 
 
Whilst it was suggested that the variability in writing abilities amongst the 
Inspectors was acknowledged to sometimes negatively impact the report 
production process, the internal workings of the Branch, a hierarchical editing 
process (alluded to in section 4.4.2 of this chapter) and the often unique nature 
of the accident themselves could mean that even the most effective investigator 
could find their report taking a considerable length of time to produce.   
 
Reports, particularly where there is more than one Inspector involved, can be a 
result of a „collision‟ of two separate reports, an amalgamation written by  one of 
the Inspectors or an „assemblage‟ created by the Principal Inspector.  These 
differences in report writing process can once again lead to variability in quality 
and production time.   
 
4.3.6  Recommendations 
 
Recommendations form a transaction between those investigating and those 
whose responsibility it befalls to implement improvements and changes. 
 
The Branches are not empowered to enforce recommendations and as such, it 
is encumbent upon those developing them to do so in such a way as to instigate 
change in a timely and cost effective manner.  
 
As a consequence of the report findings, recommendations will be made to 
prevent recurrence.  Not unlike the reports themselves, recommendations will 
stand or fall dependent upon the way they are written and interpreted. 
 
“When you write a recommendation you might think you‟ve written 
what you intend but somebody can take it and interpret it in different 
ways and it actually hasn‟t cured the problem. In name, 80% of them 
are taken up but you need to look at how satisfactory the action has 
been.” 
 
“The recommendation is the most important part of the report.  It‟s 
important that we factually understand what happened but the big 
thing is to stop the next one.” 
 
There is ultimately a trade-off between what the Accident Investigation 
Branches would like to recommend and what the company or industry is 
prepared or able to do.  A well-crafted recommendation will satisfy on multiple 
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levels and the most astute Inspector will have the ability to balance cost and 
safety benefits.  Recommendation writing is seen as no time for crusading. 
 
“Some investigators can become too attached to the issues and that 
actually clouds their vision.” 
 
“It‟s frustrating if you‟ve come across something before and you want 
to make the same recommendation again.” 
 
“You have to have an accident to make the safety measure.” 
 
“People want to know that their loved ones haven‟t died in vain.  I 
think if recommendations are made which would help prevent the 
accident happening again, it would also help the family.” 
 
“A few good recommendations are much better than a lot of mediocre 
recommendations.” 
 
Significant and far-reaching changes are possible: for example, the MAIB‟s 
investigation and report, on behalf of the Bermudan Government, into the fire 
onboard the cruise ship, the Star Princess in 2006 led to one cruise company 
having to change over 160,000 balconies (MAIB, 2006a).   
 
A fire had broken out on a cabin balcony, spreading quickly until a substantial 
part of the port side of the ship was ablaze.  Balcony areas had not previously 
been included within the fire risk assessment of cruise ships but given the 
combustible nature of the materials used in the balcony screens, furniture and 
decking, the MAIB issued immediate recommendations, which were accepted, 
to counter the risk of this type of marine casualty. 
 
The majority of recommendations, however, are acknowledged to be only minor 
incremental adjustments to an already tightly run system or safety conscious 
industry.  Timeliness becomes an issue, particularly when reports take a long 
time to be published.  It is not unusual, however, for recommendations to be 
acted upon prior to publication particularly where there is an immediate safety 
implication. 
 
4.3.7  Inquests 
 
Not unlike liaising with families, involvement with inquests, whilst not essentially 
a task item within the investigative process, is, nevertheless, an ever-increasing 
aspect of the role of Inspector. 
 
It is not unusual for Inspectors to be called to an inquest to provide an account 
of their findings.  Whilst the Inspectors interviewed acknowledged that inquests 
were a necessary part of the legal process, they were experiencing more 
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pressure to be mindful of the legal ramifications of their investigation over and 
above the regulatory requirements. 
 
“In a bounty hunting and compensation culture” … “You‟ve got to 
keep the legal train going at the same speed as the investigative 
one.” 
 
Many Inspectors expressed concern at the impact that juggling such 
requirements was having on their investigations and some felt that the NTSB 
process might be beneficial.  NTSB investigators are prohibited by law from 
giving evidence in a court.  The accident report, a purely factual document, 
remains the property of the Board and is inadmissible.  In the UK, however, 
Inspectors from the MAIB and AAIB can be called to give evidence based upon 
their findings.  They are entitled to voice „opinion‟ where the lay person would 
be constrained to „fact‟ and provide “… technical analysis and opinion inferred 
from factual evidence” (Pamplin, 2000).  The RAIB Inspectors have precluded 
themselves from giving opinion by appearing as a „witness of fact‟. 
 
 “I‟m not going to take written statements so that they can be taken 
by the courts and misinterpreted.” 
 
“Coroners inquests.  Really quite daunting.  You get a good going 
over.” 
 
4.4    Non-task specific themes 
 
In addition to the previously described task-oriented themes, content analysis of 
the interviews also offered additional groupings.  These are general descriptors 
which traverse the task-oriented phase.  Illustrative quotes will now be offered 
for each of the following coding groups: being an Inspector; the role of the 
Principal Inspector; and US/UK comparisons. 
4.4.1  Being an Inspector 
 
The day-to-day reality of the role of accident investigator is very often shrouded 
in mystery and legend, particularly within aviation, making it a coveted position 
for many within the industry. 
 
“People outside have this impression that we‟re this amazing world 
leading organization.  As long as we‟ve got the reputation I think 
we‟ll be doing OK.  We do do a good job.” 
 
“The reputation that this Branch enjoys around the world – people 
do actually step back and say we‟re glad you‟re here.  That‟s not 
the individual, that‟s the collective image that we deliver.  So our 
corporate image is very very good, with industry, in this country and 
abroad.  It‟s just the internal bits.” 
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“This place isn‟t unique but it‟s subtly different.” 
 
And whilst the Inspectors were justifiably proud of their respective reputations at 
home and internationally, there was a feeling expressed that, perhaps 
understandably, not all applicants or new starters really understood how the 
Branch functions.   
 
“You don‟t really know what the job‟s about until you get here.  
There‟s a little on the internet, but not much.  It‟s only when you get 
here that you find out what people really do, how the job is 
organized. In some ways, it‟s quite difficult because you‟re applying 
for a job that you don‟t know anything about, technically.” 
 
The Inspectors offered opinion regarding the types of individuals that they felt 
would be best suited to the role: 
 
“You don‟t want people who are too quiet – they might find it difficult 
to cope.  Extraverted would be a problem as well.  It‟s an exercise 
in moderation; you don‟t want extremes of people.” 
 
“Going back to the sort of person you recruit here, they have to be 
motivated, they have to be self-starters. They don‟t have to sit there 
pathetically saying where can I find this.  They need to go and fish it 
out themselves.” 
 
“The kind of person you get here has to demonstrate they‟re good 
at a steep learning curve.” 
 
“You have to be of a certain intellect and you have to demonstrate 
that you have a curious mind, an inquiring mind.  If you need to find 
out something then you can, you can learn it.  That‟s one of the 
main qualities of somebody coming here.” 
 
„Curiosity‟ and „motivation‟ were two terms continually used during the 
interviews, at all three Branches, and the researcher was interested to see 
whether these would continue through the subsequent phases of the research.  
 
Given the stochastic nature of accidents, many Inspectors experience 
occasional difficulties with the balance of workload. 
 
“In no other job have I had workload that builds up like it does here.  
It‟s peaks and troughs but when you‟re in a trough you wonder how 
you‟re ever going to get out of it.  It‟s out of your hands.  It‟s quite a 
unique situation.” 
 
This can be ameliorated in part by the structure of the organization but as 
accident investigation is purely a reactive function, it is not uncommon for 
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Inspectors to find themselves „juggling‟ the pressing attentions of two or three 
concurrent investigations. 
 
Accident investigations involve splitting time between the accident site or „field‟ 
and the office.  Most Inspectors interviewed expressed a preference for being 
out in the field: collecting evidence; talking to witnesses; “playing in the dirt”.  
They are self-styled „active intellectuals‟; many feeling their purpose to be 
anywhere but the office.  These out-of-the-office activities inevitably needed to 
be balanced with internal paperwork and report writing. 
 
There is a natural, if not gruesome, public fascination with death (Henry, 2004) 
and Inspectors learn, not only how to deal with the inevitable fatalities:  
 
“You don‟t really know what you‟re letting yourself in for, you just 
have to know that you have an interest in that sort of work.  No one 
can come along and say hand on heart, that is the job for me.  
There are still aspects of the job that you have doubts about.” 
  
but also how to deal with the public‟s morbid preoccupation: 
  
“I tend to say I‟m a pilot. I don‟t like the barrage of questions that 
come with saying you‟re an accident investigator.  It‟s not very long 
before they‟re asking what do you do with bodies and you don‟t 
want to go there really.” 
 
Research has shown that there are relatively low rates of psychological distress 
in occupational groups such as accident investigators, attributed in part to their 
well-defined role and clear sets of responsibilities (Schein, 2006).  This was 
supported by the Inspectors who asserted that concentrating on the task in 
hand enabled them to look past the emotive aspects of their role. 
 
“You do develop a sort of tunnel vision where there‟s a body but 
there‟s a bit of wreckage that you need to look at.  You just sort of 
concentrate on that.  The professional drive to get things done 
properly does help you through some of the worst of the gory bits.” 
 
“I was very surprised that it didn‟t affect me at all, and I thought it 
really should have done.  At the time, there‟s a job to be done and 
other things to think about.” 
 
That was not to say that the Inspectors denied the potential impact that dealing 
with fatalities could have. 
 
“There are some people that might be affected in which case 
they‟re going to need a heck of a lot more training than you get on 
the Cranfield course but you‟ve just got to make sure you get the 
right people in through the door.” 
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“I know that the day will come when something about the job will 
affect me.” 
 
Psychological interventions such as Critical Incident Stress Management 
(Leonhardt and Vogt, 2006) which encourage guided debriefing post accident to 
mitigate the impact, were dismissed as non-essential.  Less formal coping 
strategies such as the use of humour and discussions “over a few beers” were 
felt to be sufficient.  There was an acknowledgement that specialist services 
were available if required but it was rare (or at least not publicized) should an 
Inspector avail themselves of this aid.   
 
“You need a good sense of humour here.  You develop a type of 
black humour that if it ever got out into the press you‟d be 
castigated for it.”  
 
There are slight variations in the organization of each of the Branches, with 
RAIB and MAIB operating with dedicated teams and Principal Inspectors for 
both the operation and man-management functions and the AAIB using an on-
call rota basis for individual Inspectors and Principal Inspectors rather than 
teams, producing ad hoc pairings between Engineering and Operations 
Inspectors. 
 
Inspectors at the AAIB suggested that: 
 
“Teamwork happens on an individual investigation basis but not as 
a Branch on the whole.” 
 
“We work very much as individuals.” 
 
There was an acknowledgement that a team orientation was, however, 
desirable: 
 
“When you‟re out in the field it‟s OK to be a loner but when you‟re 
back in the office or liaising with your colleagues at the end of the 
day, you need to be a team player.” 
 
In a study conducted at the AAIB, Viney (1992) quotes an Inspector describing 
their role as the “Last home of the rugged individualist.”  This is responded to by 
another Inspector: “Part of the strength, part of the weakness.”  It was felt that 
the organizational structure was in part responsible for perpetuating this “rugged 
individualist” characteristic of the Branch. 
 
The proclivity for working as individuals was noted by the researcher to be 
greater at the AAIB.  Possible explanations for this include the physical 
structure of the working environment at the Branches where AAIB Inspectors 
have individual offices in contrast to the MAIB and RAIB Inspectors who work in 
an open plan environment with their team colleagues.  The style of leadership 
has also been suggested as an influencing factor as has industrial background 
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– particularly at the MAIB which, in the researcher‟s estimation, demonstrates 
the most effective teamwork of the three Branches. 
 
One of the tenets or guiding principles of the three AIBs is the preservation of 
independence or impartiality.  Whilst paid for by the Department for Transport, 
the Inspectors feel themselves to be answerable only to the public for whom 
they were created to serve. 
 
“We are completely independent so we can impartially tell people 
what happened.  The relatives and the other people connected.” 
 
Being removed from the political arena and detached from the regulator is vital 
for the effectiveness of an investigation. 
 
“You have to leave party politics out of this job.  We have no axe to 
grind, we really don‟t.  And that is one of our greatest weapons.  
The lack of an axe.” 
 
One Inspector commented that remembering who the reports were writing for 
(that is, the families and the industry) went some way to disincline investigators 
from „crusading‟.  Reports are written and recommendations made to a largely 
mature industry where “… there aren‟t huge great solutions out there.”  An 
effective investigator would accept the limitations of the role to provoke ongoing 
dramatic changes to safety. 
 
“It‟s very difficult to make a big step forward in safety.” 
 
“It‟s not a world changing job – you personally are not going to have 
an impact on safety.” 
 
“It‟s just chipping away.  All we can do is to find out what happened 
and come up with an explanation.” 
 
4.4.2  The role of the Principal Inspector 
 
The role of the Principal Inspector within the UK Branches is twofold.  They are 
expected, by turn, to perform a man-management role (performance, 
attendance, holidays, expenses, etc) as well as acting as an Investigator-in-
Charge (IIC).   
 
Each investigative body has its own interpretation of the role of the IIC (Koning 
and Peters, 2006).  Typically it implies a responsibility for the conduct of the 
investigation including the production of reports (ISASI, 2004).  On a large-scale 
accident or high profile where many investigators are deployed, such as 
Lockerbie or the Marchioness, the IIC will become the focal point for the 
investigation. 
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In the US, the NTSB‟s employment of the party system calls for an IIC to have 
an overarching control of the investigation „life-cycle‟ (Koning and Peters, 2006). 
 
“As IIC, I‟m a generalist – I look at the forest so to speak.  I‟m a 
project manager.” 
 
Whereas the Board Members will provide the focal point for the media and other 
interested parties, the IIC‟s role in the background is to ensure the Members are 
fully apprised.  
 
Given the thankfully small number of large-scale accidents that the UK 
Branches attend, this is often a nominal role - much to the vexation of some of 
the Principal Inspectors.  There is a conflict as to whether this should be a 
hands-on role – out in the field, taking command - or whether it is purely an 
office based activity, providing coordination, support and oversight to the 
Inspectors in the field. 
 
Principal Inspectors offer a “technical sounding board” to their colleagues: 
 
“An experienced PI who has been here a long time has an awful lot 
to offer in terms of mentoring or where you might go for guidance if 
he can‟t give you the guidance himself.” 
 
Given the flat structure of the organization and the combined seniority and 
experience of the Inspectorate, the position of Principal Inspector was, however, 
seen as an unenviable role.  Removed from the day-to-day investigation and 
managing others with sometimes greater seniority. 
 
“I can‟t imagine anyone wanting to do that role.  It‟s neither fish nor 
fowl.” 
 
What became apparent from these exploratory interviews as well as those with 
the Principal Inspectors themselves in Phase 2 of the research, was that their 
primary role had evolved to be that of principal report editor.  Further discussion 
of the role of the Principal Inspector can be found in the discussion chapter of 
this thesis but with regard to this editing function, there was universal 
disapprobation regarding how well this was carried out. 
 
“It‟s the PI‟s job to bring together all the parts of the report and this 
can be a problem when everyone has different workloads and 
priorities.” 
 
At the MAIB, given the fixed team structure, Inspectors will have their reports 
edited by their own Principal Inspector whereas at the AAIB, the more fluid 
organization means that initial editing (all reports are subsequently read and 
revised by the Deputy Chief Inspector and Chief Inspector) can be done by one 
of four Principal Inspectors.  This has the potential to cause conflict: 
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“You can have four PIs each with a different perspective.” 
 
Depending upon personalities and writing styles, this process was reported to 
range from easy to combative in style. 
 
The overall structure of the aviation accident investigation report is essentially 
governed by the ICAO standards which have been adopted and adapted by 
other industries as required.  Whilst this remains fixed, there can be a high level 
of variability in the content and writing style.  The role of the Principal Inspector 
is meant to go some way to mitigate this diversity but seemingly only adds to 
the issue.  One extreme view was that Principal Inspector‟s offered nothing 
more than “… destructive criticism for not doing things properly when there‟s no 
proper way to do it.”  If so, it could be proffered that the standardization is not 
quite as standardized as required. 
 
4.4.3  UK / US comparisons 
 
The purpose of including quotes regarding accident investigations from both the 
UK and the US was to illustrate how the structure and philosophy of the 
organization might have a bearing upon the way in which the investigators 
function and their output.  Interviews were conducted at the National 
Transportation Safety Board in the US to enable the researcher to gain insight 
into the varying operational and political differences and to determine whether 
once these were removed, the basis for measuring effective behaviour would 
remain the same. 
 
The NTSB‟s party system approach to accident investigation ultimately shapes 
the entire process.  Unlike their UK counterparts, investigators at the NTSB 
operate as specialists in their discrete fields.  There is a trade-off between the 
breadth of generalist knowledge and experience that is found at the UK AIBs 
and the depth of in-house specialism (for example aircraft systems, human 
performance, operations) at the NTSB. 
 
The party system supports this specialist functionality by inviting qualified 
technical and labour representatives to join the fact-finding field phase of the 
investigation.  Under the direction of the NTSB, technical background 
information is gathered for use in the Board‟s factual reports (NTSB, 2002).  
Based upon this information, the five Presidentially-appointed Board Members 
determine probable cause and issue safety recommendations. 
 
Particularly within the NTSB HQ in Washington, DC, investigators accepted that 
sometimes the party process can be “cumbersome” but “… it can bring a lot of 
eyes to the table.  It‟s a check and a balance.” 
 
The UK Inspectors acknowledged that whilst more specialist knowledge in-
house would often be beneficial in expediting the investigative process, they 
perceive there to be shortcomings in the US system; inefficiencies that 
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surprised them, echoing Uff‟s concerns about the wastefulness of multiple 
enquiries (Uff, 2000): 
 
“In spite of all the dedicated expertise, there were still large gaps in 
understanding and it‟s surprising with all that manpower.” 
 
“Everyone works in little holes in the ground and stuff gets missed.  
We have a fewer number of groups that we think are more pertinent 
to the job.  Because we‟re all inherently nosy, we all sort of look 
over into one another‟s holes and so there‟s an awful lot of overlap.” 
 
US investigators, particularly within aviation, spend a considerable proportion of 
their time investigating overseas or foreign accidents, where an American 
product or citizen is involved. 
 
“There‟s a lot we can learn and if we didn‟t learn from foreign 
investigations, we‟d have to wait for them to crash here before we 
could learn.  So, I‟m a full defender of the international work that we 
do.” 
 
Whilst necessary, the US investigators acknowledge that very often these 
investigations are “frustrating”. 
 
“Even dealing with people like the TSB in Canada; even the AAIB is 
difficult to work with sometimes.  Their rules are different to ours.  
What some of the rules do is to handcuff how much information 
we‟re likely to get.” 
 
This was rejoindered by an AAIB Inspector who commented: 
 
“The NTSB believe their system is global.  But their system is their 
system, it‟s not ICAO‟s system.  It‟s not how everyone else does it.” 
 
Both groups acknowledged, however, that: 
 
“There are different ways of doing things but the end result is fairly 
similar.” 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Whilst the purpose of Phase 1 was very much to provide background 
information and familiarity with the context, the researcher was still mindful that 
the research should be of worth in its own right.  Applying Lincoln and Guba‟s 
(1985) principles of „trustworthiness‟ as a qualitative alternative to reliability and 
validity, the researcher reviewed the findings of Phase 1 in terms of its 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
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The similarity in the Inspectors‟ responses gave the researcher confidence in 
the truthfulness and therefore credibility of the data.  Whilst opinions held 
differed, no comments were made that were found to be in complete contrast to 
the collective lines of argument.  Qualitative research is not necessarily 
characterized by generalizable findings: the degree of transferability was, 
therefore, thought to be somewhat limited to the functional group although not 
necessarily to simply those working in the UK Branches.  Similarities were also 
felt to be possible in aspects of police work or external investigative bodies.  
Dependability required an appropriate and consistent application of the process 
and whilst the interview format allowed for a certain degree of flexibility because 
of its semistructured nature, it nevertheless retained consistency through the 
use of an interview protocol which ensured that the interviewing of multiple 
Inspectors remained systematic and comprehensive. Whilst qualitative research 
is by its nature a subjective activity, the researcher remained mindful during the 
analysis of the interview transcripts of the need for reflexivity and that layers of 
biased interpretation were not added but that any accounts were a reflection of 
what was actually said.  By doing so, the researcher intended to demonstrate 
neutrality and thus confirmability.   
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5.0 Phase 2 Analysis 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The second phase of the study sought to determine the perceptions of Principal 
Inspectors regarding behavioural indicators of effectiveness in accident 
investigation.  This was achieved by employing the Repertory Grid technique to 
structure interviews and elicit responses. 
 
Interviews were conducted with each of the nine Principal Inspectors from the 
MAIB and AAIB.  The interviews lasted between 55 minutes and 2 hours and 16 
minutes; the average length of interview was 1 hour and 40 minutes. 
 
The interviewees were asked to compare and contrast the behaviours of firstly 
effective and then less effective Inspectors with regards to task-oriented 
qualifiers (how they collected evidence; how they analysed evidence; how they 
liaised with families; how they wrote reports and how they made 
recommendations), resultant from Phase 1 of the research.  Their statements 
were recorded as constructs.   
 
Each of the Principal Inspectors spoke confidently and without reserve.  When 
asked to bring to mind effective and less effective Inspectors, they were able to 
do so and whilst the majority used exemplars from their own team, two Principal 
Inspectors preferred to use Inspectors that they had worked with previously. 
 
Asking the interviewees to centre on the task-oriented qualifiers enabled the 
researcher to maintain control over the flow of the interview and ensure that 
requirements of the interview were met.  Constructs were either to be 
„behavioural‟ (visible behaviours, actions and abilities) or „cognitive‟ (hidden 
thought processes which are usually inferred) (Robinson et al, 2005; Spencer 
and Spencer, 1993).  Whilst this research focuses mainly upon behaviours, the 
researcher wanted to capture constructs regarding cognitive abilities that could 
be inferred from an Inspector‟s behaviour. 
 
The laddering technique, used to focus the constructs, worked well and enabled 
the researcher to clarify ambiguous or vague statements by repeatedly asking 
what the interviewees meant.   Laddering repeatedly asks the questions “why?”, 
“how do you mean?” or “in what way?” in order to “probe the thinking behind the 
constructs” (Adams, 2001), focus the construct, remove cliché and prompt the 
interviewee to question their own statements. It was important that both the 
researcher and the interviewee shared an understanding of the constructs being 
put forward as “… such a discrepancy can be an important threat to the content 
validity of a construct” (Bartunek and Seo, 2002).  The Principal Inspectors were 
observed to refrain, for the most part, from passing comment regarding 
personalities and any such comments were discounted from the transcripts. 
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The Repertory Grid technique worked well for this phase of the research as a 
means of focusing the interviews on the specific examples of effective and 
ineffective behaviour.  Being asked to bring to mind specific individuals ensured 
that the constructs were grounded in behaviours that reflected what actually 
occurred at the Branch as opposed to introducing behaviours that were 
idealistic.  It is usual for interviewees to rate the elements (in this case the 
Inspectors) against the constructs determined from the interview but the 
Principal Inspectors indicated unease at performing this task.  Therefore, for the 
purposes of this research, ratings were not considered to be appropriate which 
concurred with the expressed intention of the researcher that this should not be 
an evaluative study.  The constructs were generated to form the basis of the 
questionnaire used in Phase 3 and were designed to be rated against the 
qualifiers of recruitment, training and the superior investigator.  
 
Slater (1977) suggested that “… a single grid may contain as much data as a 
postgraduate student might not long ago, have collected in the course of a 
research project for a doctorate”.  With this in mind, it was important for the 
researcher to be selective in what aspects of the data the analysis would focus 
upon. 
 
5.2  Establishing constructs 
 
Computer packages are available and offer an advantage to researchers with 
large grids and many calculations to perform (Freeman, 2003).  For the purpose 
of this study, however, the decision to not employ such a program was made as 
the data set gathered during the course of the Repertory Grid interviews was 
largely qualitative and therefore did not lend itself to what is primarily a 
quantitative analysis. This decision was supported by Fransella and Bannister 
(1977) who issued a “… reminder to those in danger of being caught up in the 
number game, that there are many interesting things that can be done working 
directly with the grid‟s raw data”. 
 
Recordings of the nine interviews were replayed and statements identified as 
constructs were transcribed verbatim.  Constructs were defined as a basic unit 
of description of a behaviour that demonstrated effectiveness in accident 
investigation or its polar contrast.  The Repertory Grid interview required each 
construct to be dichotomous or bipolar (Kelly, 1955) so that a contrast existed 
for each unit of description: for example, „stubborn when challenged‟ was 
offered as the negative polar contrast to „willing to compromise‟.   
 
Content analysis was used to elicit constructs and contrast from the transcribed 
data.  Content analysis, as previously described, is a generic term for the core 
of the activity where reporting assumes the presentation of findings that are 
representative of what was said (Jankowicz, 2005).  It provides a “… robust 
mechanism for identifying the common, and most important, constructs” across 
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interviews (Freeman, 2003) and is used in Repertory Grid to build up a picture 
of the skills deemed effective (Stewart, 1981). 
 
In total, 114 constructs or behavioural indicators were determined from the data.  
These behavioural indicators were initially rationalized, reducing the number 
down to 100, removing duplications where there was an allusion to similar 
aspects of behaviour through a semantically different expression.  They were 
retained, however, if they clearly offered a different perspective on the same 
behaviour. Propositional constructs regarding characteristics such as age and 
gender had already been removed as well as personal attributes that did not 
have any bearing on behaviour.  
 
Further analysis of the remaining 100 bipolar constructs suggested five 
competency themes by which the behavioural indicators could be divided into 
groups: interpersonal and communication skills; work activity management; 
personal attributes; cognitive abilities; and technical abilities.  The researcher, 
once again, used QSR International‟s computer assisted qualitative data 
analysis software, NVivo7, to facilitate this process. 
 
As only the researcher was used to code and analyse the behavioural indicator, 
there were no issues with regards to inter-rater reliability but there remained a 
possibility of bias which in qualitative research is “practically unavoidable” 
(Freeman, 2003).  This was compounded by using generated categories as 
there were none predetermined or predefined within the literature.  The 
groupings were, however, reassessed on more than one occasion and only 
three behavioural indicators out of the total set had to be moved to a different 
category.   
 
As indicated, there was no pre-existing framework or schema to be found in the 
accident investigation literature against which to compare these emergent 
competency themes but the researcher felt comfortable that they were 
„grounded‟ in the data and not force fitted; that themes “suggested themselves” 
(Stewart, 1997).   Parity was found, however, with Robinson et al‟s (2005) 
research into aerospace design engineering competencies which supported the 
researcher‟s belief regarding the credibility of the competency themes.  Again 
too, the CIPD (2007b) survey offered comparable findings to support the 
groupings. 
 
Honey (1979) states that the researcher should be prepared to have items that 
do not fit the main categories neatly to deter them from not “… imposing an 
order on the raw data that wouldn‟t otherwise be there.”  There is a degree of 
unavoidable overlap between the five descriptors employed as competency 
themes.  They are not mutually exclusive but as no behavioural indicator fell 
outside the five themes, they are still considered to be a valid means of 
description. 
 
As the behavioural indicators were to form the basis of a questionnaire in Phase 
3 of the study, the indicators were reduced by a further 25% leaving 75 positive 
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and negative indicators remaining.  The reduction was facilitated by a frequency 
count of indicators across the sample and within the interviews.  Some 
behavioural indicators were mentioned more than once during the course of the 
interview using different but similar words which was taken as an indication of 
the relative importance placed upon that construct by the individual.  The 
researcher, however, needed to abstract to a relative importance which was 
calculated by the frequency of incidence across interviews – the number of 
interviews in which it was mentioned rather than the number of times overall, to 
avoid “double counting” (Freeman, 2003).  Reducing the number of behavioural 
indicators was essentially a subjective task, requiring a degree of reflexivity.  It 
became an iterative process: each subsequent review of the data removed 
further constructs.  The researcher took care to ensure that suitable behavioural 
indicators were not being discarded based on whim or bias and that removal 
could be justified.  Once the required number were removed, the researcher 
repeated the review to ensure that the constructs left were representative of the  
overall thoughts expressed by the Principal Inspectors and were not simply a 
reflection of what the researcher felt should be included. 
 
Varga (2007), however, also suggested that constructs unique to particular 
interviewees may indicate “old values perhaps no longer shared by most 
people” or “emergent values” yet to be adopted.  Careful consideration of this 
fact was given before the removal of any behavioural indicators from the list. 
 
It was important that each behavioural indicator (with its positive and negative 
polarity) stood on its own as a statement and was not contextually dependent 
for comprehension.  Any ambiguities were thus removed and tenses changed 
where necessary to standardize the statements. No particular order is ascribed 
to the 75 remaining behavioural indicators; the order was derived from the 
transcription process.  The behavioural indicators are set out below, separated 
into each of the five derived competency themes. 
 
5.3  Competency themes 
 
Whilst the primary purpose of the construct elicitation process was to inform the 
questionnaire used in Phase 3 of the study, there are some interesting 
observations to be made with the data it is own right. The number of 
behavioural indicators within each of the five competency themes was variable.   
As indicated, there was no attempt to force fit constructs in order to have 
comparable numbers of behavioural indicators in each group and consequently 
two of the categories (interpersonal and communication skills and personal 
attributes) account for nearly half of all the data.  Whilst the competency themes 
are not weighted in any way, the researcher felt that the increased number of 
constructs elicited for interpersonal and communication skills as well as 
personal attributes gives an indication of the relative importance the Principal 
Inspectors placed upon those two competency themes.   
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5.3.1  Interpersonal and communication skills (n=27): 
 
Construct - positive Construct - negative 
Makes things clear on paper Unable to show continuity of argument in report 
Makes a powerful case for change Evidence for recommendations lacking 
Team player Appears to be an individualist 
Writes an objective and impartial report Report is vehicle for own agenda 
Clear communicator at all levels Does not modify style of communication depending on audience 
Manages confrontation successfully Can be belligerent 
Uses social skills adeptly Gets people's backs up 
Shares information / time / experience Withholds assistance as knowledge is power 
Plays the game with respect to the rules of the organization Think the rules don't apply to them 
Treats people with respect Contemptuous of others 
Demonstrates trust in colleagues Does not trust other colleagues 
Has good written English Has poor written English 
Puts together a readable report Produces a report that doesn't flow 
Understands needs of readership Writes for self, not audience 
Puts information across succinctly Provides longwinded explanations 
Broad generalizable safety message apparent in reports Makes recommendations too specific 
Able to put aside personal differences Aspects of personality get in the way 
Succinct and factual with media Statements misinterpreted by media 
Thoughtful and understanding with relatives Insensitive to relatives or friends 
Visible and contactable at all times Office never knows where they are 
Takes control of situation Allows others to control situation 
Asks searching questions Uses superficial questioning 
Able to delegate tasks effectively Overly controlling 
Accepts differences and works to strengths Dismissive of others' working styles 
Appears approachable Standoffish / aloof 
Listens well Hears what they want to hear 
Interviewees respond well to their questioning Loses cooperation of interviewees 
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5.3.2  Work activity management (n=12): 
 
Construct - positive Construct - negative 
Thorough Superficial when investigating 
Plans ahead Unstructured - shoots from the hip 
Productive in output Takes too long to produce report 
Collects pertinent evidence Collects information not evidence 
Not sidetracked by detail Gets bogged down in the detail 
Files ordered and structured Office / desk is chaotic 
Evidence well documented Lack of transparency in continuity of evidence 
Researches previous incidents and recommendations 
thoroughly 
Does not research previous history of accidents 
Paperwork available and up to date Paperwork never up to date 
Willing to deal with DfT admin Feel themselves above DfT admin 
Mindful of the cost to the taxpayer Wasteful with money 
Maintains focus in the office as well as when in field Loses focus when back in the office 
 
 
5.3.3  Personal attributes (n=22): 
 
Construct - positive Construct - negative 
Shows flexibility in approach Is unaccommodating 
Assertive - has needs met Does not have needs met 
Confident - without arrogance Comes across as arrogant 
Attends to detail Careless with detail 
Self sufficient Requires constant hand holding 
Calm under pressure Excitable 
Shows humility Acts like a 'know it all' 
Willing to compromise Stubborn when challenged 
Prepared to learn Believes they know everything 
Dependable Unreliable and full of excuses 
Uses initiative Needs to be told what to do 
Diplomatic Tactless 
Recognizes privileged public servant position Overly status driven 
Willing to listen to constructive criticism Too precious about the report 
Excited about making a difference to the industry Too ready to accept the status quo 
Emotionally mature Has had little life experience 
Reacts positively to new challenges and ways of working Likes things to remain the same 
Internally robust Prone to bouts of doubt 
Cares about the report with their name on Has no ownership for report 
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Puts effort into producing almost perfect report Leaves the tidying up of the report to the PI 
Recognizes impact of own behaviour Oblivious to how they are perceived 
Balances technical and social skills Prizes technical knowledge above social skills 
 
5.3.4  Cognitive abilities (n=10): 
 
Construct - positive Construct - negative 
Demonstrates an inquisitive nature Shows no curiosity 
Clear thought processes Shows muddled thinking 
Makes realistic recommendations Makes impractical recommendations 
Suggests alternative solutions Rigidly fixed on one explanation 
Balances specifics with bigger picture Investigation proceeds on too broad a front 
Quick thinker Needs too much time to deliberate 
Learns quickly Slow to grasp new information 
Sees past standard responses Accepts what's said at face value 
Produces a structured flow of analysis Analysis does not follow in a logical process 
Good at practical problem solving Rather too theoretical and academic 
 
 
5.3.5  Technical abilities (n=4): 
 
Construct - positive Construct - negative 
Understands industry Has lost touch with real world 
Technically competent Lacks basic technical understanding 
Knowledgeable about standards/regulations Not up to date with regulatory information 
Has detailed technical knowledge Unfamiliar with many aspects of industry 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Once again, the researcher was keen to review the findings of this phase of the 
study in terms of Lincoln and Guba‟s (1985) principles of „trustworthiness‟: 
credibility; transferability; dependability; and confirmability. 
 
Credibility was thought to be demonstrated as the transcribed constructs were 
entirely fitting based on the researcher‟s experience of the Branches and the 
Inspectors.  The competency themes were also in line with comparable 
research findings.  The Repertory Grid, a structured interview technique, 
accompanied by preset qualifiers was thought be an important step to 
demonstrating dependability. Focusing responses on the behaviours and 
attributes of specific individuals could be said to constrain transferability but 
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whilst the findings might be thought to be limited to an individual or the group, 
the method used is entirely appropriate for employment outside of the research 
area.  Lastly, the coding, categorizing and reduction of the behavioural 
indicators was essentially a subjective activity compounded by the use of only 
one researcher.  This was countered by a constant reflexive inner dialogue to 
ensure decisions made could be justified in relation to the research question 
and methodology. 
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6.0 Phase 3 Analysis 
 
The final phase of the research utilized a five-part questionnaire that aimed to 
capture the relative perceptions of the UK MAIB and AAIB Inspectorate with 
regards to what constitutes effective behaviour in accident investigation. 
 
This chapter describes the type of data collected and provides elaboration on 
the findings from each of the five sections of the questionnaire. 
6.1  Administration 
 
The questionnaire was designed in consultation with the AIB Inspectorate and 
based upon the cognitive and behavioural indicators derived from the Repertory 
Grid interviews in Phase 2.  The questionnaires were distributed and collected 
through the kind assistance of the Branch administration personnel. 
6.2  Data preparation 
 
Each returned questionnaire was initially screened by the researcher for 
anomalous or missing responses.  The researcher was mindful of large blocks 
of questions being responded to with the same rating indicating that the 
questionnaires had not been “correctly or thoughtfully completed” (Freeman, 
2003).  Some respondents favoured high scores but these were consistent with 
the overall scoring structure. 
 
Data was entered and stored using Microsoft Excel v11.3.7.  Each entry was 
double checked to ensure accuracy. 
6.3  Types of data 
 
Part 1 – Position and Background: comprised free text, continuous numerical 
data and discrete numerical data restricted to a certain range of values. 
 
Part 2 – Professional Development: comprised dichotomous variables scored 
via a dummy-variable coding (using 1=Yes and 0=No) and free text. 
 
Parts 3 and 4 – Areas of Expertise and Behaviour Statements: ordinal data 
using a rating score of 1 to 5 to denote rank order dependent upon the variable 
and linguistically constructed referents.  Questionnaire items deemed not 
applicable or appropriate were scored 0 by the respondents. 
 
Part 5 –  Skills Most/Least Admired: entirely comprised free text. 
 
Comments: free text. 
 
Any missing data/values were designated with an X and all free text was 
transcribed verbatim. 
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6.4  Response rate 
 
A total of 54 questionnaires were distributed to Inspectors and Principal 
Inspectors at the MAIB and AAIB.  30 questionnaires were returned, resulting in 
a 56% response rate.   
 
The table below shows the relative return rates by Branch. 
 
 
 Distributed Returned % Returned 
MAIB 20 16 80 
AAIB 34 14 41 
Total 54 30 56 
 
Figure 1: Questionnaire return rates by Branch 
 
 
One questionnaire was only partially completed and therefore called for listwise 
deletion of the entire case to prevent bias in the data, leaving an overall N of 29.  
Removal of the case was not thought to adversely affect the sample reliability.  
“We should be less concerned with reduced sample size than with the ever 
present risk of bias” (Oppenheim, 1992).  
 
The researcher was satisfied with the rate of response given the length and 
complexity of the questionnaire; particularly with the response from the MAIB. It 
is recognized that response rates drop significantly for longer questionnaires 
and that there is a general decline in response to surveys in general because of 
their overuse (Neuman, 2006).   
 
Caution has been encouraged with regards to response rates; the 
representativeness of the sample being more of a concern for validity than the 
number of returned questionnaires.   Respondents within this research are a 
self-selected subgroup by virtue of their inclination to report and respond.  
Anonymity of response precluded subsequent follow-up with non-respondents 
and there was, therefore, no way of validating that the respondents were indeed 
a representative subgroup (Sarsfield et al, 2000). 
6.5  Questionnaire data 
 
Neuman (2006) notes that the people most likely to participate in surveys are 
the most interested, informed, and active in society.  Following this, there was a 
presupposition that the Inspectors would not be motivated to respond 
untruthfully although this was tempered with an understanding that, in the 
absence of „absolute veracity‟, this truth would be relative with regards to 
“experience and understanding” (King, 2004). 
 
Descriptive statistics were felt to be the most useful way of representing the 
data and as such, the median has been used as the measure of location and 
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central tendency.  The median, or middlemost score, is seen as the most 
appropriate measure for use with ordinal data (Hayes, 2000).   The researcher 
was keen to avoid “statistical silliness” by attempting to calculate means on 
ordinal data, which Argyrous (2005) notes is not an infrequent occurrence even 
with academic institutions.  Means have, however, been used with continuous 
numerical data. 
 
Numerical data was manipulated and analysed using Microsoft Excel v11.3.7.  
QSR International‟s computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
NVivo7 was employed for all free text responses. 
6.5.1  Part 1: Position and Background 
 
Data regarding position and background is a means of characterizing the 
workforce and served to further inform the researcher about the varying 
backgrounds from which the Inspectorate were drawn.  Whilst it is essentially 
generalistic, it is informative nonetheless and contributes to the body of 
knowledge regarding how different populations work and train (Sarsfield et al, 
2000).  
 
All respondents had had previous careers within the mode specific industry, in a 
variety of disciplines including the military, operations, technical, research and 
training.   The majority of MAIB respondents cited seagoing operational 
management experience in either the Royal Navy or Merchant Navy and 
several AAIB respondents had come from a background in the Royal Air Force 
or airlines.   
6.5.1a  Q1.3 and Q.14: Time in Branch and Time in Industry 
 
The length of time respondents had worked at the Branch and within the mode 
specific industry was calculated in years and months and is represented below 
in terms of mean and range. 
 
 
 Mean Range 
MAIB 4yrs <1yr - 17yrs 6m 
AAIB 12yrs 4m <1yr - 30yrs 3m 
 
Figure 2: Q1.3 Mean and range time worked at the Branch 
 
 
The lower mean for the length of time served at the MAIB can be explained in 
part by the fact that the Branch was established relatively recently, in 
comparison to the AAIB, and that changes in organizational structure has 
increased recruitment in recent years.   
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The majority of respondents have had long careers in their respective industries 
with means of 30.5 years for the MAIB Inspectors and 27.5 years for the AAIB 
Inspectors. 
 
 
 Mean Range 
MAIB 30yrs 6m 11yrs - 40 yrs 
AAIB 27yrs 6m 7yrs 6m - 45yrs 
 
Figure 3: Q1.4 Mean and range time worked in Industry 
 
6.5.1b  Q1.5: Age 
 
Respondents were also asked to indicate their age using the following ranges of 
values: 20-30; 31-40; 41-50; 51+. 
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Figure 4: Q1.5 Age distribution of respondents 
 
 
With the average length of time worked in their mode specific industry reported 
to be over 27 years, it is unsurprising to find that the demographics are slanted 
towards the older age ranges.  The majority (78%) of respondents were over 40 
years of age – with an equal split of combined respondents between the older 
age ranges. Note: one AAIB Inspector declined to respond to this question. 
 
“A by-product of hiring experienced professionals is a staff with an age 
distribution that is skewed towards older ages”  (Sarsfield et al, 2000).  Not only 
do the Branches attract older „second careerers‟ with subsequent experience, 
they are also successful in retaining them to retirement.  This retention is 
particularly noticeable within the Engineering group of the AAIB, which might be 
explained by the fact that salaries within the industry are not comparable unless 
at a senior position. Conversely, the Operations Inspectors at the same Branch 
were quick to report a pay decrease on joining the Branch so financial 
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incentives were discounted as a motivation for the retention of that group.  
Given the flat structure of the organizations, there are implications for retirement 
and succession planning with an age-skewed workforce particularly where a 
large number of employees fall within a narrow age range. 
 
6.5.2  Part 2: Professional Development 
 
The researcher was interested in what forms learning typically took for the 
Inspectorate and whether they felt that sufficient time and resource had been 
expended in the maintenance or improvement of their skills; both investigative 
and technical.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Q2.1 & 2.2 Sufficient time/resources expended in maintaining skills 
 
 
The table above indicates that whilst the majority of respondents are satisfied 
with the time and resource expended on investigative skills training, there was a 
perception that less consideration was given to the maintenance and 
improvement of technical skills. As noted by Sarsfield et al (2000), technical 
skills are those most likely to suffer from degradation over time, particularly with 
the introduction of new technologies. 
 
6.5.2a  Q2.3: Learning 
 
The learning activity most frequently engaged in by the responding Inspectorate 
involves formal in-house training with 28 out of the 30 respondents (93%) 
having undertaken some form of formal instruction during the preceding 12 
month period.  Second to this came self-study which had occupied 80% of the 
respondents. 
 
 Investigative skill Technical skill 
MAIB Y = 93.75% Y = 56.25% 
AAIB Y = 84.62% Y = 61.54% 
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Figure 6: Q2.3 Breakdown of learning activities 
 
 
From initial discussions with the RAIB, the researcher was made aware of an 
extensive and comprehensive training programme that had been designed for 
the newly appointed Inspectorate.  This training programme aimed to 
significantly increase the knowledge and understanding of Inspectors across the 
range of technical subjects.  In adopting this strategy, the RAIB showed a 
commitment to raising and maintaining the professional standards that the 
industry would be looking to them to demonstrate. 
 
Conversely, Inspectors at the MAIB have adopted specific areas of the industry 
in which to become subject matter experts.  This encourages the Inspectors to 
acquire a greater depth of knowledge and experience. 
 
Training guidelines published by ICAO (2003) with respect to aviation accident 
investigators state that there are several phases to ensuring that investigators 
receive “appropriate levels of training” commensurate with their role.  These 
phases include “ … initial training, on-the-job training, a basic investigation 
course and an advanced accident investigation course supplemented by 
specialized courses.” 
  
Each of the phases is associated with differing forms of training intervention but 
given the low predictability of technical skill needs (ie it is difficult to predict what 
technical skills may be required on a specific accident or in the future), during 
interviews most Inspectors referred to their training as continual on-the-job 
training complemented from time to time with formal specialist courses.   
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6.5.3  Part 3: Areas of Expertise 
 
Following on from what is learnt by the Inspectors and how, the researcher 
sought to determine how the acquired knowledge was dispersed within the 
Inspectorate.  Respondents were asked to rate their perceived levels of 
expertise on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 indicated little or no knowledge and 5 
indicated expertise or ability to teach and lead others. 
 
Both accident investigation and mode specific areas of expertise were 
assessed. 
 
6.5.3a  Q3(a): Accident Investigation 
 
The chart below illustrates the perceived differences in expertise between the 
MAIB and the AAIB with regards to accident investigation skills.  The median 
score was calculated and is used for comparison.  It was anticipated that the 
Inspectors would rate themselves quite highly on the Investigative Skills section 
as many had previously expressed their abilities in confident terms during the 
course of the preceding interviews.  Most areas were scored with a 4 
suggesting extensive knowledge where currency is maintained and the 
knowledge is regularly applied. 
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Figure 7: Q3(a) Areas of expertise in investigation – 
comparison between MAIB and AAIB 
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Overall, as anticipated, the median scores were high.  Low ratings were given to 
wreckage plotting (2), crash simulation (1), media relations (2), family liaison (2) 
and expert witness (2.5) by the MAIB.  The AAIB rated crash simulation and 
media relations with a low score. 
 
The low score for crash simulation can be accounted for, in part, by a number of 
respondents who rated it 0 or not applicable to the role; twice by the AAIB and 
five times by the MAIB.   
 
Media relations was scored low by both Branches suggesting an area for 
improvement. 
 
Within the MAIB, four areas were scored with a 1 indicating little or no 
knowledge, on multiple occasions: expert witness; media relations; 
photography; and wreckage plotting.  These scores were predominantly made 
by staff with less than two years service at the Branch. 
 
Only two Inspectors at the AAIB indicated that they had little or no knowledge 
for any subject.  These were in the following areas: wreckage plotting; 
documenting physical evidence; ergonomics; and analysis methodologies.  Of 
the two Inspectors, one was a relatively new starter with less than two years 
served – not unlike the MAIB low scorers – but the other had over 14 years 
service so it could not be concluded that the knowledge shortfall could be 
attributed to length of time served. 
 
The researcher was pleasantly surprised by the confidence shown in expertise 
relating to analysis methodologies as interviews during both Phases 1 and 2 of 
the research had repeatedly revealed a difficulty in articulating which specific 
analysis methodologies were employed at the Branches; personal preference 
appeared to dictate how analysis was performed with some Inspectors 
expressing a reluctance to adopt any one methodology for fear of limiting and 
confining the analysis unnecessarily. 
 
Observation of the raw data showed that AAIB staff were more likely to rate 
themselves as an expert.  Half of the AAIB Inspectors rated themselves as a 5 
in one or more areas, in particular, report and technical writing, 
recommendation writing and investigation management.  A third of the MAIB 
Inspectors rated themselves as an expert, predominantly in the area of 
investigative interviewing. 
 
It is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the longer serving, more experienced Inspectors 
that reported themselves as expert more frequently, although this did not hold 
true in every case. 
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6.5.3b  Q3(b):  Mode Specific Expertise  
 
Respondents from the MAIB were asked to rate their expertise with regards to 
marine specialisms and those from the AAIB rated themselves with regards to 
aircraft design and operations.  For aircraft design and operations, several 
areas had been subdivided in the questionnaire but for ease of comparison, 
these have been amalgamated and the cumulative median presented.  
 
6.5.3c  Maritime Specialisms 
 
The median ratings for this data were fairly uniform showing at least a moderate 
degree of knowledge across the range of specialisms. 
 
The highest rated areas were Ro-Ro ferries and passenger ships and 
navigation, each of which was rated as a 4 or having extensive knowledge, 
followed by lifeboats and life saving appliances scoring 3.5. 
 
Conversely, Inspectors rated their expertise as low in the areas of propulsion, 
hydrodynamics and underwater technology, each receiving a score of less than 
2.5. 
 
Navigation, whilst receiving an overall median score of 4, otherwise elicited 
polarized responses.  Inspectors either rated themselves as expert (5) or having 
no knowledge of the area (1).  
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Figure 8: Q3(b) Maritime specialism expertise 
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6.5.3d  Aircraft Design and Operation 
 
Again, the median ratings for these data were fairly consistent across the 
various sections; no one area scoring more than a moderate rating of 3.  It was 
unexpected to find that there were no scores of 4 and above as, as previously 
noted, the confidence in ability expressed during interview by the Inspectorate 
led the researcher to predict higher scores in terms of self perceived technical 
expertise. 
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Figure 9: Q3(b) Aircraft design and operation expertise 
 
 
Low scores indicating limited knowledge (score 2) were given for the following 
areas: structure/airframe; flight dynamics; modelling/simulation; cabin 
equipment; training/simulation; and air traffic control procedures. 
 
One point of personal interest to the researcher was that the low score ascribed 
to cabin equipment was, in part, attributable to the number of AAIB Inspectors 
who indicated that knowledge of cabin equipment was not applicable to their 
role. Cabin equipment includes not only internal soft furnishings on aircraft but 
seating and personal safety equipment.  In a recent study by the Civil Aviation 
Authority into Mandatory Occurrence Reporting data for maintenance incidents 
(CAA, 2007), cabin equipment was implicated as one of the top 3 ATA Chapters 
or parts of the aircraft involved.  There is high maintenance traffic associated 
with cabin equipment and this, in combination with its perception as a „lesser‟ 
maintenance task which can be performed by less qualified or experienced 
personnel, increases its potential with regards to maintenance error.  It is not 
seen as a high risk area as cabin equipment rarely represents a direct hazard to 
the integrity of the aircraft but its potential failure could have enormous 
ramifications in an otherwise survivable accident. 
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6.5.4  Part 4: Behaviour Statements 
 
Whilst the preceding sections of the questionnaire elicited informative data 
regarding the Inspectors as individuals, the next section of the survey was 
concerned with their relative opinions and perceptions. 
 
The questionnaire called for the Inspectors to rate the 75 positive and negative 
behavioural indicators against a five-point scale in terms of the following 
questions. 
 
For positive statements: 
a) how necessary the behaviour was in terms of new recruits 
b) how likely it was that the behaviour could be acquired or improved 
through training 
c) how much demonstration of the behaviour distinguished a superior 
investigator from an average one. 
 
For negative statements: 
a) how necessary it was to screen out this behaviour at interview 
b) how likely it was that the behaviour could be removed or reduced through 
training 
c) how much demonstration of the behaviour distinguished an ineffective 
investigator from an average one. 
 
The median, as the most appropriate measure for use with ordinal data, for 
each behavioural indicator was calculated for each Branch individually and then 
collectively.  The data were then divided into the five corresponding competency 
themes (interpersonal and communication skills; work management activities; 
personal attributes; cognitive abilities; and technical abilities) for each question.  
Due to the small sample size it was not possible to ascribe any differences in 
response to the inclusion of any one group or Branch.  Given the quantity of 
data generated, the median data for all the individual questions, competency 
themes and behavioural indicators can be found in Appendix C.  The cumulative 
competency theme medians are, however, presented below. 
6.5.4a  Q4A(a):  How necessary the behaviour is in terms of new 
  recruits 
 
Competency MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
Total 
Mdn 
    
Interpersonal and communication skills 4 4 4 
Work activity management 3.25 4 3 
Personal attributes 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities 4 4 4 
Technical abilities 4 3.5 4 
  
Figure 10: Necessary behaviour for new recruits by competency theme 
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The median scores for this question are fairly uniform. The competency themes 
rated most highly with regards to behaviour sought in new recruits were: 
interpersonal and communication skills; personal attributes and cognitive 
abilities.  With the exception of work activity management rated 3.25 by the 
MAIB and an overall median of 3 (fairly necessary), and technical abilities rated 
3.5 by the AAIB, all other accumulated competencies were deemed necessary, 
but not essential by the respondents. 
 
Observation of the individual behavioural indicator ratings revealed those 
aspects of behaviour perceived to be most necessary in newly recruited 
Inspectors.  Below are the highest rated statements, where one or both 
Branches gave a median rating of 5 or essential, grouped by competency 
theme.  
 
Interpersonal and communication skills 
 Treats people with respect 
 Team player 
 Clear communicator at all levels 
 Manages confrontation successfully 
 Has good written English 
 Puts together a readable report 
 Able to put aside personal differences 
 Thoughtful and understanding with relatives 
 Writes an objective and impartial report 
 Asks searching questions 
 Interviews respond well to their questioning 
 
Work activity management 
 Thorough 
 Collects pertinent evidence 
 
Personal attributes 
 Dependable 
 Attends to detail 
 Self sufficient 
 Calm under pressure 
 
Cognitive abilities 
 Demonstrates an inquisitive nature 
 Clear thought processes 
 Makes realistic recommendations 
 
Technical abilities 
 Technically competent 
 
Further thematic exploration of the corresponding indicators revealed two clear 
groupings around the concepts of report writing and dealing with people.  
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6.5.4b  Q4B(a):  How necessary it is to screen out behaviour at  
  interview 
 
 
Competency MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
Total 
Mdn 
    
Interpersonal and communication skills 4 4 4 
Work activity management 3 3 3 
Personal attributes 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities 3.75 4 4 
Technical abilities 4 4 4 
 
Figure 11: Necessary to screen out behaviour at interview by 
competency theme 
 
Again, the median scores for the negative behavioural indicators for this 
question were uniform, with an average median score of 4, necessary but not 
essential.  Work activity management, however, was ranked as fairly necessary 
with a score of 3.  Given the lower score attributed to work activity management 
with regards to the positive behavioural indicators, it would appear that overall, 
this competency is seen as less important than the others with regards to the 
recruitment and selection process. 
 
The behavioural indicator ratings were once again considered and the highest 
rated statements (where at least one Branch rated it with a 5 or essential) 
appear below. 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills 
 Withholds assistance as knowledge is power 
 Contemptuous of others 
 Report is vehicle for own agenda 
 Gets people‟s backs up 
 Loses cooperation of interviewees 
 
Work activity management 
 Superficial when investigating 
 Unstructured – shoots from the hip 
 
Personal attributes 
 Unreliable and full of excuses 
 Requires constant hand holding 
 Acts like a “know it all” 
 Believes they know everything 
 Tactless 
 
Cognitive abilities 
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 Shows no curiosity 
 Shows muddled thinking 
 Rigidly fixed on one explanation 
 
Technical abilities 
 Has lost touch with real world 
 Lacks basic technical understanding 
 
 
Again, a thematic exploration revealed that the majority of behaviours rated 
most highly in terms of being necessary to screen out in new recruits focused 
mainly upon dealing with other people.  
 
With regards to the technical competency theme, the statements rated most 
highly were associated with technical ability overall (lacks basic technical 
understanding; lost touch with real world) – a propensity for things technical 
rather than specific acquired knowledge.   
 
6.5.4c  Q4A(b):  How likely it is that the behaviour can be acquired 
  or improved through training 
 
The second question related to the acquisition or improvement of behaviours 
through training interventions.  Scores for this question were consistently lower 
than the previous question.  Personal attributes scored the least overall with a 3 
or fairly likely to be amenable to change through training, closely followed by 
work activity management and cognitive abilities.  Technical abilities, 
conversely, scored the highest with 4 or likely but not definite and were 
therefore considered to be more amenable to change. 
 
 
 
Competency MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
Total 
Mdn 
    
Interpersonal and communication skills 4 3 4 
Work activity management 3.5 3 3 
Personal attributes 3 3 3 
Cognitive abilities 3.5 3 3 
Technical abilities 4 4 4 
 
 
Figure 12: Likelihood of behaviour being acquired or improved through training 
by competency theme 
 
 
It was less common for the positive behavioural indicators to be given a rating 
of 5 with only „writes an objective and impartial report‟ being deemed definitely 
likely to be acquired or improved through training.  The next highest scores 
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(where one or more Branches gave the score of 4, likely but not definite) are, 
therefore, shown below. 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills 
 Writes and objective and impartial report 
 Makes things clear on paper 
 Has good written English 
 Puts together a readable report 
 Puts information across succinctly 
 Broad generalizable safety message apparent in reports 
 Takes control of the situation 
 Able to delegate task efficiently 
 
Work activity management 
 Collects pertinent evidence 
 Files ordered and structured 
 Evidence well documented 
 Researches previous incidents and recommendations thoroughly 
 
Cognitive abilities 
 Makes realistic recommendations 
 
Technical abilities 
 Understands industry 
 Technically competent 
 Knowledgeable about standards/regulations 
 
No personal attribute indicators were given a high rating in this section, 
suggesting, as previously stated, that personal attributes are considered less 
likely to be amenable to training interventions.  Once again, report writing was 
evident as a theme in the highest rated indicators for the likelihood of behaviour 
being acquired.   
 
6.5.4d  Q4B(b):  How likely it is that the behaviour can be removed 
  or reduced through training 
 
The cumulative competency scores for the negative indicators regarding the 
behaviours perceived to be more amenable to removal or reduction through 
training are presented below.  These scores are lower than previous questions 
suggesting that it was thought that there is less likelihood that interventions 
would be successful in modifying behaviour in general. 
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Competency MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
Total 
Mdn 
    
Interpersonal and communication skills 3 2 3 
Work activity management 3.75 2.5 3 
Personal attributes 3 2 2.75 
Cognitive abilities 3 3 3 
Technical abilities 3.25 4 3.5 
 
Figure 13: Likelihood of removing or reducing behaviour through training 
by competency theme 
 
 
Once again, personal attributes were seen to be least likely to be receptive to 
change and technical abilities as most likely to be receptive to change.   No 
behavioural indicators relating to personal attributes or cognitive abilities were 
given high ratings. 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills 
 Unable to show continuity of argument in report 
 Evidence for recommendations lacking 
 Statements misinterpreted by media 
 
Work activity management 
 Takes too long to produce a report 
 
Technical abilities 
 Not up to date with regulatory information 
 
The ability to produce effective written communication is raised once again, this 
time focusing upon removing or reducing the lack of skill in producing a 
coherent evidentially based argument running the course of the report.  Training 
interventions were also thought to be likely to bridge gaps in knowledge, 
ensuring Inspectors are up to date with regulatory and technical advances. 
6.5.4e  Q4A(c):  How much demonstration of the behaviour  
  distinguishes a superior investigator from an average one 
 
 
Competency MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
Total 
Mdn 
    
Interpersonal and communication skills 4 4 4 
Work activity management 4 4 4 
Personal attributes 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities 4 4 4 
Technical abilities 4 4 4 
 
Figure 14: How much demonstration of behaviour distinguishes superior 
investigator from average one by competency theme 
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At a competency level, there are no apparent differences between ratings for 
the five competency themes for the positive behavioural indicators for this 
question. All competency themes score 4, indicating that the behaviour 
distinguishes a superior investigator from an average one to a greater degree.  
The homogeneous scores are an indication that no single competency theme is 
deemed specifically more important by the respondents. 
 
Review of the highest rated statements shows a similar profile in terms of 
behaviour statements to recruitment.  Many of the same statements were 
selected, in particular, in terms of dealing with people.  
 
Interpersonal and communication skills 
 Asks searching questions 
 Treats people with respect 
 Takes control of the situation 
 Listens well 
 Thoughtful and understanding with relatives 
 Interviewees respond well to their questioning 
 
Work activity management 
 Collects pertinent evidence 
 
Personal attributes 
 Attends to detail 
 Prepared to learn 
 Dependable 
 Uses initiative 
 
Cognitive abilities 
 Produces a structured flow of analysis 
 Learns quickly 
 Good at practical problem solving 
 
Technical abilities 
 Technically competent 
 Has detailed technical knowledge 
 
It could be inferred that whilst training is of importance, it is recruitment that 
provides the opportunity to bring in the skills and abilities necessary for a 
superior investigator. 
 
 
6.5.4f  Q4B(c):  How much demonstration of the behaviour  
  distinguishes an ineffective investigator from an average 
  one 
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Again there was homogeneity of data across the competency themes for this 
question, with each competency being given a 4 or greater degree, in terms of 
distinction between an ineffective investigator and an average one. 
 
 
Competency MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
Total 
Mdn 
    
Interpersonal and communication skills 4 4 4 
Work activity management 4 4 4 
Personal attributes 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities 4 4 4 
Technical abilities 4 4 4 
 
Figure 15: How much demonstration of behaviour distinguishes an ineffective 
investigator from an average one by competency theme 
 
 
Those behavioural indicators where one or more Branches used the rating of 5 
are presented below.  No behavioural indicators relating to the work activity 
management competency theme were given a high rating. 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills 
 Contemptuous of others 
 Loses cooperation of others 
 Unable to show continuity of argument in report 
 
Personal attributes 
 Unreliable and full of excuses 
 Careless with detail 
 
Cognitive abilities 
 Shows no curiosity 
 
Technical abilities 
 Lacks basic technical understanding 
 
The most common theme running through the statements associated with 
behaviour distinguishing an ineffective investigator from an average one was, 
once again, dealing with people.  
 
6.5.5  Part 5:  Skills Most / Least Admired 
 
Respondents were asked to think about those colleagues in their Branch who 
they most admired and with them in mind, to list five skills or behaviours that 
distinguished them from the rest.  
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They were then asked to repeat the exercise bringing to mind five colleagues 
that they least admired, listing five skills or behaviour that distinguished them 
from the rest.  Neither listings were deemed to be in hierarchical order and 
therefore they were not weighted in any way. 
 
Whilst this section of the questionnaire was not designed specifically to elicit 
information regarding effectiveness in terms of behaviour, the researcher had 
inferred from the interviews conducted during Phases 1 and 2 of the researcher, 
that the colleagues whom the Inspectors had most admiration for, were in 
practice those who were considered most effective in their role. 
 
The listed skills and behaviours, both positive and negative, are presented 
verbatim in Appendices D and E and a summary (where the skills or behaviours 
were volunteered more than once) is presented below.  No distinction has been 
made between the two Branches on this occasion as there would not have been 
enough data available to make any meaningful comparisons. 
 
The verbatim lists were analysed using the qualitative data analysis software 
NVivo 7 and any duplicates or semantically similar skills or behaviours counted. 
 
 
Most Admired Skills and Behaviours Count 
  
Analysis - analytical skills/problem solving 2 
Approachable 4 
Attention to detail 3 
Communication 7 
Competence - technical 2 
Courteous 2 
Decisive 2 
Determined 3 
Drive 2 
Experience - technical/industry 3 
Focus 3 
Honest 2 
Humour 3 
Inquisitive 3 
Integrity 3 
Interpersonal skills 2 
Knowledge - technical 7 
Leadership 2 
Listening skills 4 
Logical thinker 2 
Memory 2 
Objective 2 
Open-minded 6 
Organized 2 
Professional 2 
Reliable 2 
Report writing skills 10 
Sharing - time/knowledge 6 
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Team player 4 
Tenacity 3 
Thoroughness 6 
Tolerant 2 
 
Figure 16: Q5 Most admired skills and behaviours 
 
 
Those admired skills and behaviours most frequently cited were, in order: the 
ability to write a report well; verbal communication; technical knowledge; being 
open minded; sharing time and knowledge with others; being thorough; being 
approachable and being a team player.  These findings concur with the 
behaviour indicator ratings in the previous section with report writing and 
dealing with people being the behaviours rated most highly. 
 
 
Least Admired Skills and Behaviours Count 
  
Abrupt 2 
Arrogant 12 
Commitment (lack of) 3 
Communication (poor technique) 6 
Critical (overly) 2 
Dishonest 2 
Dismissive 7 
Experience (lack of) - technical/industry 4 
Focus (lack of) 2 
Illogical 2 
Indecisive 4 
Interviewing (poor technique) 3 
Knowledge (lack of) – technical/industry 3 
Lazy 5 
Loud 2 
Management (lack of skill) 3 
Overambitious 2 
Report writing (lack of skill) 8 
Rude 2 
Sharing (lack of) - time/knowledge 8 
Sloppy 2 
Superficial 4 
Team player (inability to be) 4 
 
Figure 17: Q5 Least admired skills and behaviours 
 
 
The most frequently cited least admired skills and behaviours were, in order: 
being arrogant; poor report writing; not sharing time and experience with others; 
being dismissive; inability to communicate effectively; and being lazy. 
 
Again, report writing and dealing with people are apparent as themes continuing 
through the responses. 
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6.5.6  Part 5: Comments 
 
Respondents were invited to make additional comments with regards to a skill 
or experience not referred to in the questionnaire.  7 comments in total were 
made with regards to the length and complexity of the questionnaire.  The 
remaining 10 comments provided further clarification of those skills and 
behaviours that the Inspectors felt were essential for an investigator to be 
effective and therefore successful in their role.  One referred directly to the 
personal development of Principal Inspectors and another to organizational 
structure and management.  
 
Analysis of the comments did not reveal anything particularly novel but they 
proved an excellent summation of the views expressed by the Inspectors during 
the three phases of the research.  As such, they have been transcribed 
verbatim and are presented below.   
 
“A good inspector requires to be: practical; understanding; thorough; 
technically sound; logical and a good communicator, both written and 
verbally.” 
 
“Acceptance that accident investigation is an exact science; and poor 
investigation / report is due to inability of inspector to ask correct 
questions or find the evidence.” 
 
“I am surprised to apparently see no references to 'diversity' or similar 
- guess this area is covered under general openmindedness?  
Ability/experience of dealing with those from different cultures is a 
valuable skill from the diverse industry of shipping.” 
 
“Experience in an office environment; social conscience; 
environmental awareness.” 
 
“An inspector needs to be a good communicator at all levels and 
shouldn't be afraid to talk to a high ranking official or to a member of 
the public and shouldn't be afraid of being in the media spotlight.  To 
obtain you need to give, ineffective communication can lead to 
ineffective results.” 
 
“Sustained desire to improve flight safety; lateral thinking - prepared 
to tackle status quo and address basic causes: both essential; 
distinctly lacking in some areas of the AIBs that I have come across.” 
 
“Need to have a sense of humour.” 
 
“Inspectors ideally should possess the widest range of knowledge and 
experiences but not wholly limited to aviation matters.  Question 4.1 is 
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most important: "should demonstrate an inquisitive nature"! And be 
able to write logically as well!” 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
It became apparent from feedback from the Inspectors that the questionnaire 
proved to be overly long and complex in its construction, a reflection of 
inexperience on the part of the researcher coupled with the need for more 
rigorous pilot testing.  Despite its shortcomings, it proved an appropriate 
instrument for capturing the perceptions of the Inspectors with regards to the 
behaviours of effective and ineffective investigators. 
 
Utilizing Lincoln and Guba‟s (1985) principles of once again, the researcher 
reviewed the findings of the final phase of the research and despite concerns 
with the length and complexity of the questionnaire, trustworthiness was felt to 
have been demonstrated. 
 
There were similarities between the findings of this study and the conclusions 
drawn by Robinson et al (2005) with regards to the increased criticality of 
interpersonal and communication skills and there was nothing determined from 
the analysis that conflicted or contradicted with the general impression gained 
by the researcher in the interviews in Phases 1 and 2. 
 
Transferability remains an elusive concept with regards to this research.   The 
researcher has attempted to provide sufficient contextual detail through all 
phases of the study in order that there can be an evaluation as to the extent that 
the findings are transferable but would argue that the very nature of qualitative 
research focused upon a single group will always have limitations in this area. 
 
Dependability is demonstrated through the consistent use of the questionnaire, 
albeit with limitations.  There exists the opportunity to utilize the structure and 
questions posed in further studies, as required.  Lastly, neutrality has been 
maintained as this section of the study is largely characterized by descriptive 
statistics which are less likely to be susceptible to bias and subjectivity. 
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7.0 Discussion 
 
 
The discussion chapter seeks to synthesize the various elements of the 
research, to further consolidate the knowledge acquired during the course of the 
study and to determine what the implications are for this knowledge.  
 
The chapter will follow the three phases of the research to summarize the 
salient findings within the context of the AIBs.  It will discuss how well the 
research design performed and conclude with consideration of the overall 
limitations of the present study. 
 
7.1  Phase 1 
 
The first phase of the study allowed the researcher to become more familiar 
with the subject of accident investigation through the use of semistructured 
interviews with Inspectors from all three Branches.  Whilst adherence to a 
protocol ensured that focus was maintained, the method had sufficient latitude 
to allow the researcher to follow lines of enquiry that might otherwise have been 
closed off in a more formal interview stetting.  As such it was a valuable 
opportunity to step beyond the public persona of the accident investigator and 
look in more depth at the individuals that make up the Branches. 
 
Analysis of the transcripts revealed two distinct groups of comments: task and 
non-task specific themes.  The task specific themes (evidence collection; 
interviewing; liaison with families; analysis; report writing; recommendations; 
and inquests) focus upon individual activities that need to be undertaken in 
order to successfully complete an accident investigation.  Non-task specific 
themes reveal more about the context in which accident investigators work 
including being an Inspector, the role of the Principal Inspector and 
comparisons between the accident investigation bodies in the United Kingdom 
and the United States.   
 
Reviewing the transcribed comments in the Phase 1 analysis chapter, the 
pervasive motifs of individualism and variability characterize the working 
practices of the Branches.  These, with the role of the Principal Inspector, will 
be explored in more detail.  
 
7.1.1 Individualism 
 
By individualism, the researcher is alluding, not to a moral stance or political 
philosophy, but to an outlook stressing independence and self-reliance, 
promoting the exercise of one‟s goals and desires, while opposing most 
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external interference upon one‟s choices.  It is meant as a descriptive, not a 
judgemental, term.   
 
Despite being UK government civil servants, Inspectors have expressed a 
feeling of being removed from the rest of the Civil Service with its consequent 
„bureaucracy‟.  Righteous indignation was apparent, for example, at having to 
complete necessary forms or diversity training.   
 
This individualism continues at a Branch level where there is little call for inter-
Branch cooperation although when it occurs, it is very successful: as exampled 
by the recovery of and data retrieval from the Voyage Data Recorder of the 
sunken ferry Al Salam Boccaccio ‟98 in the Red Sea in 2006 by the MAIB with 
assistance from an AAIB Flight Data Recorder engineer. The three Chief 
Inspectors form a Board of Transport Accident Investigators which purports to 
pursue joint initiatives, identify opportunities to share best practice and the 
efficient use of shared resources (MAIB, 2008a).  It was unclear from 
interviewing the Inspectors, however, how such „synergies‟ were being 
translated into changes in practice at their level. 
 
Although the structure at the Branches is the same with regards to hierarchy 
(the chain of command rising from an Inspector to a Principal Inspector through 
to the Deputy Chief Inspector and finally to the Chief Inspector), the AAIB differs 
in its day-to-day operation with the use of matrix management.  The RAIB and 
MAIB both have dedicated functional teams led by a Principal Inspector who 
operates as both man-manager and technical investigator-in-charge with overall 
responsibility for the investigation of the accident and production of the report – 
the „legwork‟ being undertaken by the Inspectors within that team. 
 
The Inspectors at the AAIB, on the other hand, have established Principal 
Inspectors for man-management tasks but the ad hoc pairings of Inspectors 
based on the rota system for attending accidents results in a random 
assignment of Principal Inspector in the role of investigator-in-charge.  There 
are obvious pros and cons to this system.  The small team cohesion could be 
absent but two Inspectors pointed out in interview that the rotation meant that it 
was rare to have to work with someone you did not like on more than a few 
occasions.  
 
Although differing levels of individualism are apparent between the Branches, 
nowhere is it more evident than at the AAIB, described previously as “the last 
home of the rugged individualist” (Viney, 1992).  The AAIB Inspectors gave the 
impression that accident investigation can be quite a solitary affair exacerbated 
to some degree by the organizational structure and with Inspectors having 
individual offices.  There were conflicting opinions as to the ability of the Branch 
to operate as a team overall but it was felt that this could only truly be tested in 
the face of a major accident on the scale of Lockerbie or Kegworth. 
 
The downside to the individualist nature is that it is more difficult to engender a 
team oriented approach to the running of the Branch as a whole; this is 
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exemplified by a comment at the AAIB suggesting that teamwork might happen 
in an individual investigation but not at a Branch level.  Whilst this research did 
not set out to measure the effectiveness of the Branch as a function of 
teamwork, the findings do have implications for the research question.  The 
skills and attributes required to operate effectively in a team can be different to 
those required to operate effectively as an individual. The MAIB, by contrast, 
appear to have a more team-oriented philosophy that certainly presents as 
more cohesive and cooperative in its working style.  From the limited 
opportunity the researcher had in observing the RAIB Inspectors, it was 
surmised that the team-oriented structure had been adopted but that as staff 
were relatively new to their role, it would take time for the teams to bed into the 
organization. 
 
In order to work effectively as a team, there is a requirement for a “… 
constellation of social skills” including: social perceptiveness; persuasion; 
negotiating; instructing and helping others.  “Strong social skills enable 
individuals to adopt the social roles needed to manage conflict, coordinate their 
work, and otherwise work in a more cooperative and integrated fashion with 
others”. (Morgeson et al, 2005). 
 
It has been suggested that the skills, knowledge and motivation needed for 
teamwork “… go well beyond the core technical skills often measured in 
traditional selection contexts.” (Morgeson et al, 2005). 
 
Individuals need both the competencies to work as individuals as well as the 
skills and behaviours to work as part of a team (West and Allen, 1997) and 
„knowing‟ how to work in a team which Stevens and Campion (1999) refer to as 
„situational judgement‟, or “getting along” behaviour. 
 
Team members‟ declarative knowledge regarding teamwork competencies (ie 
how a team functions successfully) was found to positively affect planning and 
task coordination, collaborative problem solving and communication skills.  
Those occupying the most „critical‟ position in the team were found to benefit 
most from this knowledge (Ellis et al, 2005).  
 
Although most work is usually organized around teams, Morgeson et al (2005) 
point to the dearth of empirical research on how individuals are selected for 
team-based settings.  Those AIBs who operate a team-based philosophy 
should, it is posited, be mindful that “… the knowledge, skill, ability, and other 
characteristics (KSAOs) needed for successful performance in team contexts 
might be somewhat different than the KSAOs needed in more traditional 
individually oriented jobs.” (Morgeson et al, 2005).  
 
It is not clear, however, if the organizational structure at the Branches has 
driven the collective culture and preferred working style of the Inspectorate or 
vice versa.   The question is how this individuality is best managed in order to 
maintain an effective operation.  It has implications for the structure and 
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leadership of the Branches particularly in terms of the skills and behaviours 
required for its Inspectors. 
 
7.1.2 Variability 
 
As a corollary to individualism, there is a perceived variability in the 
organizational practices of the Branches that ran contrary to the researcher‟s 
preconceptions at the commencement of the research.  Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the accident analysis methodologies applied. 
 
It was determined through the interviews in Phase 1 of the research that despite 
a plethora of accident analysis tools being available for use by accident 
investigators, and that each Branch had a preferred if not commonly articulated 
approach, that they were neither widely nor consistently used, in the UK or 
within the industry as a whole. 
 
Some might argue against their necessity.  Sennewald and Tsukayama (2001) 
would posit that investigation is an imaginative process: more of an art than a 
science.  “Despite all the modern technological assistance available to the 
investigator, and regardless of what marvellous things machines and computers 
can do, for the successful investigator there is no substitute for … imagination 
and creativity.” 
 
There is a romantic notion of the investigator piecing together the puzzle “like a 
fictional private detective” (Tench, 1985) or “ … the individual of brilliant insights 
… who engages in an intuitive exercise which ultimately leads to the solution.” 
(Repetto, 1978).   And whilst the image of the „jigsaw man‟ is seductive in many 
ways, there is a conflict between this and the expectation of a quality-controlled, 
process-driven investigation.  There is a calling now for „more science‟ and „less 
art‟.  In order to do this, the industry has to ensure that underlying 
methodologies leading to reproducible results are rigorously and consistently 
applied. 
 
It could be speculated that the analysis frameworks and tools available do not 
provide the breadth and flexibility required or that there should be one all-
purpose methodology (Woodcock et al, 2005) but that in principle the adoption 
of such a methodology would go some way to allaying the criticism that 
“Different people with different knowledge, experience, interests and outlooks 
may be able to draw different conclusions from the evidence.” (Kletz, 2006). 
 
In their work with the UK police force, Irving and McKenzie (1983) showed that 
an improved knowledge about the ergonomics of the overall investigative 
system would enhance the process and improve the decisions and conclusions 
made.  “Judgements have to be made … so relevant instruction as to how to 
make such judgements needs to be provided, otherwise the vacuum will be 
filled with dense PHOG (Prejudice, Hunch, Opinion and Guess)”. 
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Later studies with the Kent Police Force recognized that an investigative model 
would “… display transparency and integrity” – if findings are to be challenged 
then not only the findings but the entire process needs to withstand scrutiny.  
Accident investigation is an emotive subject and this need for counteracting 
criticism echoes the comment by Wood and Sweginnis (1995) that if a report 
can be challenged based upon its logic and content then it will be. 
 
In the US, the Board of the NTSB have ownership of the investigation report 
and as such the individual investigators have no responsibility with regards to 
the findings.  This is not the case elsewhere as demonstrated recently in New 
Zealand.   
 
An investigation report published by the Transport Accident Investigation 
Commission in New Zealand into a helicopter crash in 2001 suggested that the 
cause was attributable to maintenance.  Subsequent investigations into two 
further helicopter crashes led to metallurgy tests which confirmed that the initial 
crash was probably caused by fatigue failure and not by poor maintenance thus 
exonerating the mechanics.  Given the detrimental effect the findings of the 
original report may have had upon the reputation of the maintenance 
organization, the engineers were reported to be considering suing the 
investigators (TVNZ, 2006a).  Whether or not in practice this is achievable, it 
demonstrates that the standing of the investigative body is not unassailable and 
that its reputation can easily be tainted by inaccuracy or ambiguity or lack of 
evidence.  There are calls for the TAIC‟s processes to be more transparent, in 
the wake of this situation, allowing its findings to be publicly scrutinized (TVNZ, 
2006b). 
 
This echoes the concerns expressed with regards to whether transparency is 
truly attainable in government accident investigation.  Whether investigations 
conducted in private as opposed to through public inquiry fulfil the requirement 
of “full, accurate, and timely disclosure of information” (Elliman et al, 2007); 
when there is a lack of public scrutiny of evidence and an inability for the public 
to be able to challenge what evidence was considered and what was omitted. 
 
Benner (2007) states that the consequences of “getting it wrong” with accident 
investigations are manifold: injustices; litigation; misdirected future 
investigations; wrong policies; distrust; delays; flawed data and research; and 
above all missed opportunities for preventing recurrence.  There are pressures 
from all quarters to ensure that all aspects of the investigation are robust, none 
more so than the analysis itself. 
 
Zotov (2002) argues for the pursuit of the “scientific approach” to investigations 
to build in quality control, reflecting Benner and Rimson‟s earlier call for defined 
steps following an input-operation-output-feedback loop (1991).  “Scientific 
methods may offer the possibility of better quality investigations, with more 
rigorously argued analysis and more persuasive recommendations in 
consequence.” 
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“Analysis activities ultimately rely on the judgement of investigators, but analysis 
has been a neglected area in terms of standards, guidance and training of 
investigators in most safety investigation organisations.” (ATSB, 2008). 
 
“Many investigators (from most safety investigation organisations) seem to 
conduct analysis activities primarily using experience and intuition which is not 
based on, or guided by, a structured process.  It also appears that much of the 
analysis is typically conducted while the investigation report is being written.  As 
a result, the writing process can become inefficient, supporting arguments for 
findings may be weak or not clearly presented, and important factors can be 
missed.” (ATSB, 2008). 
 
Recognizing the multiplicity of analysis techniques available for use by the 
investigation agencies, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) sought 
to clarify their position by reviewing best practice in this area and building upon 
it to create a new analysis framework thus providing them with standardized 
terminology and definitions, an accident development model, a defined process 
for conducting analysis activities as well as a set of tools to document the 
process.  This suite of products was complemented with policies, guidelines and 
training for investigators.  The ATSB cite the aims of the new analysis 
framework to be to “… improve the rigour, consistency and defensibility of 
investigation analysis activities, and improve the ability of investigators to 
identify safety issues in the transportation system”. 
 
The system is in its infancy but the ATSB believes that whilst no approach to 
investigation will receive global approbation, theirs offers a “… balanced 
approach which most effectively achieves its aims” and encourages debate and 
discussion within the industry. 
 
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada launched a similar initiative in 1998 
with the desire to improve its operational effectiveness and efficiency.  The 
Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology was developed to “… 
systematically integrate the TSB‟s efforts in determining findings as to causes 
and contributing factors, identifying safety deficiencies, assessing the 
associated risks to safety in the national transportation system, evaluating 
options for mitigating those risks and for communicating the resultant safety 
message in the most convincing way.” (TSB, 2000).  It offered a holistic context 
in which to address safety issues, looking at going far beyond establishment of 
the immediate cause to the assessment of risks associated with safety 
deficiencies (Ayeko, 2002). 
 
The researcher found throughout the interviews with the Inspectors that 
Branches differed in their amenability to the employment of analysis tools. One 
criticism expressed regarding accident analysis tools was that they were 
considered to be either overly complex or too simplistic and as such were not 
highly regarded.  It is not known whether this is as a result of being new to the 
role, functional leadership or cultural drivers but the RAIB appeared to be 
„satisfied‟ with using an analysis tool to structure their evidence and report 
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although some confusion remained as to which was the most appropriate tool to 
use. 
 
There is little evidence to suggest that a lack of a prescribed methodology has 
had a serious impact on the validity or reliability of an accident investigation 
report published by one of the AIBs, at least not in recent years and no 
methodology is without its flaws and shortcomings. It is predicted that 
adherence to protocol, however, should lead to less variability in the quality of 
investigations.   The consistent use of a methodology allows for replicability, a 
clearer articulation and greater transparency of the process and continuity of 
argument.   Answers to causal questions are then based upon accepted 
decision rules and methodology as opposed to judgement predicated primarily 
upon experience.   It is speculated that a highly prescriptive analysis process 
would, however, sit uncomfortably with some of the Inspectors interviewed; a 
view expressed during the Phase 1 interviews was that Inspectors were 
employed for their “… experience and expert opinion, and not to merely follow a 
flow chart”. 
 
7.1.3 The role of the Principal Inspector 
 
The researcher felt that the role of the Principal Inspector had important 
implications for the overall effectiveness of the accident investigation.  Their 
function is manifold: by turn they are mentors, technical sounding boards, team 
leaders and report editors as well as being man-managers and performing the 
role of Investigator-in-Charge (IIC).  It should be noted that the IIC has 
definitional connotations of taking control of a large-scale accident but in this 
instance they are notionally responsible for the investigation, performing more 
of a facilitative, coordinating function for the types of investigations that are 
more prevalent for the three AIBs.  The Phase 1 interviews revealed that there 
was a resigned acceptance amongst the Principal Inspectors that the role was 
no longer hands-on, out in the field, taking command but more of a 
coordination, support and oversight function. 
 
The AIBs have dedicated publications staff but it appeared, at the time of the 
research, to be an over-reliance upon the Principal Inspectors to produce the 
final, edited version of the report.  The interviews confirmed that a large 
percentage of the Principal Inspectors‟ time was spent editing the reports 
created by the Inspectors.  This received universal disapprobation from both 
Principal Inspectors and Inspectors alike.   
 
Whilst it was expected that Principal Inspectors would use their knowledge and 
experience to comment upon technical comment or logic of analysis and 
conclusions, it was felt inappropriate that such a resource should be used to 
correct spelling, grammar and typographical errors.  The inconsistency of 
„standards‟ in terms of writing styles and expectations amongst the Principal 
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Inspectors was noted by the Inspectors as well as a high degree of variability in 
man-management and operational styles.   
 
Despite the perceived variance, there appeared to be a general consistency 
amongst the Principal Inspectors interviewed in terms of their defined effective 
behaviours.  Not unsurprisingly, it was found that those aspects of behaviour 
that the Principal Inspectors themselves regarded highly were reflected in what 
they sought in the style and content of the report.  For example, one Principal 
Inspector commented on the need to get the facts back out to the industry and 
families as soon as was possible.  Factual correctness delivered in a timely 
manner.  The „niceties‟ such as grammar, punctuation and presentation were 
deemed to be secondary.  Conversely, other Principal Inspectors felt that the 
integrity of the report content and recommendations could be adversely affected 
by “sloppy writing”.  Whilst the differences between the Principal Inspectors was 
not observed to be marked, they were sufficient to have raised continual 
comment by the Inspectorate. 
 
It was felt by some to be entirely logical that such the function of report 
publication should be undertaken by support staff in line with a house style – not 
unlike the process at the NTSB in the United States, but with more individual 
control over the initial report construction. 
 
Benner (2008) comments that the IIC or similar function has two fundamental 
quality control issues to manage: the quality of the investigation process and the 
quality of the work product.  It is their responsibility to ensure that the overall 
investigation process is efficient, effective and unassailable as too are the 
investigation report and recommendations, by way of the work product.  The 
Principal Inspectors‟ focus with regards to the report production is, therefore, 
not inappropriate.  What is of concern is the ability to balance the time and effort 
expended with relation to the other added-value activities that could be 
undertaken. 
 
The existence of the Board of Transport Accident Investigators where the Chief 
Inspectors of the three UK AIBs have agreed to pursue joint initiatives provides 
the perfect opportunity for not only the Chiefs but as, if not more, importantly the 
Principal Inspectors to maximize on the potential „synergies‟ that exist.   
 
The flat hierarchical structure of the AIBs and the longevity of the position 
holders leaves little room for advancement and development, particularly for 
Principal Inspectors.  One proposal would be for there to be more inter-Branch 
endeavours to capitalize upon best practice and differing perspectives. 
 
As an example, the RAIB reported (RAIB, 2007) that as part of their internal 
audit process, peer reviews of reports were performed which also encompassed 
the standards of the investigations themselves.  Inter industry peer reviews of 
investigation reports by Principal Inspectors from the three UK AIBs would 
provide an independent quality assessment of the product as well as fresh 
ideas, expanding the knowledge and experience of the Principal Inspectors. 
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Finally, an accident investigation provides the opportunity for the industry to 
learn: to learn why a specific accident occurred and what corrective action could 
prevent recurrence.  As importantly, the investigation itself provides valuable 
lessons in terms of the process, the methodology, the tools used and so forth.  
Benner (2008) believes this is a vital role for the IIC and in this case, the 
Principal Inspector to undertake.  Having oversight of a number of 
investigations, they are in a position to offer insights that would benefit the 
overall advancement of the “state-of-the-art of investigation”.  This aligns with 
the remits of both the existing professional societies for marine and air 
investigators: the Marine Accident Investigators‟ International Forum which aims 
to “… promote and improve marine accident investigation” and the International 
Society of Air Safety Investigators which, as well as promoting air safety, strives 
towards “… mutual development of improved investigations”. 
 
7.2  Phase 2  
 
The second phase of the study sought to determine the perceptions of Principal 
Inspectors regarding behavioural indicators of effectiveness in accident 
investigation.  This was undertaken by employing the Repertory Grid technique 
to structure interviews and elicit responses. 
 
Behavioural indicators, both positive and negative constructs, were extracted 
from the interview transcripts and once rationalized for duplication and saliency, 
formed the basis of the questionnaire used in the final phase of the research. 
 
Further analysis of the remaining behavioural indicators suggested five 
competency themes: interpersonal and communication skills; work activity 
management; personal attributes; cognitive abilities; and technical abilities.  
 
As indicated, there was no attempt to force fit constructs in order to have 
comparable numbers of behavioural indicators in each group and consequently 
two of the categories (interpersonal and communication skills and personal 
attributes) account for nearly half of all the data.  Whilst the competency themes 
are not weighted in any way, the researcher felt that the increased number of 
constructs elicited for interpersonal and communication skills as well as 
personal attributes gives an indication of the relative importance the Principal 
Inspectors placed upon those two competency themes.  
 
Whilst interpersonal and communication skills have been taken as one 
competency group or theme within this research, it could be argued that with 
reflection on the findings of Phase 3 which indicated the relative importance of 
dealing with people and report writing, that the competency theme could be 
separated out into interpersonal skills and communication skills. 
 
There was no pre-existing schema specific to the role of the accident 
investigator available against which to compare these themes, the Chartered 
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Institute of Personnel and Development‟s recent Learning and Development 
Survey (CIPD, 2007b) found the most „popular‟ (ie most frequently utilized) 
competencies to be, in order: communication skills; people management; team 
skills; customer service skills; results orientation; and problem solving. 
 
This concurred with earlier findings in Rankin‟s (2004) survey into 49 employers‟ 
core frameworks which showed the top six competencies to be: team 
orientation; communication; people management; customer focus; results 
orientation; and problem solving. 
 
More recently, and specific to an aerospace design engineering organization, 
Robinson et al (2005) found the comparable competency groups of: personal 
attributes; project management; cognitive strategies; cognitive abilities; 
technical ability; and communication.  These similarities in groupings indicated 
to the researcher that there was credibility in the findings (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985), and that the competency themes determined were valid grouped 
descriptions of behaviour for this role.  There was also a feeling of „fit‟ with what 
the researcher had experienced during the study which Corbin and Strauss 
(2008) offer as one measure of the quality of the findings. 
 
It was not the expressed intention of the research to create a competency 
framework per se, but the method employed for generating the behavioural 
indicators followed the typical process for the development of competency 
frameworks: collecting job role behaviour and skills information using 
observations, interviews and questionnaires; analyzing raw data and creating 
subgroups from statements with related behaviours; and identifying specific 
competency names to represent the smaller subgroups of behaviour. 
 
The resultant competency framework is therefore a credible tool in its own right 
and has applicability and usefulness (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  The 
Repertory Grid interviews used in this phase, stopped short of comparing 
„elements‟ or individual Inspectors and rating them using the positive and 
negative constructs or behavioural indicators as this was not considered to be 
appropriate by the Principal Inspectors interviewed.  This aligned with the 
researcher‟s intent that this should not be an evaluative study. Not using a 
method in its entirety or „method slurring‟ attracts the possibility of losing some 
of the credibility associated with using that particular method (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008).  The researcher felt that the change to the method was valid, 
however, in the context of the study and it was the use of the Repertory Grid to 
frame the interviews rather than the ensuant element ratings which was of 
value.   There is, however, the opportunity to revisit the use of this framework by 
the Branches should they wish to employ such a measurement tool. 
 
Phase 2 determined 200 indicators of effective and ineffective behaviour in 
accident investigation as positive and negative constructs.  In a typical 
competency framework these would be used as either illustrations of behaviour 
that would characterize the possession of a competency or else could be used 
as a measurement of competence.  
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It is the assertion of the researcher that elements of the competency framework 
could be incorporated into the MAIB‟s Professional Standards of Competence in 
Accident Investigation framework by the inclusion of all requisite values and 
behaviours. 
 
The ubiquitous drive for performance assessment has manifested itself at the 
MAIB in terms of their adoption of a competence framework that guides internal 
accreditation of Inspectors.  The MAIB used the structure of establishing 
performance criteria with discrete elements, accompanied by requisite 
knowledge and understanding, following National Occupational Standard (NOS) 
principles.  Whilst it is typical for the NOS to focus primarily upon activities and 
knowledge, there is the possibility of extending the framework to include values 
and behaviours. Competencies traverse the different elements of the standards 
of competence.  For example, communication skills are required within each of 
the four units and with many if not all of the underlying elements of which the 
unit is comprised. 
 
As such the competency aspects of this research, including the behavioural 
indicators generated in Phase 2, could be used to further strengthen the 
Professional Standards of Competence in Accident Investigation tool.  This 
answers a call in the literature for more blended approaches to determining 
competences and competencies (Schippman et al, 2000; Robinson et al, 2005). 
 
The value of using behavioural indicators and competency themes developed 
with the Principal Inspectors is that there is a degree of saliency in being able to 
use the statements that reflect the language used by the group although the 
researcher would wish to review these to ensure that whilst keeping the 
sentiment of the original intention, the tone and language used matched that of 
the competence framework. 
 
It is possible to apply weightings to behavioural indicators based on whether 
they are deemed to be mandatory, desirable or optional for the role.  Likewise, 
weightings can be applied at the competency level: a percentage value can be 
set as a means of communicating to the Inspectors the relative value and 
priority the Branch attributes to each competency.  This enables behavioural 
indicators and competencies to be more focused in measuring what is of real 
importance to the organization as opposed to the blanket application of a 
generic model. 
 
7.3  Phase 3  
 
The final phase of the study sought to utilize the behavioural indicators 
generated by the Repertory Grid interviews in the previous phase in order to 
capture the relative perceptions of the UK MAIB and AAIB Inspectorate with 
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regards to what constitutes effective behaviour in accident investigation.  This 
was undertaken with the use of a five-part questionnaire. 
 
The first three parts of the questionnaire (position and background; professional 
development, and areas of expertise) sought to characterize the Inspectors: 
their backgrounds; length of industry experience; their thoughts on learning and 
development at the Branch; and lastly, their perceived levels of expertise in both 
technical and investigative subjects. 
 
As has been shown, the majority of respondents have had many years 
experience in their industry which as Sarsfield et al (2000) pointed out, tends to 
skew the age distribution of accident investigators towards older ages.  Whilst 
there are implications for retirement and succession planning given the flat 
structure of the organizations, this experience brings with it more than just an 
accumulation of technical knowledge.  The majority of the Inspectors are 
„second careerers‟ and will have had the opportunity for developing social and 
organizational skills which this research has indicated are desired qualities for 
the role.  A caveat to this would be that if these interpersonal and 
communication skills are not apparent in those of an older age at recruitment 
then they are less likely to be amenable to development, referred to as a 
„cognitive lock-in‟ (Murray and Häubl, 2007).  This is not to comment upon 
cognitive functioning and ability to acquire new skills but habits and ways of 
working may become more engrained as age increases; this is tempered, 
however, by an increase in knowledge and expertise. 
 
The Inspectors interviewed expressed high levels of confidence in their own 
abilities and the findings reflect this with an equally high rating in terms of their 
levels of expertise, in particular with respect to accident investigation skills.  The 
perceived levels appear to be lower for technical / mode specific skills but this 
could be a reflection of the spread of expertise across the Inspectorate.  It could 
be surmised that whilst an Inspector will be required to employ all of the 
investigation skills in the course of investigating an accident, that it is not a 
requirement for them to have expertise in all technical areas – this is stated with 
a presumption that the Branch as a whole should possess these skills. 
 
Expertise is largely defined as a special skill or knowledge attained through 
training or experience but the literature reveals that there are various 
idiosyncrasies associated with expertise that have ramifications for the 
performance of an organization. 
 
Being able to articulate and communicate the analysis process and conclusions 
drawn is a vital part of the role but from a cognitive perspective, as expertise 
increases, mentally represented tasks become more abstract and simplified 
which can “… interfere with experts‟ ability to share their expertise”. (Hinds and 
Pfeffer, 2003).  Knowledge, acquired as a result of experience (Polanyi, 1966) 
becomes tacit and held at an unconscious level increasing the challenge of 
articulation.  Experts somehow forget what it was like not to know and have an 
oversimplified view of what might actually be a complex task (Hinds, 1999).  
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This is of particular concern if they are communicating with someone 
considered to be significantly less expert as there is a need to „bridge the gap‟, 
referred to as “… the curse of knowledge” (Camerer et al, 1989).  This can have 
unwelcome consequences where experts are encouraged and expected to pass 
on knowledge through mentoring. 
 
It is the successive development of procedurally oriented knowledge structures 
that facilitate the processes of expertise, a product of experience rather than “… 
of superior intelligence.” (Clark, 1999)  This reiterates a point made by Argyris 
and Schön (1974) “ … the ease with which they can process large amounts of 
information and produce elegant and effective outputs tempts one to assume 
they have superior mental capabilities or aptitudes.”  Expertise is more likely to 
have implications for long term memory and schemata: “Many so-called 
indicators of talent are not inherited prerequisites for exceptional performance 
but rather capabilities acquired as a result of intensive practice.” (Ericsson, 
1990)  It is therefore impractical to expect new Inspectors to demonstrate the 
same degree of expertise in the field of accident investigation as those who 
have had many years in the role. 
 
Limitations are not just cognitive but can also be motivational.  Where there is a 
competitive environment with a flat hierarchy as at the Branches, knowledge is 
power held in the individual rather than the collective.  Status is accorded to 
those who provide assistance to others (Blau, 1955) and an exchange of 
knowledge for status is effected.  Hinds and Pfeffer (2003) suggest that 
organizations need to create systems that motivate or reward sharing 
knowledge and information between and within groups to sustain assistance. 
 
Not only are there issues with regards to communication, expert opinion, for that 
is what the Inspectorate offers, is reliant upon a rational deference to „epistemic 
authority‟.  There is an acknowledgement of superiority in terms of knowledge 
but with it comes an ineluctable element of trust. Accident investigation 
processes need either to be so transparent and proceduralized that they can be 
undertaken by the layperson, or there needs to be trust not only in the reliability 
of their knowledge (for one can only truly tell whether an expert is competent by 
becoming an expert oneself), but also in their characters and motivation. 
“Where there is expertise, knowledge is not in fact open and accessible to all.”  
(Hardwig, 1994).   
 
The Inspectorate requires public trust in order to function, and that trust is 
largely built upon the perceived epistemic authority derived through experience 
and technical knowledge.  
 
7.3.1 Recruitment, training and the superior investigator 
 
The final part of the questionnaire required respondents to rate both the positive 
and negative behavioural indicators with regards to importance at recruitment, 
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amenability to change through training intervention and how they distinguished 
superior behaviour.  
 
The positive behavioural indicators rated in terms of how necessary they were 
in new recruits and conversely how necessary it was to screen the behaviour 
out at interview fell predominantly into the interpersonal and communication 
skills, cognitive abilities and personal attributes competency themes.  Negative 
behavioural indicators were more evenly spread but again, were mainly found in 
the same competencies.  Conversely, work activity management was seen as a 
less important competency to consider at recruitment.  The researcher surmised 
that the latter was more likely to be amenable to interventions once recruited 
and could therefore be developed whereas there might be less possibility of 
improving the ability to communicate and deal with people effectively.   
 
It was considered to be necessary to screen out individuals who showed no 
proclivity towards the technical aspects of the role but technical knowledge was 
not seen as essential for recruitment.  This concurs with Robinson et al (2005) 
who found that technical abilities were ranked lower than personal attributes 
and project management skills, not so much because they were deemed less 
important but more likely because there was an expectation of a particular level 
of technical ability and experience as a prerequisite for initial selection into the 
role.  Technical expertise was the starting point and not an aspirational 
acquisition.  “Differences in technical ability are only likely to emerge when 
increasingly technical fields are considered.”  “When personal attributes and 
project management competencies are considered, there is likely to be far 
greater differentiation in ability … consequently, it is the non-technical 
competencies that are more critical to excellent performance.” (Robinson et al, 
2005). 
 
Recruitment and selection of new Inspectors is conducted by external 
organizations. The status of the role is such that it attracts many responses 
when vacancies are advertised; some applications are purely speculative but 
the remainder are subject to a series of filters before short lists are developed.  
Potential candidates are screened through one-to-one telephone calls with the 
recruitment agency and the successful applicants invited to the Branch for a 
one day assessment centre.  It was reported that the AIBs have enjoyed a 
stable relationship with the selection organization, if not the recruitment agency, 
over successive rounds of recruitment. 
 
Application forms for recent recruitment campaigns at the AIBs call for proven 
experience in the competency areas of critical thinking (intellectual capacity, 
critical analysis, inquisitive outlook), interpersonal skills (engaging people, 
professional empathy, working with others), results focus (resilience, delivery, 
structured task planning) and decision making (managing information, 
pragmatic decision making, impartiality and objectivity) as well as 
communication skills, integrity, credibility and a positive attitude.  These concur 
with the competency themes and underlying behavioural indicators elicited 
during the research. 
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The assessment day (as experienced by the researcher during Inspector 
selection at the AAIB in 2007) comprises a group discussion typically based 
upon a mode neutral traffic accident; psychometric personality, verbal and 
numerical critical thinking tests, a psychological exploration with an external 
psychologist and a formal interview with a three person Board.  In addition, a 
written exercise is conducted based upon the subject matter of the group 
discussion. 
 
The nomothetic psychological tests in use at that time were the Watson-Glaser 
Critical Thinking Appraisal UK and the Rust Advanced Numerical Reasoning 
Appraisal used to assess intellectual ability.  These tests are complementary 
and co-norming and purport to measure analytical and cognitive skills including: 
drawing inferences; recognizing assumptions; argument evaluation; deductive 
reasoning; logical reasoning; and “… the intuitive recognition of equivalence or 
sufficiency of information” (Rust, 2002).  All these have been deemed requisite 
skills in the field of accident investigation.   
 
In addition, the 15FQ+ personality test was also administered.  Based upon 
Cattell‟s (1946) 16 PF test, Psytech‟s 15FQ+ has remained true to the original 
personality factors with exception of the „Intelligence‟ variable.  In line with 
current research, this has been replaced by the term „Intellectance‟ denoting a 
self-expressed cognitive style or preference rather than a straightforward 
measure of ability.  This test includes an impression management scale known 
as „social desirability‟.  Candidates rating highly on this scale are thought to be 
desirous of presenting “… an unrealistically positive image of themselves” 
(Psytech, 2008).  The researcher was advised that the longstanding relationship 
between the AIBs and the selection psychologist had enabled the „preferred‟ 
psychological profile of the candidate to be refined over time although it was 
posited that it was unlikely that a template for the ideal accident investigator 
existed as each Branch had ventured its own preferred profile dependent, it was 
suggested, upon the culture of the Branch and industry. 
 
Questionnaire-based measures of personality and values provide “… a fair, 
objective and cost-effective method of predicting likely behaviour” (Psytech, 
2008).  “To the extent that every individual „has‟ a personality that is stable and 
relatively permanent, behaviour will be consistent from one situation to another; 
an alternative view is that behaviour is largely determined by situational factors 
and that behaviour will show considerable inconsistency across situations.” 
(Gross, 1996).    
 
Detractors would posit that a flaw in tests for personality and to some degree 
ability also, is in terms of ecological validity.  Are the tests able to reflect what 
people would actually do in „real life‟, for example, quick thinking in times of 
emergency (Hayes, 2000); people behaving in a manner not predicted by 
personality tests.  “When a group is populated by individuals who are saying 
and doing one thing but thinking and feeling another, high effectiveness in the 
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long haul is unlikely” (Porter et al, 1975).  If nothing else, they provide signposts 
for the Branches to use to indicate generalized acceptable qualities. 
 
Selection is the obvious opportunity for ensuring that those candidates 
perceived to exhibit behaviours detrimental to the effectiveness of an 
investigation are eliminated, unless those behaviours are deemed sufficiently 
amenable to improvement or reduction through training interventions.  
Bonnstetter (2000) argues that selection rarely focuses upon attitude – usually 
due to the fact that skills and knowledge are the easier components of 
performance to define and therefore measure.  Experience has shown, 
however, that organizations “hire for skills and fire for attitude” (Bonnstetter, 
2000). 
 
What was noticeable to the researcher during observation of the selection 
assessment at the AAIB was that there was not more rigorous testing of report 
writing and the ability to deal with people, particularly in confrontational or 
emotive situations.  
 
As these two areas are consistently rated highly as essential for new recruits 
during this study, the researcher would encourage the Branches to look at ways 
to incorporate more opportunities for demonstrating capacity, if not ability, in 
these areas.   
 
More demanding writing exercises where not only the fundamentals such as 
grammar and spelling can be assessed but also the ability to analyse and 
assimilate facts and figures to create a fluid coherent report.   
 
Further exploration of the manner in which candidates cope with challenging 
role play interviews with „witnesses‟ and „relatives‟ would inform the selection 
assessment with regards to capacity for pertinent questioning, articulation of 
findings and essentially, demeanour and interpersonal skills under pressure. 
 
Whilst there is an appreciation that additional or longer exercises would 
increase the costs involved with running an assessment centre, better initial 
screening and a full day of exercises would ensure that only those candidates 
most appropriate would be called back for interviewing at a later stage. 
 
Historically, particularly at the AAIB, there has been an emphasis on selecting 
for technical knowledge and experience both of which are considered 
prerequisites for establishing expertise.   Technical knowledge, however, has 
been shown to have certain limitations. Sarsfield et al (2000) stated that there 
are three „clusters‟ of knowledge and skills required by accident investigators: 
investigation (understanding and implementing appropriate methodologies and 
requisite steps to successful output); management (coordination of teams, time 
management, etc); and technical (domain and industry knowledge).   Their 
studies showed that of all these, technical knowledge and skills were seen to 
atrophy and date much quicker than either investigation or management.  But 
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with a basic proclivity towards the technical aspects of the role, such a 
knowledge shortfall could be supplemented on a continued development basis. 
 
From the findings of the Phase 3 questionnaire, it was shown that technical 
abilities were perceived to be most amenable to change or improvement 
through training and in particular, behavioural statements pertaining to report 
writing were rated most highly.  Conversely, personal attributes were rated as 
least amenable to training suggesting that if the role of investigator was 
desirous of those aspects of behaviour then they were better sought at 
recruitment and selection rather than reliance on improvement or acquisition 
once in the role. This concurs with Spencer and Spencer‟s iceberg model 
(1993) which found that surface skill and knowledge was relatively easy to 
identify and develop through training whereas it was better to recruit for the 
deeper, core personality characteristics as these were less likely to be 
amenable to interventions. 
 
“Training in this very practical art is essentially an apprenticeship.” (Zotov, 1997)  
It is generally accepted that investigators, particularly effective ones, are not 
created simply by “… the ownership of a fluorescent jacket.” (Braithwaite, 2002)  
It is a role where experiential learning is essential; where experience is 
transformed into knowledge. 
 
There are several phases to training investigators.  ICAO (2003b) in its Training 
Guidelines proposes that aircraft accident investigators undergo initial basic 
training, followed by more advanced specialist courses, on-the-job training and 
mentoring. Many structured investigation courses are available, particularly in 
aviation.  These are often conducted by universities and other educational 
institutes, as well as by investigation authorities, manufacturers or military 
establishments (ICAO, 2003). 
 
Cranfield University ran its first course in 1977.  It was initially conceived and 
developed in association with the Chief of Air Accidents due to the increasing 
strain placed upon the Branch by requests for assistance for training by foreign 
agencies (Tench, 1985).  Principally designed for civil aircraft accident 
investigation, its syllabus and scope has widened to include military and in 
recent years has been „enhanced‟ through collaboration with the MAIB and 
RAIB to incorporate the investigation of accidents in other modes of transport.  
 
Braithwaite (2004) points to the need for industries to learn from one another‟s 
mistakes; to “… learn lessons across modes”.  With the formulation of 
multimodal agencies in many countries such as Australia, Canada, the 
Netherlands and the US, there are advantages of sharing resources, and more 
readily sharing information or “lessons”. 
 
“Perhaps one of the most valuable outcomes of bringing investigators from 
different modes together has been in revealing differences in approach.  Some 
of the differences are entirely logical and are a function of the operating 
environments.  However, some of the others do suggest an opportunity to 
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question whether „the way we have always done it‟ is necessarily still valid.  … 
The philosophical difference may be for some valid historical reasons, but there 
is considerable value in asking why we do certain things the way we do.” 
(Braithwaite, 2004). 
 
The introduction to the Cranfield course notes in 2003 included the comment 
that “It is not intended to convey the impression that on completion of the 
course you will be fully competent .. investigators.  For it is only through 
continuity of practice, diligent application and experience that you can achieve 
that distinction.” 
 
This is echoed by ICAO‟s training guide: “As an investigator gains experience, 
he will realise that the need to increase his knowledge and upgrade his skills is 
a continuing process.  While training is essential, the optimization of an 
investigator‟s capabilities generally depends upon a personal commitment to 
excellence.” (ICAO, 2003b). 
 
Given the tendency for technical knowledge to decline over time (Sarsfield et al, 
2000), the AIBs are inclined to employ generalists, exemplary in the 
investigative and management aspects of the role and make use of external 
expertise as and when required.  Whilst there are questions regarding the 
impact upon impartiality and independence, it has proven a successful process 
and removes the issues of replacing in house specialists upon retirement or 
transfer.   
 
The RAIB, during its infancy, sought to offer an extensive training package to its 
newly appointed Inspectors with nearly 170 days training provided during their 
first year in the role.  This was a move to turn „generalists‟ into „specialists‟.  
Sarsfield et al (2000) commented upon giving relatively inexperienced people 
greater volumes of training to acquire skills needed, suggesting that the 
effectiveness of such an „employee development plan‟ was unclear. 
 
At the start of the research, both the sponsors and the researcher were keen to 
determine what behaviours and skills distinguished a superior investigator from 
an average one.  Superior was operationally defined as resulting in a higher 
quality investigation.  The researcher found, however, that the Phase 3 findings 
showed all attributes or competencies received comparable ratings: no one 
competency theme attracted a higher rating than any other.  Whilst this may 
have been a reflection on the manner in which the question was phrased, the 
researcher felt that it was more likely to be attributable to the requirement for 
the superior investigator to have a balanced complement of skills. 
 
Further analysis of the data showed that the behavioural indicators attracting 
the higher scores mirrored those perceived to be essential at recruitment 
leading the researcher to surmise that effective selection of non-technical skills 
was paramount in developing the quality of investigations. 
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Competency and competency modelling have been synonymous with enhanced 
or superior performance since the term was first proposed (McClelland, 1973).   
The reason cited for the introduction of competency modelling to many 
organizations is the increased business advantage – an opportunity to 
outperform competitors (Horton, 2000a).  It could therefore be concluded that a 
well-constructed competency model should capture those elements of superior 
behaviour that the organization wishes to maximize upon to capitalize upon. 
 
In practice, this has not proven to be quite so straightforward.  Superior 
behaviour can be difficult to specify (Bonnstetter, 2000) as there are usually no 
defining thresholds.  Bonnstetter (2000) argues that it is context dependent: the 
best performer in one organization might be deemed average in another.  It is 
therefore more likely to be associated with measuring investigators “relative to 
mission” (Collins, 2005) and determining what is fit for purpose as opposed to 
defining a “one size fits all” discrete set of attributes. 
 
The researcher believes that the competency themes developed during Phase 
2 of the research form a base against which to measure performance.  If 
defining thresholds are thought not to exist, then it could be argued that 
performance should be considered to be a continuum.  Expected minimum 
levels of performance are dictated by competence measures as definite 
indicators of attainment of a standard.  Any increases upon that level of 
effectiveness could therefore be considered to be superior, something that adds 
value and would be measurable through a competency framework. 
 
The last part of the questionnaire called for the Inspectors to bring to mind 
colleagues that they most and least admired and list qualities that distinguished 
them from the rest.  There was an assumption, based on the findings of the first 
two phases of the research, that the colleagues for whom the Inspectorate has 
most, and conversely, least admiration for, were in practice those who were 
considered most effective in their role. 
 
The researcher was keen to see how these compared with the overall findings 
of the questionnaire and noted that there were many similarities, lending 
credibility to the findings.  The most frequently cited skills and behaviours that 
Inspectors admired in colleagues were, in order: the ability to write a report well; 
verbal communication; technical knowledge; being open minded; sharing time 
and knowledge with others; being thorough; being approachable; and being a 
team player.  These findings concur with the behaviour indicator ratings with 
report writing and dealing with people being the behaviours most highly rated. 
 
The most frequently cited skills and behaviours that Inspectors least admired 
were being arrogant; poor report writing; not sharing time and experience with 
others; being dismissive; inability to communicate effectively; and being lazy.  
Again, report writing and dealing with people are apparent as themes continuing 
through the responses. 
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This study has repeatedly pointed to the concepts of report writing and dealing 
with people.  The next section of this chapter now looks at these in more detail. 
 
7.3.2 Report writing 
 
“In safety, the story is not mere packaging, a wrapping to make the principles 
palatable.  The story is the important bit, what really happened.” (Kletz, 2001). 
 
As alluded to in the literature review, the accident report is the key deliverable 
from an investigation, representing the quality of the investigation as a whole.   
 
“A superbly written report cannot do much to overcome a bad investigation, but 
a poor report can definitely ruin a good investigation.”  (Wood and Sweginnis, 
1995).  These sentiments were echoed by Tench (1985), “Writing an accurate 
and properly assessed accident report is by far the most difficult part of the 
investigator‟s task, but it is the investigator‟s only end-product.  No matter how 
efficiently the investigation has been conducted, an inadequate report nullifies 
the effectiveness of the investigation”. 
 
Unless an investigation is able to present a logical coherent argument in a 
manner which is readily understood by both technical specialists and lay people 
alike, then the opportunity to effect change is compromised.  Investigations and 
ensuant reports are often contentious despite their eschewing culpability and 
liability and “If the report can be attacked and refuted based on its logic and 
content, it will be” (Wood and Sweginnis, 1995). 
 
One aspect of report writing that was alluded to frequently in the interviews was 
the length of time it took to produce reports.  Inspectors were mindful of the 
constant need to balance the creation of a comprehensive and evidentially 
based report with the need for industry and families to get timely information.  A 
divide was observed amongst the Inspectors in terms of their opinion regarding 
this balance.  This can be illustrated by the following quotes taken from the 
Phase 1 interview analysis:  
 
“No point in producing a report that‟s too old”  
 
“Good quality takes time”. 
 
During the interviews in Phase 1, the value of a report and findings published in 
some cases nearly four years after the event was questioned.  Corrective 
actions are put in place and the industry moves on in that time.  It is, however, 
only a relatively small percentage of the overall accidents investigated that 
overrun the 12 month figure (described as a „notional‟ target by one Chief 
Inspector).  Looking at the reports published in 2006 and 2007, the overrun 
figures for the Branches were as follows: RAIB – 15%; AAIB – 8%; and MAIB – 
7%.  Two notes of caution should be made with respect to these figures: the 
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RAIB was very much in its infancy at this time and establishing the preferred 
report format; and 100% of the AAIB formal reports leading from Inspectors‟ 
Investigations overran the 12 month figure.  One Inspector commented that this 
was largely due to the fact that these investigations tended to be far more 
bureaucratic and political in nature, implying their investigative work was done 
expeditiously but that the process was delayed by agencies and influences 
beyond their control. 
 
The structure of narrative reports, such as used by the AIBs, follows the facts-
analysis-conclusion format promoted through ICAO‟s Annex 13, and as such 
provides a framework to guide the content of the accident report.  Annex 13 
also provides report writing „conventions‟ (ICAO, 2003a) ranging from the 
general “… convey an attitude of impartiality and write objectively” to the 
specific “… pronouns should be placed close to their antecedents to ensure 
clarity”.   
 
Such guidelines may not, however, be sufficient to guarantee consistent, 
appropriate or correct use of grammatical rules and spelling.  As reported by 
one Inspector, “… when it comes to spelling and grammar, you either get it or 
you don‟t – and quite frankly, I don‟t!”  The impression gathered from this 
comment amongst others was that some people had a natural proclivity towards 
such things and that training and education could only help the situation so far 
for those that did not. Whilst report writing courses are made available to 
Inspectors, there are those who readily admitted during interview that it was 
often too difficult to sustain the required changes and that without constant 
conscious effort, Inspectors reverted to habit and preferred writing style. 
 
The interviews in Phase 1 suggest a high degree of variability in the writing 
styles and expectations of the Principal Inspectors in their role as investigation 
report editor.  One Principal Inspector commented upon the need to get the 
facts back out to the industry and families as soon as possible.  Factual 
correctness delivered in a timely manner.  The „niceties‟ such as grammar, 
punctuation and presentation were deemed to be secondary. 
 
Conversely, other Principal Inspectors felt that the integrity of the report content 
and recommendations made could be adversely affected by “sloppy writing”.  
Whilst the differences between Principal Inspectors were not observed to be 
marked, they were sufficient to have raised continual comment from the 
Inspectorate. 
 
One of the solutions discussed with the AIB Inspectors was the adoption of the 
US NTSB process of using professional writers to collate and edit investigation 
reports.  The writing team assemble the reports based upon the information 
passed to them by the investigators.  In principle this appears to have merit as 
an idea but in practice it was often reported to be quite difficult.  Investigators 
were said to be disparaging regarding the technical understanding of the writers 
and the writers felt undervalued by the investigators and not given sufficient 
respect with regards to their professional writing abilities. Whilst many UK 
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Inspectors acknowledged the potential benefit of having a dedicated writing 
resource (particularly as it would free up the Principal Inspectors for more 
management centric activities), there was a reticence: as if somehow ownership 
of the investigation would be diminished. It was conceded, however, that it 
would be easier to control the „house style‟ and thus standardize the output. 
 
Whilst it was suggested that the variability in writing abilities amongst the 
Inspectors was acknowledged to sometimes negatively impact the report 
production process, the internal workings of the Branch, the hierarchical editing 
process and the often unique nature of the accidents themselves often means 
that even the most effective investigator could find their report taking a 
considerable length of time to produce.  
 
The variability in styles and expectations has meant that the report is not yet 
something “with measurable and immutable characteristics” (Irving and 
McKenzie, 1993) but remains organic, honed and shaped by successive layers 
of contribution and editing. 
 
7.3.3 Dealing with people 
 
One of the most important aspects of the role of Inspector, as determined 
through the interviews in Phase 1 of the research and the findings in the Phase 
3 questionnaire, is that of interacting with other people.  As well as the friends 
and family of those involved in air, marine and rail accidents, Inspectors need to 
be able to communicate effectively with the media, manufacturers, operators, 
other technical specialists and coroners to name but a few.  As importantly, they 
will need to work with colleagues within the Branch.  
 
Sometimes popularly described as „emotional intelligence‟ (Goleman, 1995), the 
ability to understand and manage other people is well documented as a 
requirement for survival and adaptation; whether in business or life in general.  
Whereas the predominant focus on intelligence has been associated with 
cognitive abilities, concepts such as „social intelligence‟ (Thorndike, 1920) and 
„interpersonal intelligence‟ (Gardner, 1983) fit well with the competency 
literature and have been embraced as viable complements (rather than 
alternatives) to traditional intelligence tests. 
 
A debate exists as to whether emotional competencies are innate talents or 
learned capabilities and as such susceptible to improvement through training 
interventions (Goleman, 1998).  The findings of this research suggest that there 
is a perception that they are less likely to be changed through training and are 
better selected for during recruitment. 
 
Defining, measuring and validating such emotional intelligence has, however, 
proven difficult despite its popular media interest and whilst emotional 
intelligence has an intuitive feel about it, caution should be exercised in its use 
as a predictive instrument. 
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As an extension of emotional intelligence, social intelligence (the use of 
emotional intelligence in social settings) is made up of social awareness 
(including empathy, attunement, empathic accuracy and social cognition) and 
social facility (synchrony, self-presentation, influence and concern) (Goleman, 
2006).  Sternberg (1999) interprets this as „successful intelligence‟ defining it as 
“… the ability to balance the needs to adapt to, shape and select environments 
in order to attain success.” 
 
An interesting corollary to research in relation to social intelligence is 
teamworking which has been alluded to earlier in this chapter.  Although 
participatory and collaborative work is encouraged at all the Branches, it was 
not clear from the interviews conducted that it was necessarily the natural 
working style of some of the Inspectors.  The researcher has found that the 
individual competencies required for effective performance as an accident 
investigator will always be context dependent and it will be equally important for 
an Inspector to demonstrate the competencies required for working as part of a 
team or group, which may differ. 
 
Soft skills, as illustrated through the concept of „dealing with people‟, should not 
be seen as a replacement for technical knowledge or skill but essentially 
complementary, unlocking the potential for highly effective performance in order 
to gain flexibility and adaptability.  
 
7.4 Research limitations 
 
Undertaking PhD research is described as akin to an apprenticeship served on 
the journey towards becoming a professional researcher (Phillips and Pugh, 
1987).  As such, it provides an opportunity to acquire the associated research 
skills and to demonstrate their acquisition in an appropriate manner.  Phillips 
and Pugh (1987) indicate the „holistic‟ nature of the process “… involving 
guesses, reworkings, corrections, blind alleys and above all inspiration”. 
 
At the commencement of the research project, it emerged through discussion 
with each of the sponsors that there was insufficient common understanding of 
the terms „competence‟ and „competency‟ and as such, differing expectations as 
to the preferred direction the research should take.  Unfortunately, it was not 
simply a question of semantics as there are, as explained in this thesis, clear 
differences in the concepts and subsequent implications for the research 
methodology. Additionally, each of the three UK AIBs was individually involved 
with projects that had implications for the study.  A consultancy had been 
employed to develop a competency framework and both the MAIB and RAIB 
were pursuing accreditation although along widely differing lines. 
 
Given the amount of work already being undertaken in the area, there appeared 
to be diminishing room for unassisted innovative research.  In order to produce 
work that was original, the researcher was obliged to step outside of the original 
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„remit‟ of simply developing a competency framework for the Branches to inform 
training and assessment.  In doing so, the researcher found the RAIB 
unconvinced of the value in continuing to support the research at a time when 
resources were more usefully employed in shaping the operation.  Their 
withdrawal from the research was disappointing and regrettable as the 
researcher was denied a quite different perspective but the researcher was 
grateful for their contribution nonetheless. 
 
The question should be raised as to how appropriate social research is when a 
thesis is published a number of years after the start of a project. “In doctoral 
work – in the rigours that it requires and the constraint on resources – there is a 
limit to the speed in which one can progress, and this is significantly slower than 
is generally expected in practice.” (Freeman, 2003).  Organizations are dynamic 
entities and change is constant making a study over a long period of time (as 
opposed to a longitudinal study) more difficult.  Changes at the Branches over 
the course of the research - some extensive, others minor - have included the 
formation of the RAIB and the commencement of its operation, alterations to 
organizational structures, changes in personnel in both the Inspectorate and at 
senior levels largely as a result of retirements, as well as in terms of senior 
government officials with responsibility for transport.   
 
And yet there are constants: accidents and serious incidents continue to occur, 
the nature of which do not appear to be changing even if frequency and scale 
do.  Neither have the skills and behaviours required by the accident 
investigators appeared to have altered greatly over the course of the research.  
Branch initiatives will have been introduced since the study was undertaken that 
may have had some bearing upon the findings and conclusions drawn but 
qualitative research, such as this, can only ever be thought of as a snapshot in 
time. 
 
The Inspectorate at the AIBs is a fairly small population resulting in a limited 
sample.  This was reduced further by the subsequent non-inclusion of the RAIB 
Inspectors.  This sample size gave little scope for deriving anything statistically 
meaningful from the data and the researcher felt that as a result, a qualitative 
study was considered the best approach.  Interviewees were not selected 
randomly but opportunistically; based upon availability and to some degree 
willingness to participate.  
 
The research was influenced by the realism paradigm, where reality is thought 
to exist outside of the subjects but that people‟s experiences will shape their 
interpretation of it, was strengthened by the adoption of a “multi strategy” 
approach (Dawson et al, 2006).   
 
Gathering various types of information, from various sources, enables “… 
different facets of the data” to be revealed (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).  Such 
multi strategy research can attract adverse comment.  This is largely because of 
the notion that aligning one‟s research to a particular methodology carries with it 
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„epistemological commitments‟ thus self-imposing delimitations with regards to 
how data is collected, analysed and presented.   
 
The researcher holds the view that the research question should dictate the 
method of investigation (Trow, 1957 cited in Gill and Johnson, 2002) and not 
the alignment with a particular philosophical stance.  A pluralistic approach to 
data collection, that is collecting information in more than one form, answers the 
call for „complementarity‟ or cross-referencing (Hammersley, 1996 and Trow, 
1957 cited in Gill and Johnson, 2002). 
 
The researcher was fortunate to have relatively unhindered access to the 
Inspectorate but this varied between Branches, subject to their workload, 
availability and amenability. It enabled the researcher to acquire first hand a 
working knowledge of the individual Branches, their operation and the apparent 
differences and converse similarities between Inspectors.  
 
The Inspectors who took part in the interviews in Phases 1 and 2 were found to 
be open and candid.  As previously noted, the researcher had no concerns 
regarding probity but was mindful that by its very nature, comment was 
subjective and based upon the experiences of the individual Inspectors and 
should be treated as such. 
 
The research topic appeared to be salient to the Inspectors who were all able to 
clearly articulate their perceptions of what constituted effective behaviour in 
accident investigation. They were all happy to discuss the topic at length and 
offer opinion and insight. 
 
Despite some logistical problems with regards to availability and ambient noise 
levels (as a result of construction work at the AAIB), the face-to-face interviews 
in the first two phases of the research worked well; the process becoming more 
refined with each subsequent interview.   The adoption of an interview protocol 
ensured the interviews remained constructive and by restraining to some extent 
the breadth of topics covered, focused the researcher on attaining requisite 
depth. The structure provided by the interview protocol also facilitated the 
transcription of interviews.  
 
It became apparent from the comments written on the returned questionnaire 
employed in Phase 3 of the research, that the researcher had underestimated 
the time implication for completion and indeed the patience of the respondents 
in tackling what turned out to be a lengthy and complex questionnaire.  This 
was a reflection on the inexperience of the researcher. 
 
It would appear that those individuals from whom the researcher sought 
comments regarding the design and content of the questionnaire were perhaps 
not harsh enough in their critique or were content that the questions were not 
contentious and appeared at face value to represent the tone and language of 
the Branch.  A more rigorous pilot study would have gone a long way to allay 
some of the issues experienced with the final questionnaire.  
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With the benefit of hindsight, the researcher acknowledges that the 
questionnaire should have been condensed and extraneous questions „cut‟ for 
the sake of brevity.  Concentrating upon the core questions, in this case the 
rating of behavioural indicators, may have increased the response rate although 
the researcher is not sure the percentage increase would have been significant. 
 
As previously noted, response rates for the questionnaire were adequate overall 
(although exemplary from the MAIB).  Response rates are recognized to drop 
significantly for longer questionnaires (Neuman, 2006) and the possibility exists 
that tedium will set in and latter questions may be answered randomly or 
without sufficient thought (Brown, 1992; Bryman, 1989). The interest or 
motivation for completing surveys varies by respondent with different people 
valuing either positively or negatively specific aspects of the process.  This 
could be the topic, the length of questionnaire, the researcher or the reward 
offered for completion.  Neuman (2006) refers to this as leveraging the saliency:  
akin to “what‟s in it for me?”  
 
The data from the questionnaire in Phase 3 did not lend itself to inferential 
statistics which in itself was not an issue but the application of quantitative 
techniques to what is essentially qualitative data could have added “… power 
and sensitivity” when attempting to determine patterns in a set of observations 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994).   
 
As this research is largely concerned with perceptions of a small sample, it was 
also inappropriate to use inferential statistics to make inferences from the data 
to more general conditions.  Descriptive statistics, however, provide “… a 
powerful summary that may enable comparisons across people or other units” 
(Trochim, 2006). 
 
The behavioural indicators were rated using an ordinal scale.  Ordinal scales 
are commonly used to measure opinion or attitude as opposed to specific 
interval data points such as height and weight.  An ordinal scale establishes an 
ordered relationship between the objects being measured.  Numbers are used 
to rank order on a continuum but the units of measurement are not equal; for 
example, 1 to 2 is not equal to 2 to 3 (Kranzler, 2003).  The numbers reflect 
relative merit; “The alternative amounts or degrees of intensity that the states 
represent” (Hildebrand et al, 1977) but not how much. 
 
Ordinal scales are sometimes ascribed the same characteristics as interval 
scales where the numerical values are seen as a “… representation of a 
continuum expressible as a real number, albeit a fuzzy one” (Hassall, 1999). 
 
One criticism regarding the employment of ordinal scales is that ratings are 
based upon “… a set of imprecise (or vague) referents which may represent 
concepts to which varying degrees of membership may be assigned (Hassall, 
1999).  Given that the absolute distances between ranks cannot be known, 
141 
respondents can only provide “… an imprecise judgement in relation to a range 
of hypothetical statements” (Hassall, 1999). 
 
It was felt that there was no value in investigating gender differences during this 
research as the sample size (there are currently only two female Inspectors and 
one female Chief Inspector) was too small from which to draw any meaningful 
conclusions.   
 
Given the qualitative nature of this research, data is produced and collected as 
part of a social process or interaction; a creative process from which it would be 
all but impossible to remain value neutral.  A bias-free interview cannot exist, as 
a result of the interaction between interviewer and interviewee.  "The spoken or 
written word has always a residue of ambiguity, no matter how carefully we 
word the questions and report or code the answer" (Fontana and Frey, 1994). 
Language used can be misinterpreted and the researcher‟s intentions not made 
clear. 
 
The researcher, however, remained aware of the need for reflexivity during her 
interviews with the Inspectors; a self-awareness of the integral role played by 
the researcher in the overall study.   And whilst the use of only one researcher 
had the potential to impact objectivity and introduce bias, this was tempered by 
a greater feeling of intimacy with the data and subjects. 
 
Despite the pursuit of impartiality, assumptions were made based upon the 
preceding reputation of the Inspectors as a group.  Their putative 
professionalism and technical expertise was broadly accepted and nothing 
transpired as a result of the interviews to challenge this view.   
 
“… there are no operationally defined truth tests to apply to qualitative 
research.” (Eisner, 1991 cited in Hoepfl, 1997) and “Judgements about 
usefulness and credibility are left to the researcher and the reader.” (Hoepfl, 
1997).   Whilst accepting that the call for methodological rigour in qualitative 
research remains contentious (Willig, 2007), the researcher sought to determine 
an appropriate measure of “usefulness” (Fransella, Bell and Bannister, 2004) as 
a more practical alternative. 
 
Sekaran‟s Eight Hallmarks of Science (2003) were thus applied as a measure,  
including: purposiveness; rigour; testability; replicability; precision and 
confidence; objectivity; generalizability; and parsimony (see section 2.7 for fuller 
explanation).  Purposiveness was demonstrated by establishing a clear 
objective for the research, which was to determine the required skills and 
behaviours for an effective investigator.  A sound methodological design was 
developed as a measure of rigour but the researcher felt that the ease of 
completion for the questionnaire used in Phase 3 could have been greatly 
improved by more thorough pilot testing.  The aim of the research was in fact 
testable and the detailed procedure included in the methodology allows for 
replication.   
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The researcher believes that the findings of the research „make sense‟ within 
the context of accident investigation, resembling what is being studied, thereby 
demonstrating precision and confidence.  Objectivity was strived for, ensuring 
personal biases and values did not impact on the process or the findings.  The 
use of only one researcher, and the qualitative nature of the research can 
increase subjectivity but this was avoided where possible through constant 
reflexivity and the use of verbatim exemplars.  The study focused upon UK AIBs 
and as such the findings are pertinent to that group.  The research method, 
however, is generalizable and affords comparison with other investigation 
bodies and comparable roles.  Lastly, the role of the accident investigator is a 
wide ranging topic and there were many other aspects of the role that could 
have been studied.  In order to demonstrate parsimony, the researcher stated 
the intent to look at skills and behaviours rather than attempting to cover the 
entire topic at no great depth. 
 
The researcher has determined that, however inviting a notion it might be, an 
„identikit‟ accident investigator does not exist.  Particularly within the UK, and 
most specifically within the AAIB, an individualistic nature is present and prized.  
What is evident is that a competent investigator has a balance of investigation, 
management and technical skills commensurate with the role.  Success, 
however that is defined, is not entirely dependent upon the attributes or 
experience of the investigator.  It comes from the consistent application of a 
rigorous and apposite methodology and is measured by the contribution to the 
advancement of the body of safety knowledge. 
 
The potential breadth of research into the role of the accident investigator is 
vast.  Given the integral part the investigator plays within the accident 
investigation process, it is almost impossible to separate one from the other to 
study in isolation.  A „successful‟ investigation is not solely predicated upon the 
skills and knowledge of the investigator but their contribution is obviously 
irrefutable.  The scope of this particular research project was purposefully 
limited to those aspects of the investigator‟s behaviour that were deemed 
„effective‟ in the investigation process; behaviour referring, of course, to 
something that could be demonstrated.  
 
Thankfully, within the UK the fatality rate associated with aviation, marine and 
rail accidents is relatively low.  As suggested during the introduction to this 
thesis, when compared with the number of deaths incurred on the roads, the 
expenditure versus benefit argument remains debatable.  Philosophically, and 
perhaps morally, the need for accident investigation and therefore accident 
investigators is unlikely to diminish.  The public comfort derived from their work 
is immeasurable. 
 
As Braithwaite (2004) stated “Investigation is a discipline in evolution: as 
technologies and techniques become more advanced, so too the demands on 
the investigator will increase.”  This constant change or evolution is echoed in 
this comment:  “Whatever competence means today, we can be sure its 
meaning will have changed by tomorrow.  The foundation for future professional 
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competence seems to be the capacity to learn how to learn.”  (Argyris and 
Shön, 1974).  There is a call for the AIBs to be “future focused” in all aspects of 
recruitment, succession planning and training; ensuring that the competences 
and indeed competencies required going forward are adequately provided for.  
 
 
 
 
. 
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8.0 Conclusions and further considerations 
 
This research sought to determine the requisite skills, qualities and behaviours 
in an effective accident investigator.  This was undertaken through a 
multiphased approach using semistructured interviews, Repertory Grid 
interviews and rated behavioural indicators qualified in terms of selection, 
training and ability to distinguish superior behaviour. 
 
The research focused upon the perceptions of the Inspectors of Accident at the 
UK Accident Investigation Branches for marine, aviation and rail.  Job 
incumbents are thought to be able to infer the knowledge, skills, abilities and 
other characteristics required for the role with some degree of accuracy 
(Brannick and Levine, 2002). 
 
The literature regarding the field of accident investigation showed that even 
operating within a prescribed legal framework, variation in terms of 
organizational philosophy and function exist which can have an impact upon the 
investigation process and outcome.  The investigation process is observed to 
be unlike scientific research, with recognized quality controls.  There is more 
latitude for flexibility and more reliance upon expert opinion as opposed to a 
pursuit of reproducible outcomes.  This is demonstrated by the variety of 
accident analysis methodologies on offer: availability, however, does not 
necessarily lead to consistent employment. 
 
A preference in organizations for adopting competency frameworks as a 
method of measuring and enhancing performance was found although a degree 
of confusion was said to exist regarding the most appropriate use of the terms 
competency and competence. Whilst there is a tendency to conflate the terms, 
the researcher found that this was more than a question of semantics and that 
there were fundamental differences in focus and purpose.  For this research, 
competence was seen as a minimum standard of acceptable performance 
whereas competency referred to the behaviours by which this standard was 
achieved. 
 
Individualism and variability characterized the findings of the Phase 1 
semistructured interviews which also illustrated the role of the Principal 
Inspector in the overall effectiveness of the investigation.  Individualism refers to 
the proclivity of many Inspectors, particularly at the AAIB, for being self-reliant 
and opposing external interferences with regards to how their work is 
conducted, which has implications for effective teamwork.  Variability points to 
the lack of clearly defined standards with regards to analysis activity that was 
noted to be based more on experience and intuition than a structured process 
leading to reproducible results. 
 
The Branches are encouraged to consider their stance with regards to 
individualism and variability as their structure, philosophy and leadership style 
will influence both considerably.  The individualistic nature is present and prized 
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and it must be determined whether its strengths outweigh its potential 
weaknesses.  Standardizing an approach to analysis should not serve to 
constrain, but to guide thinking and promote transparency. 
 
The Principal Inspector, although having the notional dual role of man-manager 
and investigator-in-charge of allocated accidents, was found to spend an 
increasing amount of time fulfilling the role of report editor, in terms of both style 
and content, which was met with disapprobation.  Inconsistencies in styles and 
expectations with respect to the accident report added to the perceived 
frustration for both the Principal Inspectors and Inspectors alike. The researcher 
would advocate more use of dedicated publications resource to generate more 
consistency. 
 
The role of the Principal Inspector was found to take many forms, none of which 
appeared to be wholly satisfactory.  The researcher found that there were many 
opportunities for learning and sharing best practice that could be afforded by the 
extension of the collaborative principles of the Board of Transport Accident 
Investigators down to the Principal Inspector, if not below, and would encourage 
the Branches to capitalize on the expertise and experience of the Principal 
Inspectors in a more productive manner. 
 
Analysis of the Repertory Grid interviews conducted with Principal Inspectors in 
Phase 2 of the research established a competency framework with associated 
positive and negative behavioural indicators and revealed five main competency 
themes: interpersonal and communication skills; work activity management; 
personal attributes; cognitive abilities; and technical abilities.  These were 
consistent with other frameworks considered in the literature review, in 
particular, Rankin (2004), Robinson et al (2005) and the CIPD (2007). 
 
The majority of behavioural indicators fell into one of two competency groups  
(interpersonal and communication skills and personal attributes) indicating to 
the researcher that of the competencies, these were felt to be most important 
for the „effective‟ investigator.  Further thematic analysis of the behavioural 
indicators showed an emphasis on report writing and dealing with people. 
 
Rating of the behavioural indicators in the final phase of the study confirmed 
that interpersonal and communication skills, personal attributes and cognitive 
were seen as most important in terms of recruitment.  Technical skills, however, 
were seen as being most amenable to change through training interventions 
with personal abilities least likely, suggesting that they would be better sought at 
recruitment.  This concurs with Spencer and Spencer‟s iceberg model (1993) 
which found that surface skill and knowledge was relatively easy to identify and 
develop through training whereas it was better to recruit for the deeper, core 
personality characteristics as these were less likely to be amenable to 
interventions.  Finally, with regards to distinguishing superior performance, no 
one competency group was outstanding but thematic analysis of highly rated 
behavioural indicators showed a propensity towards statements that reflected 
an ability to deal with people. 
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These findings have implications for recruitment as, concurring with Robinson et 
al (2005), the traditional focus on technical skills and knowledge should be 
taken as a prerequisite and not an aspirational acquisition, and the relative 
importance of non-technical competencies such as report writing and the ability 
to deal with people be more prevalent in selection testing and decision-making. 
 
No specific skills or behaviours were found to distinguish a superior investigator 
from an average one: instead it was thought to require a balance of 
competencies.  With no defining threshold, the researcher proposes that 
superior performance must be measured “relative to mission” (Collins, 2005) 
and is more usefully thought of as a continuum rather than an absolute set of 
discrete skills and behaviours. 
 
The constraints of the research study fall partly to concerns with the length and 
complexity of the questionnaire used in Phase 3 and partly to the initial issues 
regarding the management of sponsors‟ expectations, compounded by the 
withdrawal of the RAIB from the research project.  The relatively small sample 
size precluded meaningful quantitative methods but qualitative techniques such 
as semistructured interviews and Repertory Grid were found to be appropriate 
for eliciting information from the Inspectorate. 
 
The researcher applied Sekaran‟s Eight Hallmarks of Science (2003) to the 
study as a means of assessing the value of the research and was encouraged 
to see that despite any weaknesses in the construction of the final 
questionnaire, overall the study conformed to the required standards. 
 
The ubiquitous drive for performance assessment has manifested itself at the 
MAIB in terms of their adoption of a competence framework that guides internal 
accreditation of Inspectors.  The RAIB, at the time of their involvement in the 
research, were pursuing external accreditation as a means of validating 
vocational competences. The MAIB used the structure of establishing 
performance criteria with discrete elements, accompanied by requisite 
knowledge and understanding, following National Occupational Standard (NOS) 
principles.  Whilst it is typical for the NOS to focus primarily upon activities and 
knowledge, there is the possibility of extending the framework to include values 
and behaviours.  As such the competency aspects of this research, including 
the behavioural indicators generated in Phase 2, could be used to further 
strengthen the Professional Standards of Competence in Accident Investigation 
tool.  This answers a call in the literature for more blended approaches to 
determining competences to be available. 
 
Other potential areas for future work involve reviewing competencies required 
for team based activities as well as reconsidering the role of the Principal 
Inspector to involve closer collaboration and increased development 
opportunities between the Branches. This study primarily involved the UK 
Accident Investigation Branches with comparative information sought from the 
US National Transportation Safety Board.  Whilst it would be interesting to 
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repeat the research with other comparable agencies such as the ATSB or the 
BFU in Germany, it is anticipated that many of the findings would be similar.  
The transport industry is however, by its nature, a global one.  What would be of 
more value would be to involve non-Western agencies with differing 
philosophies and cultures and to explore further their impact upon the manner 
with which investigations are conducted.  
 
 
Far from identifying an „identikit‟ accident investigator, the research has found 
that in considering effectiveness, an investigator‟s performance measurement is 
context dependent.  This suggests that if the organizational structure is such 
that individualism and variability are operational norms, then it should not be 
surprising that the tendencies of the Inspectorate will follow suit.  It is not clear, 
however, if the organizational structure at the Branches has driven the collective 
culture and preferred working style of the Inspectorate or vice versa.  What is 
important for the Branches to consider is what their expectations are of the 
Inspectors, for the philosophy espoused and the leadership shown will impact 
more than the individual skills and behaviours of the Inspectorate.  It is the 
balance of societal expectation of the transparent, quality-controlled, process-
driven investigation with the inscrutable, independent expert that many of the 
investigators strive to be.  
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APPENDIX A:  Protocol for Phase 1 semistructured interviews 
 
 
1. Purpose of interview 
Background to research 
Background of researcher 
Confidentiality assurances 
 
2. Background of interviewee: previous employment; time at Branch; 
education; discipline and specialty. 
Why they joined 
Difference between groups (eg operations vs engineering; nautical vs 
engineering; signal engineers vs permanent way experts etc.) 
 
3. Investigation process 
Description of day-to-day activities 
Proportion of time taken with different aspects 
Likes / dislikes 
What Inspectors do well / what they struggle with 
Managing investigations 
 
4. Life at the Branch 
Outward impression 
How it differs from preconceptions 
Strengths / weaknesses 
Missing skill sets 
Rivalries / internal conflicts 
Team vs individualist 
 
5. Training 
Development 
Performance management 
Discipline 
Remuneration 
Competency vs competence 
 
6. First investigation / first time at crash site 
Thoughts / feelings / enduring memories 
Coping strategies 
Subsequent investigations 
Dealing with media / families / coroners 
 
7. Description of effectiveness in investigation 
Converse – what does ineffective look like 
What constitutes superior behaviour 
 
8. Branch within industrial context 
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World standing 
Branch within society 
Changes to Branch structure and activities over time 
Historical and societal influences 
Future of Branch – requisite changes 
 
9. Leadership 
Politics 
Influence of DfT / Civil Service 
Funding 
Interaction with other Branches 
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APPENDIX B: Protocol for Phase 2 Repertory Grid interviews 
with Principal Inspectors 
 
 
The purpose of this interview is to find out what you consider to be an effective 
investigator.  You are not required to talk about specific individuals but to look at 
generalised behaviours that demonstrate effectiveness.  Personality 
judgements are also not required unless they have a direct impact on the quality 
of the work. 
 
You will be asked to think of three people within the Branch whom you consider 
to be very good at their job and then three people who you consider to be less 
effective. 
 
Thinking about the three effective investigators, can you tell me something that 
makes two of these people more effective than the third in terms of : 
i. how they collect evidence  
ii. how they analyse evidence 
iii. how they liaise with families 
iv. how they write reports 
v. how they make recommendations. 
 
Thinking about the three less effective investigators, can you tell me something 
that makes two of these people less effective than the third in terms of : 
i. how they collect evidence  
ii. how they analyse evidence 
iii. how they liaise with families 
iv. how they write reports 
v. how they make recommendations. 
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APPENDIX C: Phase 3 median data charts 
 
1.(a) Necessary behaviour in new recruits: 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
2 Makes things clear on paper 4.5 4 4 
3 Makes a powerful case for change 3 4 3 
4 Team player 4 5 4 
6 Writes an objective and impartial report 3.5 5 4 
11 Clear communicator at all levels 4 5 4 
16 Manages confrontation successfully 4 5 4 
18 Uses social skills adeptly 4 4 4 
21 Shares information / time / experience 4 4 4 
25 Plays the game with respect to the rules of the organization 4 3 4 
26 Treats people with respect 5 5 5 
36 Demonstrates trust in colleagues 4 4 4 
37 Has good written English 4 5 4 
39 Puts together a readable report 4 5 4 
40 Understands needs of readership 3 4 4 
41 Puts information across succinctly 4 4 4 
42 Broad generalizable safety message apparent in reports 3 3.5 3 
45 Able to put aside personal differences 4 5 4 
46 Succinct and factual with media 3 4 3 
47 Thoughtful and understanding with relatives 4 5 4 
50 Visible and contactable at all times 3 3 3 
52 Takes control of situation 3 4 4 
53 Asks searching questions 3 5 4 
59 Able to delegate tasks effectively 3 3.5 4 
60 Accepts differences and works to strengths 4 3 4 
68 Appears approachable 4 4 4 
69 Listens well 4.5 4 4 
70 Interviewees respond well to their questioning 3 5 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
 
 
 
Work activity management MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
9 Thorough 4 5 5 
12 Plans ahead 4 4 4 
20 Productive in output 4 4 4 
32 Collects pertinent evidence 4 5 4 
38 Not sidetracked by detail 3.5 3 3 
43 Files ordered and structured 3 3 3 
44 Evidence well documented 3 4 3 
48 Researches previous incidents and recommendations thoroughly 3 4 3 
49 Paperwork available and up to date 3 3 3 
51 Willing to deal with DfT admin 3 3 3 
64 Mindful of the cost to the taxpayer 3 3 3 
67 Maintains focus in the office as well as when in field 3.5 4 4 
     
 Competency median 3.25 4 4 
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Personal attributes MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
5 Shows flexibility in approach 4 4 4 
7 Assertive - has needs met 3 4 4 
8 Confident - without arrogance 4 4 4 
13 Attends to detail 4 5 4 
14 Self sufficient 4 5 4 
15 Calm under pressure 4 5 4 
17 Shows humility 4 4 4 
23 Willing to compromise 3 3 3 
24 Prepared to learn 5 5 5 
27 Dependable 4.5 5 5 
28 Uses initiative 4 5 5 
29 Diplomatic 4 4 4 
31 Recognises privileged public servant position 3 3 3 
33 Willing to listen to constructive criticism 4 4 4 
57 Excited about making a difference to the industry 4 4 4 
58 Emotionally mature 4 4 4 
61 Reacts positively to new challenges and ways of working 4 4 4 
62 Internally robust 4 4 4 
65 Cares about the report with their name on 4 4 4 
66 Puts effort into producing almost perfect report 3 4 4 
72 Recognizes impact of own behaviour 4 4 4 
75 Balances technical and social skills 3.5 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
1 Demonstrates an inquisitive nature 5 5 5 
10 Clear thought processes 4 5 4 
22 Makes realistic recommendations 4 5 4 
34 Suggests alternative solutions 3.5 3 4 
35 Balances specifics with bigger picture 4 3 4 
54 Quick thinker 4 4 4 
55 Learns quickly 4 4 4 
63 Sees past standard responses 3.5 4 4 
71 Produces a structured flow of analysis 3.5 4 4 
73 Good at practical problem solving 4 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
Technical abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
19 Understands industry 4 4 4 
30 Technically competent 4.5 5 5 
56 Knowledgeable about standards/regulations 3 3 3 
74 Has detailed technical knowledge 4 3 4 
     
 Competency median 4 3.5 4 
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1.(b) Necessary to screen out behaviour at interview: 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
2 Unable to show continuity of argument in report 4 4 4 
3 Evidence for recommendations lacking 3 4 4 
4 Appears to be an individualist 4 3 3 
6 Report is vehicle for own agenda 4 5 5 
11 Does not modify style of communication depending on audience 3 4 3 
16 Can be belligerent 4 4 4 
18 Gets people's backs up 4 5 5 
21 Withholds assistance as knowledge is power 5 5 5 
25 Think the rules don't apply to them 4 4 4 
26 Contemptuous of others 5 5 5 
36 Does not trust other colleagues 4 4 4 
37 Has poor written English 4 4 4 
39 Produces a report that doesn't flow 3 3 3 
40 Writes for self, not audience 3 4 3 
41 Provides longwinded explanations 3 3 3 
42 Makes recommendations too specific 3 3 3 
45 Aspects of personality get in the way 3 4 3 
46 Statements misinterpreted by media 3 3 3 
47 Insensitive to relatives or friends 4 4 4 
50 Office never knows where they are 3 4 3 
52 Allows others to control situation 3 4 4 
53 Uses superficial questioning 3 4 4 
59 Overly controlling 4 4 4 
60 Dismissive of others' working styles 4 4 4 
68 Standoffish / aloof 3.5 4 4 
69 Hears what they want to hear 4 4 4 
70 Loses cooperation of interviewees 4 5 5 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
 
 
 
Work activity management MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
9 Superficial when investigating 4 5 4 
12 Unstructured - shoots from the hip 4 5 4 
20 Takes too long to produce report 3 3 3 
32 Collects information not evidence 3 4 3 
38 Gets bogged down in the detail 4 3 4 
43 Office / desk is chaotic 2 2 2 
44 Lack of transparency in continuity of evidence 3 3 3 
48 Does not research previous history of accidents 3 3 3 
49 Paperwork never up to date 3 3 3 
51 Feel themselves above DfT admin 3 3 3 
64 Wasteful with money 4 3 3 
67 Loses focus when back in the office 3 3 3 
     
 Competency median 3 3 3 
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Personal attributes MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
5 Is unaccommodating 4 4 4 
7 Does not have needs met 3 3 3 
8 Comes across as arrogant 4 4 4 
13 Careless with detail 4 4 4 
14 Requires constant hand holding 4 5 4 
15 Excitable 3 3 3 
17 Acts like a 'know it all' 4 5 4 
23 Stubborn when challenged 4 4 4 
24 Believes they know everything 4 5 4 
27 Unreliable and full of excuses 5 5 5 
28 Needs to be told what to do 4 4 4 
29 Tactless 4 5 4 
31 Overly status driven 4 4 4 
33 Too precious about the report 3 3 3 
57 Too ready to accept the status quo 3.5 4 4 
58 Has had little life experience 4 3 4 
61 Likes things to remain the same 3.5 4 4 
62 Prone to bouts of doubt 3 2 3 
65 Has no ownership for report 3.5 3 3 
66 Leaves the tidying up of the report to the PI 3 3 3 
72 Oblivious to how they are perceived 3 3 3 
75 Prizes technical knowledge above social skills 3 3 3 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
1 Shows no curiosity 5 5 5 
10 Shows muddled thinking 4 5 4 
22 Makes impractical recommendations 4 4 4 
34 Rigidly fixed on one explanation 4 5 4 
35 Investigation proceeds on too broad a front 2.5 3 3 
54 Needs too much time to deliberate 3 3 3 
55 Slow to grasp new information 4 4 4 
63 Accepts what's said at face value 3.5 4 4 
71 Analysis does not follow in a logical process 3 4 4 
73 Rather too theoretical and academic 3 3 3 
     
 Competency median 3.75 4 4 
Technical abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
19 Has lost touch with real world 5 5 5 
30 Lacks basic technical understanding 4 5 4 
56 Not up to date with regulatory information 3 3 4 
74 Unfamiliar with many aspects of industry 4 3 3 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
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2.(a) Likely that behaviour can be acquired or improved through training: 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
2 Makes things clear on paper 4 4 4 
3 Makes a powerful case for change 4 2 4 
4 Team player 3 3 3 
6 Writes an objective and impartial report 4 5 4 
11 Clear communicator at all levels 4 3 4 
16 Manages confrontation successfully 3 3 3 
18 Uses social skills adeptly 4 2 2 
21 Shares information / time / experience 4 3 3 
25 Plays the game with respect to the rules of the organization 4 3 4 
26 Treats people with respect 2 2 2 
36 Demonstrates trust in colleagues 3 2 2 
37 Has good written English 4 4 4 
39 Puts together a readable report 4 4 4 
40 Understands needs of readership 4 3 4 
41 Puts information across succinctly 4 4 4 
42 Broad generalizable safety message apparent in reports 4 4 4 
45 Able to put aside personal differences 3 3 3 
46 Succinct and factual with media 3 4 3 
47 Thoughtful and understanding with relatives 4 3 4 
50 Visible and contactable at all times 4 3 3 
52 Takes control of situation 4 4 4 
53 Asks searching questions 4 3 4 
59 Able to delegate tasks effectively 4 4 4 
60 Accepts differences and works to strengths 3 3 3 
68 Appears approachable 2 3 3 
69 Listens well 4 3 3 
70 Interviewees respond well to their questioning 3 4 3 
     
 Competency median 4 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Work activity management MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
9 Thorough 3.5 3 3 
12 Plans ahead 4 3 3 
20 Productive in output 3 3 3 
32 Collects pertinent evidence 4 4 4 
38 Not sidetracked by detail 3.5 3 3 
43 Files ordered and structured 4 4 4 
44 Evidence well documented 4 4 4 
48 Researches previous incidents and recommendations thoroughly 4 4 4 
49 Paperwork available and up to date 3.5 3 3 
51 Willing to deal with DfT admin 3 3 3 
64 Mindful of the cost to the taxpayer 3.5 3 3 
67 Maintains focus in the office as well as when in field 3 3 3 
     
 Competency median 3.5 3 3 
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Personal attributes MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
5 Shows flexibility in approach 3 3 3 
7 Assertive - has needs met 3 2 3 
8 Confident - without arrogance 3 3 3 
13 Attends to detail 3 3 3 
14 Self sufficient 3 2 3 
15 Calm under pressure 2.5 2 2 
17 Shows humility 3 2 3 
23 Willing to compromise 2.5 3 3 
24 Prepared to learn 3 2 3 
27 Dependable 2.5 2 2 
28 Uses initiative 3 3 3 
29 Diplomatic 3 3 3 
31 Recognises privileged public servant position 4 3 3 
33 Willing to listen to constructive criticism 3 3 3 
57 Excited about making a difference to the industry 3 3 3 
58 Emotionally mature 2 2 2 
61 Reacts positively to new challenges and ways of working 3 2 3 
62 Internally robust 2.5 2 2 
65 Cares about the report with their name on 3 2 2.5 
66 Puts effort into producing almost perfect report 3.5 3 3 
72 Recognizes impact of own behaviour 3 3 3 
75 Balances technical and social skills 3 3 3 
     
 Competency median 3 3 3 
Cognitive abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
1 Demonstrates an inquisitive nature 2 2 2 
10 Clear thought processes 3.5 2 3 
22 Makes realistic recommendations 4 4 4 
34 Suggests alternative solutions 4 3 3 
35 Balances specifics with bigger picture 3.5 3 3 
54 Quick thinker 2 2 2 
55 Learns quickly 2 2 2 
63 Sees past standard responses 4 3 3 
71 Produces a structured flow of analysis 4 3 4 
73 Good at practical problem solving 3.5 3 3 
     
 Competency median 3.5 3 3 
Technical abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
19 Understands industry 4 4 4 
30 Technically competent 4 4 4 
56 Knowledgeable about standards/regulations 4 4 4 
74 Has detailed technical knowledge 3.5 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
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2.(b) Likelihood of reduction or removal by training: 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
2 Unable to show continuity of argument in report 4 4 4 
3 Evidence for recommendations lacking 4 4 4 
4 Appears to be an individualist 3 2 2 
6 Report is vehicle for own agenda 3 2 3 
11 Does not modify style of communication depending on audience 3.5 3 3 
16 Can be belligerent 2 2 2 
18 Gets people's backs up 2 2 2 
21 Withholds assistance as knowledge is power 2 2 2 
25 Think the rules don't apply to them 2 2 2 
26 Contemptuous of others 2 1 2 
36 Does not trust other colleagues 3 2 3 
37 Has poor written English 3 3 3 
39 Produces a report that doesn't flow 4 3 4 
40 Writes for self, not audience 4 3 3 
41 Provides longwinded explanations 4 3 4 
42 Makes recommendations too specific 4 3 4 
45 Aspects of personality get in the way 2 2 2 
46 Statements misinterpreted by media 4 4 4 
47 Insensitive to relatives or friends 4 2 3 
50 Office never knows where they are 3.5 3 3 
52 Allows others to control situation 4 3 3 
53 Uses superficial questioning 4 3 3 
59 Overly controlling 2.5 2 2 
60 Dismissive of others' working styles 2.5 2 2 
68 Standoffish / aloof 2 2 2 
69 Hears what they want to hear 3 2 2 
70 Loses cooperation of interviewees 3 2 3 
     
 Competency median 3 2 3 
 
 
 
Work activity management MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
9 Superficial when investigating 3.5 2 3 
12 Unstructured - shoots from the hip 4 2 3 
20 Takes too long to produce report 4 4 4 
32 Collects information not evidence 4 3 4 
38 Gets bogged down in the detail 4 3 3 
43 Office / desk is chaotic 3 2 3 
44 Lack of transparency in continuity of evidence 4 3 4 
48 Does not research previous history of accidents 4 3 4 
49 Paperwork never up to date 3 2 3 
51 Feel themselves above DfT admin 3 2 3 
64 Wasteful with money 3 3 3 
67 Loses focus when back in the office 3 2 3 
     
 Competency median 3.75 2.5 3 
190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal attributes MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
5 Is unaccommodating 2 2 2 
7 Does not have needs met 2.5 2 2 
8 Comes across as arrogant 2 2 2 
13 Careless with detail 3.5 2 3 
14 Requires constant hand holding 3 2 3 
15 Excitable 3 2 2 
17 Acts like a 'know it all' 2 2 2 
23 Stubborn when challenged 3 2 3 
24 Believes they know everything 2 2 2 
27 Unreliable and full of excuses 2 1 2 
28 Needs to be told what to do 3 2 3 
29 Tactless 3 2 3 
31 Overly status driven 3 2 2 
33 Too precious about the report 4 3 3 
57 Too ready to accept the status quo 3 3 3 
58 Has had little life experience 2 3 2.5 
61 Likes things to remain the same 2.5 2 2 
62 Prone to bouts of doubt 3 2 3 
65 Has no ownership for report 4 3 3 
66 Leaves the tidying up of the report to the PI 4 3 3 
72 Oblivious to how they are perceived 2 2 2 
75 Prizes technical knowledge above social skills 3 3 3 
     
 Competency median 3 2 2.75 
Cognitive abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
1 Shows no curiosity 2 1 2 
10 Shows muddled thinking 3 2 3 
22 Makes impractical recommendations 4 3 3 
34 Rigidly fixed on one explanation 4 3 3 
35 Investigation proceeds on too broad a front 4 3 4 
54 Needs too much time to deliberate 3 3 3 
55 Slow to grasp new information 3 2 3 
63 Accepts what's said at face value 3 2 3 
71 Analysis does not follow in a logical process 4 3 4 
73 Rather too theoretical and academic 2.5 3 3 
     
 Competency median 3 3 3 
Technical abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
19 Has lost touch with real world 2 2 2 
30 Lacks basic technical understanding 3.5 4 4 
56 Not up to date with regulatory information 4 4 4 
74 Unfamiliar with many aspects of industry 3 4 3 
     
 Competency median 3.25 4 3.5 
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3.(a) Demonstration of behaviour distinguishes a superior investigator 
from an average one: 
 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
2 Makes things clear on paper 4 4 4 
3 Makes a powerful case for change 4 4 4 
4 Team player 4 4 4 
6 Writes an objective and impartial report 4 4 4 
11 Clear communicator at all levels 4 4 4 
16 Manages confrontation successfully 4 4 4 
18 Uses social skills adeptly 3.5 4 4 
21 Shares information / time / experience 4 4 4 
25 Plays the game with respect to the rules of the organization 4 3 4 
26 Treats people with respect 4.5 5 5 
36 Demonstrates trust in colleagues 4 4 4 
37 Has good written English 4 4 4 
39 Puts together a readable report 4.5 4 4 
40 Understands needs of readership 4 4 4 
41 Puts information across succinctly 4 4 4 
42 Broad generalizable safety message apparent in reports 4 4 4 
45 Able to put aside personal differences 4 4 4 
46 Succinct and factual with media 3.5 4 4 
47 Thoughtful and understanding with relatives 4 5 4 
50 Visible and contactable at all times 4 4 4 
52 Takes control of situation 4.5 5 5 
53 Asks searching questions 5 5 5 
59 Able to delegate tasks effectively 3 4 4 
60 Accepts differences and works to strengths 4 4 4 
68 Appears approachable 4 4 4 
69 Listens well 4.5 5 5 
70 Interviewees respond well to their questioning 4 5 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Work activity management MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
9 Thorough 4 4 4 
12 Plans ahead 4 3 4 
20 Productive in output 4 4 4 
32 Collects pertinent evidence 4.5 5 5 
38 Not sidetracked by detail 4 4 4 
43 Files ordered and structured 3 3 3 
44 Evidence well documented 4 4 4 
48 Researches previous incidents and recommendations thoroughly 4 4 4 
49 Paperwork available and up to date 4 3 4 
51 Willing to deal with DfT admin 3 3 3 
64 Mindful of the cost to the taxpayer 3 4 3 
67 Maintains focus in the office as well as when in field 4 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
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Personal attributes MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
5 Shows flexibility in approach 4 4 4 
7 Assertive - has needs met 3 3 3 
8 Confident - without arrogance 4 4 4 
13 Attends to detail 4 5 4 
14 Self sufficient 4 4 4 
15 Calm under pressure 4 4 4 
17 Shows humility 4 4 4 
23 Willing to compromise 3 3 3 
24 Prepared to learn 4 5 4 
27 Dependable 4 5 4 
28 Uses initiative 4 5 4 
29 Diplomatic 4 4 4 
31 Recognises privileged public servant position 4 3 3 
33 Willing to listen to constructive criticism 4 4 4 
57 Excited about making a difference to the industry 4 4 4 
58 Emotionally mature 4 4 4 
61 Reacts positively to new challenges and ways of working 4 3 4 
62 Internally robust 4 4 4 
65 Cares about the report with their name on 4 4 4 
66 Puts effort into producing almost perfect report 4 4 4 
72 Recognizes impact of own behaviour 4 4 4 
75 Balances technical and social skills 4 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
1 Demonstrates an inquisitive nature 4 4 4 
10 Clear thought processes 4 4 4 
22 Makes realistic recommendations 4 4 4 
34 Suggests alternative solutions 4 4 4 
35 Balances specifics with bigger picture 4 4 4 
54 Quick thinker 4 4 4 
55 Learns quickly 4 5 4 
63 Sees past standard responses 4 4 4 
71 Produces a structured flow of analysis 5 5 5 
73 Good at practical problem solving 4 5 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
Technical abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
19 Understands industry 4 4 4 
30 Technically competent 4 5 4 
56 Knowledgeable about standards/regulations 4 4 4 
74 Has detailed technical knowledge 4 5 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4.5 4 
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3.(b) Demonstration of behaviour distinguishes an ineffective investigator 
from an average one: 
 
Interpersonal and communication skills MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
2 Unable to show continuity of argument in report 4 5 4 
3 Evidence for recommendations lacking 4 4 4 
4 Appears to be an individualist 3 3 3 
6 Report is vehicle for own agenda 4 4 4 
11 Does not modify style of communication depending on audience 4 4 4 
16 Can be belligerent 3 4 4 
18 Gets people's backs up 4 4 4 
21 Withholds assistance as knowledge is power 4 4 4 
25 Think the rules don't apply to them 4 4 4 
26 Contemptuous of others 5 4 5 
36 Does not trust other colleagues 4 4 4 
37 Has poor written English 4 4 4 
39 Produces a report that doesn't flow 4 4 4 
40 Writes for self, not audience 4 4 4 
41 Provides longwinded explanations 4 4 4 
42 Makes recommendations too specific 3.5 4 4 
45 Aspects of personality get in the way 3 4 3 
46 Statements misinterpreted by media 3 4 4 
47 Insensitive to relatives or friends 4 5 4 
50 Office never knows where they are 4 4 4 
52 Allows others to control situation 4 4 4 
53 Uses superficial questioning 4 4 4 
59 Overly controlling 3.5 4 4 
60 Dismissive of others' working styles 4 4 4 
68 Standoffish / aloof 3 4 4 
69 Hears what they want to hear 4 4 4 
70 Loses cooperation of interviewees 4 5 5 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
 
 
 
Work activity management MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
9 Superficial when investigating 4 4 4 
12 Unstructured - shoots from the hip 4 4 4 
20 Takes too long to produce report 3 4 3 
32 Collects information not evidence 4 4 4 
38 Gets bogged down in the detail 4 3 4 
43 Office / desk is chaotic 3 3 3 
44 Lack of transparency in continuity of evidence 4 4 4 
48 Does not research previous history of accidents 4 4 4 
49 Paperwork never up to date 3.5 4 4 
51 Feel themselves above DfT admin 3 3 3 
64 Wasteful with money 3 3 3 
67 Loses focus when back in the office 4 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
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Personal attributes MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
5 Is unaccommodating 3.5 4 4 
7 Does not have needs met 3 3 3 
8 Comes across as arrogant 4 4 4 
13 Careless with detail 4 5 4 
14 Requires constant hand holding 4 4 4 
15 Excitable 3 4 3 
17 Acts like a 'know it all' 4 4 4 
23 Stubborn when challenged 4 3 4 
24 Believes they know everything 4 4 4 
27 Unreliable and full of excuses 5 5 5 
28 Needs to be told what to do 4 4 4 
29 Tactless 4 4 4 
31 Overly status driven 3.5 4 4 
33 Too precious about the report 4 3 4 
57 Too ready to accept the status quo 4 4 4 
58 Has had little life experience 4 4 4 
61 Likes things to remain the same 4 4 4 
62 Prone to bouts of doubt 3 3 3 
65 Has no ownership for report 4 4 4 
66 Leaves the tidying up of the report to the PI 4 4 4 
72 Oblivious to how they are perceived 4 3 4 
75 Prizes technical knowledge above social skills 3 3 3 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
Cognitive abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
1 Shows no curiosity 5 5 5 
10 Shows muddled thinking 4.5 4 4 
22 Makes impractical recommendations 4 4 4 
34 Rigidly fixed on one explanation 4 4 4 
35 Investigation proceeds on too broad a front 4 4 4 
54 Needs too much time to deliberate 3.5 3 3 
55 Slow to grasp new information 4 4 4 
63 Accepts what's said at face value 4 4 4 
71 Analysis does not follow in a logical process 4 4 4 
73 Rather too theoretical and academic 3.5 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
Technical abilities MAIB 
Mdn 
AAIB 
Mdn 
All 
Mdn 
19 Has lost touch with real world 4 4 4 
30 Lacks basic technical understanding 4 5 5 
56 Not up to date with regulatory information 4 3 4 
74 Unfamiliar with many aspects of industry 4 4 4 
     
 Competency median 4 4 4 
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APPENDIX D: Phase 3 most admired skills and behaviours 
 
Courteous MAIB 
Knowledgeable MAIB 
Methodical MAIB 
Responsive MAIB 
Literate MAIB 
Industriousness MAIB 
Tenacity MAIB 
Thoroughness MAIB 
Approachable MAIB 
Understanding MAIB 
Technical experience MAIB 
Industry experience MAIB 
Humility  MAIB 
Team player MAIB 
Openness MAIB 
Generous with time and knowledge MAIB 
Non judgemental and cooperative MAIB 
Tenacity in investigation MAIB 
Prompt report writing and ability MAIB 
Accuracy of English in report writing MAIB 
High integrity MAIB 
Tolerant MAIB 
Sensitive to other people‟s feelings MAIB 
Decisive MAIB 
Only speaks when he has something worth saying MAIB 
Strong analytical skills and problem solving MAIB 
Takes control of difficult situations and uses initiative MAIB 
Clear communicator MAIB 
Incisive thinking MAIB 
Investigative enthusiasm and drive MAIB 
Open minded MAIB 
Determined – not put off MAIB 
Inquisitive MAIB 
Skilled report writing MAIB 
Knowledgeable MAIB 
Adapt questions to the witness/ship type MAIB 
Able to remember many facets of a case MAIB 
Writing ability MAIB 
Ability to communicate with others MAIB 
Organisation of services (diving/underwater survey) MAIB 
Knowledgeable MAIB 
Friendly  MAIB 
Humour MAIB 
Good memory MAIB 
Attention to detail MAIB 
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Integrity MAIB 
Honesty MAIB 
Reliability MAIB 
Professional standards MAIB 
Ability to produce a report respected by the industry MAIB 
Team player MAIB 
Leadership MAIB 
Sharing information MAIB 
Open frank discussion MAIB 
Accepting of constructive criticism MAIB 
Ability to work quickly yet thoroughly MAIB 
Good interpersonal skills MAIB 
Good analytical skills MAIB 
Focused on task MAIB 
Respects others MAIB 
Focus MAIB 
Drive MAIB 
General interest MAIB 
Work ethic MAIB 
Reliability MAIB 
Experience - lifeskills/investigation/industry/commercial MAIB 
“Knowing they don‟t know” and seeking knowledge / advice MAIB 
Tolerance/openmindedness of clients and colleagues MAIB 
Willingness to help and pass on knowledge MAIB 
Calmness under pressure and decisiveness MAIB 
Motivates others MAIB 
Leads by example MAIB 
Communicates up and down MAIB 
Listens MAIB 
Firm but fair MAIB 
Pleasant MAIB 
Careful listener MAIB 
Not sarcastic MAIB 
Can understand diversity MAIB 
Good sense of humour MAIB 
Doggedness and persistence AAIB 
Flying ability AAIB 
Well ordered with paperwork/information AAIB 
Not afraid to speak out AAIB 
Good sense of humour AAIB 
Not ambitious for promotion AAIB 
Extremely technically competent AAIB 
Does not keep harping back to some perceived slight 10 years ago AAIB 
Takes the investigation forward at his pace AAIB 
Still finds time to offer constructive advice AAIB 
Very observant AAIB 
Ability to visualise impact sequence and match to impact marks  AAIB 
Very patient AAIB 
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Honest about what they know AAIB 
Team worker AAIB 
Those that share experience and knowledge AAIB 
Approachable and friendly AAIB 
Those that are not afraid to question anything or anyone AAIB 
Respect for everyone regardless of status or experience AAIB 
Technical competence AAIB 
Good interpersonal skills AAIB 
Ability to progress investigation AAIB 
Flexibility AAIB 
Good presenter of information AAIB 
Fast learners AAIB 
Open minded AAIB 
Articulate AAIB 
High attention to detail AAIB 
Approachable AAIB 
Tenacity AAIB 
Courtesy/diplomacy AAIB 
Technical knowledge AAIB 
Relaxed style AAIB 
Unflappable AAIB 
Professional AAIB 
Polite AAIB 
Good written skills AAIB 
Good oral skills AAIB 
Intelligent AAIB 
Inquisitive attitude AAIB 
Objectivity AAIB 
Persistence AAIB 
Thoroughness AAIB 
Logical thought AAIB 
Willingness to try/push new methods AAIB 
Thorough AAIB 
Listening AAIB 
Sharing AAIB 
Confident AAIB 
Prepared to listen AAIB 
Good readable writing style AAIB 
Wide knowledge/skills base (general and aviation) AAIB 
IT skills above the norm (CAD for example) AAIB 
Understand the importance of producing reports/safety 
recommendations in appropriate time scales 
AAIB 
Clear logical thinker AAIB 
Keeps colleagues in picture – good team player AAIB 
Keeps aim in view – doesn‟t get distracted AAIB 
Inquisitive AAIB 
Open to new ideas AAIB 
Integrity AAIB 
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Thoroughness AAIB 
Knowledge AAIB 
Report writing skills AAIB 
Approachability AAIB 
Objective, open minded approach AAIB 
Thorough documentation of evidence AAIB 
Extensive and broad technical knowledge AAIB 
Ability to write reports that flow logically AAIB 
Attention to detail AAIB 
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APPENDIX E: Phase 3 least admired skills and behaviours 
 
Unreliable MAIB 
Plays the system MAIB 
Poor literacy MAIB 
Lack of focus MAIB 
Poor technical knowledge MAIB 
Single mindedness MAIB 
Lack of commitment MAIB 
Inability to prioritise MAIB 
Indecisiveness MAIB 
Laziness MAIB 
No technical experience MAIB 
No industrial experience MAIB 
Lack of humility MAIB 
No respect for all (including those involved in accidents) MAIB 
Lack of compassion MAIB 
Cluttered thought process during investigation MAIB 
Poor interview technique MAIB 
Ineffective report writing MAIB 
Weak presentation skills MAIB 
Poor analysis technique MAIB 
Arrogant MAIB 
Loud MAIB 
Lazy MAIB 
Unhelpful MAIB 
Snobbish MAIB 
Lack of decisiveness and too much time needed to deliberate MAIB 
Arrogance and “know it all” tendency MAIB 
Full of excuses MAIB 
Lack of enthusiasm MAIB 
Unstructured – shoots from the hip MAIB 
Resistance to challenge of theories MAIB 
Dismissive MAIB 
Illogical MAIB 
Ambivalent MAIB 
Bored with subject matter MAIB 
Poor interviewing skills MAIB 
Overkeen to volunteer others MAIB 
Correction of reports MAIB 
Aloof MAIB 
Arrogant MAIB 
Dismissive MAIB 
Sloppy MAIB 
Unwilling to share information MAIB 
Sloppy approach MAIB 
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Lack of commitment MAIB 
Professional knowledge out of date MAIB 
Lack of attention to detail MAIB 
Poor investigator/interviewee interface MAIB 
Arrogant MAIB 
Not accepting of discussion MAIB 
Unprepared to share information – knowledge is power MAIB 
Reactive rather than proactive MAIB 
No leadership/management skills MAIB 
Loud and judgemental MAIB 
Lacks subtlety MAIB 
Insensitive to others in room MAIB 
Inexperienced in modern methods in industry MAIB 
Lack of focus on task in hand MAIB 
Superficial knowledge of the job MAIB 
Careless MAIB 
Arrogant MAIB 
Does not listen to advice MAIB 
Does not recognise own shortfalls MAIB 
Dithering indecisiveness MAIB 
Lack of “presence” – lack of respect from peers MAIB 
Lack of detailed technical knowledge of their specialism MAIB 
“Information is power” – unwillingness to help newbies and others MAIB 
Lack of broad experience – only know one way to do things, so that 
way is the right way 
MAIB 
Autocratic MAIB 
Unreasonable MAIB 
Focus on procedures rather than outcomes MAIB 
Focus on quantity rather than quality MAIB 
Lack of commitment MAIB 
Impatient with people from other backgrounds MAIB 
Overly critical MAIB 
Interrupts conversation MAIB 
Arrogant attitude MAIB 
Deviousness – looking out for themselves MAIB 
Arrogance AAIB 
No „esprit de corps‟ AAIB 
Over ambitious AAIB 
Moodiness AAIB 
Cannot work as part of a team AAIB 
Over ambitious AAIB 
Over critical of other, generally younger, inspectors AAIB 
Lazy AAIB 
Never have the time to help newer colleagues AAIB 
A degree of arrogance AAIB 
Poor team player AAIB 
Poor report writing skills AAIB 
Arrogance AAIB 
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Belief they are above others and do not provide assistance to others AAIB 
Abruptness and lack of respect AAIB 
Expectation that others will do the small stuff eg admin AAIB 
Lack of communication, does things without discussion with the team AAIB 
Not always truthful AAIB 
Poor communication within team AAIB 
Jump to conclusions AAIB 
Put other people‟s backs up AAIB 
Non production of reports AAIB 
Poor communicators AAIB 
Information hoarders AAIB 
Individualist AAIB 
Not willing to canvass opinion AAIB 
Judgemental AAIB 
Micro management AAIB 
Superficiality esp technically AAIB 
Dismissive attitude AAIB 
Inability to see other perspectives AAIB 
Abrupt AAIB 
Indecisive AAIB 
Rude AAIB 
Arrogant AAIB 
Dismissive AAIB 
Lazy AAIB 
Superficial – prepared to jump to conclusions AAIB 
Illogical – lazy and / or don‟t care AAIB 
Arrogant – stuck on transmit AAIB 
Bullying AAIB 
Poor writing skills AAIB 
Presumptuous AAIB 
Too confident too early AAIB 
Inconsiderate AAIB 
Rude AAIB 
Too much time talking over coffee on inconsequential matters AAIB 
No sense of urgency on all investigations AAIB 
The inability to progress multiple investigations (time mgt issues) AAIB 
General timekeeping (long not short term) AAIB 
Not „mixing in‟ with colleagues AAIB 
Self interest AAIB 
Lack of communication AAIB 
Lack of basic management skills AAIB 
Superficial  AAIB 
Lack of consistency AAIB 
Laziness AAIB 
Unwilling to improve performance AAIB 
Dishonesty AAIB 
Lack of appreciation of others‟ time AAIB 
Poorly written reports AAIB 
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Ambiguous, wordy use of written English AAIB 
Poor IT skills AAIB 
Occasionally poor interpersonal skills AAIB 
Proclivity to make longwinded presentations AAIB 
Reluctance of some senior inspectors to pass on technical expertise to 
others 
AAIB 
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APPENDIX F: Phase 3 comments 
 
Skills related comments 
 
A good inspector requires to be: practical; understanding; thorough; 
technically sound; logical and a good communicator, both written and verbally. 
 
Acceptance that accident investigation is an exact science; and poor 
investigation / report is due to inability of inspector to ask correct questions or 
find the evidence. 
 
Consider Ps carry out an accident investigation or at least one PE in the field 
as part of staff development 
 
I am surprised to apparently see no references to 'diversity' or similar - guess 
this area is covered under general openmindedness?  Ability/experience of 
dealing with those from different cultures is a valuable skill from the diverse 
industry of shipping 
 
Experience in an office environment; social conscience; environmental 
awareness. 
 
An inspector needs to be a good communicator at all levels and shouldn't be 
afraid to talk to a high ranking official or to a member of the public and 
shouldn't be afraid of being in the media spotlight.  To obtain you need to 
give, ineffective communication can lead to ineffective results. 
 
Sustained desire to improve flight safety; lateral thinking - prepared to tackle 
status quo and address basic causes: both essential; distinctly lacking in 
some areas of the AIBs that I have come across.   
 
Need to have a sense of humour 
 
Inspectors ideally should possess the widest range of knowledge and 
experiences but not wholly limited to aviation matters.  Question 4.1 is most 
important: "should demonstrate an inquisitive nature"! And be able to write 
logically as well! 
 
How well or poorly someone develops as an accident investigator will be 
influenced by how well they and the organisation are managed. Humour is a 
vital ingredient.  This questionnaire takes a lot longer than 20 minutes. 
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Questionnaire related comments 
 
Please make future questionnaires more user friendly 
 
This questionnaire is too long 
 
This is not 20 mins long, even though I tried to make it so - it took an hour; 
time management? 
 
20 minutes was a very poor estimate for completion of this form! 
 
Too many questions and therefore superficial answers.  To complete properly 
would take approx 2 hours.  Took, me 40 minutes with little thought at end of 
questionnaire. 
 
Section B column C is not 100% clear to me eg "shows no curiosity" is 
marked as a 5 since lacking curiosity will show someone as having the 
qualities of a poor investigator and will therefore distinguish the ineffective 
investigator. 
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APPENDIX G: Phase 3 generic questionnaire 
 
